People v. Mitchell

Decision Date06 June 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 311360.
Citation301 Mich.App. 282,835 N.W.2d 615
PartiesPEOPLE v. MITCHELL.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, John A. McColgan, Jr., Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Price, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Strauss & Strauss, PLLC (by Gary D. Strauss), for defendant.

Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and TALBOT AND WILDER, JJ.

HOEKSTRA, P.J.

Defendant appeals as of right his convictions following a jury trial of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, MCL 750.226. Defendant was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 30 to 50 years' imprisonment for his second-degree murder conviction and to 3 to 7 1/2 years' imprisonment for his weapon conviction. Because we conclude that the trial court erred by denying defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and because there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's weapon conviction, we reverse defendant'sconvictions and remand for a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder.

Defendant's convictions are the outgrowth of his ongoing argument with the victim regarding five dollars that the victim owed defendant. The victim was defendant's neighbor in an apartment complex. Testimony during trial established that in the days leading up to the victim's death, defendant was harassing the victim by banging on the walls of his apartment and kicking or banging on his doors. Defendant also made threatening statements to the victim. Mark Yelle, a friend of the victim, testified that he spoke with the victim while defendant was harassing him about the money and the victim stated that he planned to “defend himself” if defendant bothered him again and indicated he would “beat” defendant. The victim's ex-wife, April Kolhoff, also testified about defendant's threats regarding the victim's debt and defendant's conduct of yelling and pounding on the doors. Both Yelle and Kolhoff testified that they were with the victim at the victim's apartment on January 14, 2011, but that their attempts to contact the victim on January 15, 2011, were unsuccessful.

On January 16, 2011, the victim's body was found face down on the kitchen floor of his apartment. An autopsy showed that the victim sustained injuries to his head, neck, and back, including a skull fracture and three or four stab wounds on the back of his neck. The medical examiner testified that some of the victim's injuries were consistent with being struck by an object such as a baseball bat. The police interviewed several people who knew the victim, including defendant. Defendant admitted having been involved in a physical altercation with the victim and testimony by the police established that defendant had a swollen hand, a scratch on his face, and his right eye was bruised. However, defendant claimed that he struck the victim only in self-defense after the victim attacked him with a baseball bat.

Defendant was eventually arrested in connection with the victim's death. He was tried before a jury on charges of open murder and carrying a weapon with unlawful intent. The jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of second-degree murder and carrying a weapon with unlawful intent. This appeal ensued.

At trial, defendant maintained that the assault “was in the heat of the moment” and that the victim was the initial aggressor and, therefore, defendant requested a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The trial court denied defendant's request, finding insufficient evidence of adequate provocation to support the instruction. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. 1 We agree.

[2] We review a claim of instructional error involving a question of law de novo, but we review the trial court's determination that a jury instruction applies to the facts of the case for an abuse of discretion.” People v. Dupree, 486 Mich. 693, 702, 788 N.W.2d 399 (2010). However, not all instructional error warrants reversal. Reversal is warranted only if ‘after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear’ that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 495–496, 596 N.W.2d 607 (1999), quoting MCL 769.26. [T]he effect of the error is evaluated by assessing it in the context of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a different outcome would have resulted without the error.” Lukity, 460 Mich. at 495, 596 N.W.2d 607. The verdict is undermined when the evidence clearly supports the requested lesser included instruction that was not given to the jury. People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335, 365, 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002).

When a defendant is charged with murder, the trial court must give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter if the instruction is “supported by a rational view of the evidence.” People v. Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 541, 664 N.W.2d 685 (2003). To prove that a defendant committed voluntary manslaughter, ‘one must show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions.’ People v. Reese, 491 Mich. 127, 143, 815 N.W.2d 85 (2012), quoting Mendoza, 468 Mich. at 535, 664 N.W.2d 685. However, provocation is not an element of voluntary manslaughter; rather, it is a circumstance that negates the presence of malice. Mendoza, 468 Mich. at 536, 664 N.W.2d 685. In People v. Tierney, 266 Mich.App. 687, 703 N.W.2d 204 (2005), this Court held that [t]he degree of provocation required to mitigate a killing from murder to manslaughter ‘is that which causes the defendant to act out of passion rather than reason.’ Id. at 714–715, 703 N.W.2d 204, quoting People v. Sullivan, 231 Mich.App. 510, 518, 586 N.W.2d 578 (1998). Further, [i]n order for the provocation to be adequate it must be that which would cause a reasonable person to lose control.” Tierney, 266 Mich.App. at 715, 703 N.W.2d 204 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Whether the provocation was reasonable is a question of fact; but if “no reasonable jury could find that the provocation was adequate, the court may exclude evidence of the provocation.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

