People v. Mitchell

• Decision Date: 06 April 1976
• Citation: People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 347 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1976)
• Parties: , 347 N.E.2d 607 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James MITCHELL, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 246

383 N.Y.S.2d 246

39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v.James MITCHELL, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 6, 1976.

Certiorari Denied July 21, 1976. See 96 S.Ct. 3178.

Allen S. Stim, Plainview, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Paula Van Meter, Peter L. Zimroth and Robert M. Pitler, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

In the later afternoon of December 30, 1972 the battered and hacked body of Saroj Bardhanabedya was found in appellant's room on the sixth floor of the Warrington Hotel in New York City.The deceased was a chambermaid in the hotel and had disappeared shortly after reporting for work at about 9:00 a.m. on the morning of her brutal demise.At that time she was observed leaving the elevator on the sixth floor of the hotel, where she had been assigned to clean vacated rooms, but was not seen alive thereafter.Mrs. Peck, a resident of the hotel, began looking for the deceased since the latter had failed to deliver some clean linens to her room as promised.She found Saroj's street clothes and partially eaten lunch on the sixth floor.Upon reporting to the desk clerk that she could not locate the maid, several residents began searching for her, shouting her name on each floor of the hotel to no avail.Another resident, one Mr. Morrsion, telephoned the police for assistance in locating the maid.Two patrolmen arrived at the hotel and agreed to assist the management in a search for the maid throughout the hotel.Initially, they checked the vacant rooms and then proceeded to knock on doors and inquire of the hotel residents whether they had seen the maid.Eventually, the two patrolmen and Mr. Morrsion reached the room occupied by the defendant.In response to their questions, he stated that he had not seen the missing maid and permitted the police officers to step into his room.After a cursory glance at the surroundings, the officers departed.

At 1:15 p.m. Detective O'Neill of the homicide squad, responding to a missing persons report, arrived at the hotel to assist in the search for Saroj.A through but futile investigation was conducted of the hotel basement, roof, air ducts, alleyways and an adjoining restaurant.Then, a room-by-room search of the hotel was commenced.The last room to be searched on the sixth floor was that of the defendant.Detective O'Neill entered the room with a passkey provided by the management and, looking more carefully than his fellow officers had previously, noticed reddish brown stains on the bedding, rug and bathroom wall.Finally, a closet door was opened and two human feet were observed protruding from a laundry basket.Removal of blood soaked linens which had been stuffed into the basket revealed a hatchet and the corpse of the unfortunate chambermaid.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized in his hotel room and statements made to the police after his arrest, defendant was convicted of murder and his conviction was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division.On this appeal, he claims that the evidence seized in his room should be suppressed because the entry into his room violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, having been effected without a warrant and without probable cause that he had committed a crime.Additional he argues that the inculpatory statements made to the police should be suppressed, even though voluntarily made after valid preinterrogation admonitions because they were the 'poisoned fruits' of the illegal search of his hotel room (cf.People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662, 376 N.Y.S.2d 469, 339 N.E.2d 162).

The search of defendant's room was not interdicted by the Fourth Amendment because it was triggered in response to an emergency situation and was not motivated by the intent to apprehend and arrest him or to seize evidence.We have recognized the general obligation of police officers to assist persons whom they reasonably believe to be in distress (People v. Gallmon, 19 N.Y.2d 389, 394, 280 N.Y.S.2d 356, 361, 227 N.E.2d 284, 287).Furthermore, State and Federal courts have sanctioned 'the right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest' as 'inherent in the very nature of their duties as peace officers'(United States v. Barone, 2 Cir., 330 F.2d 543, 545, cert. den.377 U.S. 1004, 84 S.Ct. 1940, 12 L.Ed.2d 1053;see, also, Root v. Gauper, 8 Cir., 438 F.2d 361, 364;Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 234, 318 F.2d 205, 211--212, cert. den.375 U.S. 860, 84 S.Ct. 125, 11 L.Ed.2d 86;United States v. Goldenstein, 8 Cir., 456 F.2d 1006, 1010;State v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 518 P.2d 151;Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486(Del.);People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 303 P.2d 721;Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 204 A.2d 76;ALI Model Code of Prearraignment Procedure, 1975 Proposed Official Draft, § 260.5, pp. 164--165).

Appraising a particular situation to determine whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless intrusion into a protected area presents difficult problems of evaluation and judgment.This difficulty is highlighted by the fact that Judges, detached from the tension and drama of the moment, must engage in reflection and hindsight in balancing the exigencies of the situation against the rights of the accused.Thus, we think it necessary to articulate some guidelines for the application of the 'emergency' doctrine.The basic elements of the exception may be summarized in the following manner:

(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.

(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.

(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.^*

The first requisite is that the police have valid reasons for the belief that an emergency exists, a belief which must be grounded in empirical facts rather than subjective feelings (seeRoot v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, Supra;People v. Smith, 7 Cal.3d 282, 287, 101 Cal.Rptr. 893, 496 P.2d 1261).In the instant case, the maid had not been seen for hours and she had not responded when summoned.It was highly probable that she was somewhere in the hotel and obviously all of the circumstances led to the conclusion that some grave misfortune of an indeterminable nature had befallen the maid.

The second requirement is related to the first in that the protection of human life or property in imminent danger must be the motivation for the search rather than the desire to apprehend a suspect or gather evidence for use in a criminal proceeding.Of course, the possibility that criminal agency could account for the danger may be present.Thus, one commentator had stated that the emergency doctrine includes the right to 'promptly launch a criminal investigation involving a substantial threat of imminent danger to either life, health, or property * * * provided * * * they(the police) do not enter with an accompanying intent to either arrest or search'(Mascolo, The Emergency Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BuffaloL.Rev. 419, 426).Detective O'Neill testified at the suppression hearing that he had no reason to believe a crime was being committed in defendan...