People v. Mojica

• Decision Date: 24 February 2009
• Docket Number: 2007-04084.
• Citation: People v. Mojica, 62 A.D.3d 100, 874 N.Y.S.2d 195, 2009 NY Slip Op 1507 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. MIGUEL MOJICA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

62 A.D.3d 100

874 N.Y.S.2d 195

2009 NY Slip Op 01507

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. MIGUEL MOJICA, Appellant.

2007-04084.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department.

Decided February 24, 2009.

Bruce A. Petito, Poughkeepsie, for appellant.

William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie (Kirsten A. Rappleyea of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

McCARTHY, J.

Penal Law § 120.03 (1) provides that a person is guilty of vehicular assault in the second degree when he or she causes serious physical injury to another person, inter alia, while operating a motor vehicle while impaired or intoxicated and causes that serious physical injury as a result of such intoxication. The statute also provides that proof of such operation and the causation of such serious physical injury raises a rebuttable presumption that the serious injury is the result of such intoxication. This appeal presents us with the principal questions of whether the rebuttable presumption violates the defendant's right to due process or whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague for failing to provide fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence of the conduct it forbids and failing to provide clear law enforcement standards. We find that the statute does not violate due process and is not void for vagueness.

I. Pretrial Dunaway/Huntley Hearing

The defendant Miguel A. Mojica was indicted for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (two counts), in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2) and (3), and vehicular assault in the second degree (two counts), in violation of Penal Law § 120.03 (1). In his pretrial omnibus motion, the defendant moved, inter alia, to suppress the results of a blood alcohol test, which the trial court granted to the extent of conducting a joint Dunaway/Huntley hearing (see Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]; People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]). At that hearing, the People adduced the following evidence. On July 28, 2006, at approximately 4:00 A.M., in the City of Poughkeepsie, the defendant drove a pickup truck through a red traffic light and struck a marked patrol car driven by a city police officer, Richard Poluzzi. Officer Poluzzi, who was removed from the scene by ambulance and transported to St. Francis Hospital, suffered head injuries and spent one month in an in-patient rehabilitation facility before returning to work six months after the accident, in January 2007. Immediately after the accident, Patrol Officer Edward Fenichel observed the defendant, who was still seated in the driver seat of his pickup truck, detected alcohol on his breath, and saw that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. The defendant told Officer Fenichel that he had consumed one half of a beer and was on his way to a bar when the accident occurred. Because the defendant complained of possible head injuries, no field sobriety test was conducted. Officer Fenichel could not determine at that time whether the defendant was intoxicated. When the ambulance arrived, the defendant exited the truck without assistance and was transported by ambulance to Vassar Brothers Hospital (hereinafter the hospital).

At approximately 4:45 A.M., Dutchess County Deputy Sheriff Tyler Wyman arrived at the hospital, where Officer Fenichel briefed him on the circumstances of the accident, his observations of the defendant at the scene, and the defendant's statement to him at the scene that he had consumed one half of a beer earlier that night. Approximately 20 minutes later, at 5:04 A.M., Deputy Sheriff Wyman administered a prescreening test called an Alco-Sensor, which indicated the presence of alcohol in the defendant's system. Based upon his observations, training, and experience, Deputy Sheriff Wyman was by then of the opinion that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. At approximately 6:01 A.M., Deputy Sheriff Wyman placed the defendant under arrest and read him his driving while intoxicated (hereinafter DWI) warnings (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 [2] [b]), which the defendant indicated he understood.

The defendant immediately indicated he would consent to a chemical test, which requires a blood draw, and signed a consent form at 6:04 A.M. At that point, which was approximately two hours after the accident and within minutes of his arrest, the defendant's blood was drawn by a hospital nurse and his blood alcohol content (hereinafter BAC) was later determined to be .18%, which is more than twice the legal limit (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [2]).

More than one hour later, at 7:19 A.M., Deputy Sheriff Wyman advised the defendant of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), and the defendant, both in writing and orally, indicated he understood those rights and agreed to speak with Deputy Sheriff Wyman. In response to Deputy Sheriff Wyman's inquiry, the defendant stated that he had consumed a mixed alcoholic drink known as a Long Island iced tea approximately four hours before the accident, and was on his way to a bar when the accident occurred.

The defendant was the sole witness for the defense at the hearing. In his testimony, the defendant stated that he was not advised of his Miranda rights or DWI warnings until a judge, accompanied by police officers and state troopers, arraigned him in his hospital room between 8:00 A.M. and 9:00 A.M. The defendant asserted that it was only at that time that he realized he was under arrest. The defendant further testified that, at the time he signed the consent form for his blood to be drawn, he believed his blood needed to be drawn as part of his medical care, not as part of the criminal investigation.

In rebuttal, the People called as a witness Deputy Jeffrey Wilkinson, who had been present at the defendant's arraignment in the hospital. Deputy Wilkinson testified that, during the arraignment, the judge did not advise the defendant of his Miranda rights.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the results of the blood alcohol content (hereinafter BAC) test, finding that Deputy Sheriff Wyman had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving while intoxicated based on information Officer Fenichel relayed to him, his own observations, and the results of the Alco-Sensor test he had administered to the defendant.

II. The Trial

At trial, the People presented the following pertinent evidence:¹

Eyewitness Kimberly Friedman² testified that, just prior to the accident, she was driving her car along North Bridge Street and, as she approached its intersection with Mill Street, the green light was in her favor. Just before she turned her vehicle right onto Mill Street, she observed a pickup truck on Mill Street, with its headlights on, approaching the intersection from her left. Without slowing down, the truck went through the intersection and hit a police vehicle that was traveling along North Bridge Street through the intersection from the side of Mill Street opposite to her vehicle. Friedman's passenger called 911, while Friedman approached the police vehicle, and found Officer Poluzzi with his head against the passenger side window, apparently unconscious. The police arrived within minutes.

City Police Officer William Badner, a certified accident reconstructionist and crime scene technician with the City Traffic Division, visited the scene at approximately 4:30 A.M. on the morning of the accident, or about 30 minutes after the accident. Among other things, Officer Badner checked the street and traffic lights at the intersection of Mill and North Bridge Streets and found everything fully operational. In addition, Steven Scano, an electrician responsible for maintaining street and traffic lighting in the city, testified that two years before the accident, the traffic light at the subject intersection had been upgraded by computerizing the traffic cycles and replacing the single light bulbs in each traffic signal with hundreds of light-emitting diode lamps. Further, Scano explained that because of a blind corner on Mill Street, he had programmed the signals with a two-second safety delay on the red lights, so that the traffic lights facing both streets would all be red for two seconds before one traffic signal turned green. Approximately 4½ hours after the accident, Scano checked the computer that governs the traffic lights at the intersection and found no recorded failure alarms, which are automatically generated if, for example, two green lights or two yellow lights simultaneously appeared on both Mill and North Bridge Streets, or if there had been a power dip. Scano also personally observed five or six traffic light cycles and found everything functioning properly.

New York State Police Sergeant Frank B. Lynch, a collision reconstructionist, testified on the basis of his observations of the accident location, which were made approximately 3½ hours after the accident, as well as his examination of the two vehicles. According to Sergeant Lynch, marks on the roadway and the damage to the vehicles indicated that the 4,400-pound police vehicle had been traveling north at a speed of approximately 29 miles per hour, when it was struck on its right side by the westbound truck, which weighed 4,900 pounds and was traveling at a speed of approximately 37 miles per hour. The posted speed limit for both Mill and North Bridge Streets is 30 miles per hour. The front end of the police vehicle was damaged postimpact, when it collided with a fire hydrant, sign, garbage pails, and a porch railing. Sergeant Lynch found no evidence of a steering wheel or brake malfunction on either vehicle.

Sergeant Lynch's testimony that his examination of the police vehicle's seat belt indicated that Officer Poluzzi had not been wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident prompted a lengthy sidebar. The defense argued that...