We find the following facts in this case relevant to whether the trial court erred by concluding that a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not supported by the evidence. First, the testimony demonstrated that the victim owed defendant a small sum of money and that, before this incident, defendant had been threatening and harassing the victim by banging or kicking on the walls and doors of his apartment in an effort to collect the money from the victim. Further, Yelle testified that before his death, the victim indicated that he was going to “beat [defendant's] ass” if defendant continued to bother him about the money. Although defendant did not testify at trial, the jury heard evidence that defendant maintained that the victim was the initial aggressor through his interview with the police, the recording of which was played for the jury, and his signed statement. During the interview and in the signed written statement, defendant stated that he went to the victim's apartment and the victim opened the door. The victim started using profanity and then swung a baseball bat and struck defendant. Defendant maintained that he was able to take the baseball bat from the victim, but claimed that the victim still hit him in the right eye three or four times. Defendant claimed that he used the baseball bat that he took from the victim to hit the victim on the head and shoulders and that the victim fell to the floor moaning and moving around. Defendant claimed that he left the apartment at that time.

Defendant's version of the altercation was corroborated in part by the testimony of the police that when they took defendant's statement on the same day that the victim's body was found, defendant had a swollen hand, a scratch on his face, and a bruise on his right eye. Moreover, a baseball bat, which the prosecution maintained was the murder weapon and which tested positive for the presence of the victim's blood, was discovered in the victim's apartment. Further, Yelle testified that the victim kept a baseball bat in his apartment, which supports defendant's claims that the baseball bat belonged to the victim and was at the victim's apartment before the altercation and that defendant did not bring the murder weapon with him to the scene.

We conclude that these proofs constitute sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because, if believed, the evidence would support a finding of provocation.2 Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction.

We next consider whether the trial court's failure to give the requested instruction was error requiring reversal. Error that requires reversal occurs when the error is outcome determinative, meaning the error undermined the reliability of the jury verdict. Cornell, 466 Mich. at 365, 646 N.W.2d 127.

In this case, we need look no further than the question posed to the trial court during jury deliberations. The note sent by the jury stated: “Do we only have three options available for the murder charge: (1) Guilty first-degree; (2) Guilty second-degree; (3) Not guilty?” The trial court responded in the affirmative. The jury's inquiry strongly suggests that it wanted to consider, and likely would have convicted defendant of, a lesser charge than first- or second-degree murder if given the opportunity. In light of the jury's inquiry and the fact that the evidence supported the instruction, we conclude that defendant has shown...

To continue reading

Request your trial
24 cases
  • People v. Ackah-Essien, Docket No. 317411.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • June 4, 2015
    ...necessary to sustain a conviction of carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent under MCL 750.226. People v. Mitchell, 301 Mich.App. 282, 292–293, 835 N.W.2d 615 (2013) (holding that although the word "carrying" is used in the catch line of the statute, it is not an element of the off......
  • People v. Boshell
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 29, 2022
    ...21 People v Miller, 326 Mich.App. 719; 929 N.W.2d 821 (2019) ....................................... 28 People v Mitchell, 301 Mich.App. 282; 835 N.W.2d 615 (2013) ..................................... 7 People v Schaw, 288 Mich.App. 231; 791 N.W.2d 743 (2010) ....................................
  • People v. Simmons
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • April 29, 2021
    ...error and issues of law arising from jury instructions are reviewed de novo as a question of law. People v. Mitchell , 301 Mich. App. 282, 285-286, 835 N.W.2d 615 (2013)."The United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for a single offense." Peopl......
  • Doe v. Dep't of Corr., Docket Nos. 321013
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • August 25, 2015
    ...should not be used to construe the section more broadly or narrowly than the text of the section would indicate." People v. Mitchell, 301 Mich.App. 282, 292, 835 N.W.2d 615 (2013). MCL 8.4b provides:The catch line heading of any section of the statutes that follows the act section number sh......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT