People v. Monasterski

• Decision Date: 22 April 1981
• Docket Number: 50034,Docket Nos. 49728
• Citation: People v. Monasterski, 105 Mich.App. 645, 307 N.W.2d 394 (Mich. App. 1981)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond MONASTERSKI, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John MUNDE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

Page 394

307 N.W.2d 394

105 Mich.App. 645

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Raymond MONASTERSKI, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.John MUNDE, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 49728, 50034.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

April 22, 1981.

Released for Publication July 13, 1981.

Steven F. Fishman, Detroit, for defendant-appellant in No. 49728.

Mark E. Weiss, Detroit, for defendant-appellant in No. 50034.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol.Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros.Atty., E. Reilly Wilson, III, Chief Appellate Asst. Atty. Gen., Timothy A. Baughman, Asst. Pros.Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RILEY, P. J., and HOLBROOK and BREIGHNER, ^* JJ.

RILEY, Presiding Judge.

Defendants, Raymond Monasterski, and John Munde, were each charged with the crimes of felony murder, M.C.L. § 750.316;M.S.A. § 28.548, and armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.529;M.S.A. § 28.797, and were tried jointly before a jury.On May 9, 1979, a Detroit Recorder's Court jury found Monasterski guilty as charged but found Munde guilty of armed robbery and guilty of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter, M.C.L. § 750.321;M.S.A. § 28.553.On May 16, 1979, Monasterski was sentenced to the mandatory life sentence in solitary confinement at hard labor on the felony-murder conviction and life in prison on the armed-robbery conviction, the sentences to run concurrently.Munde was sentenced to serve from 10 to 20 years in prison for armed robbery and from 10 to 15 years for manslaughter.Both defendants perfected timely appeals, raising numerous issues, several of which merit discussion here.Since many of the legal issues raised for our consideration are common to both defendants, their appeals have been consolidated.

On March 24, 1977, at approximately 11 p. m., three men, two of whom are alleged to have been the defendants, broke into a two-family flat in Detroit.One or more of the three men severely beat the owner, Mr. Thomas, who lived in the lower flat.Mr. Thomas did not survive the attack.

The upper flat was occupied by two tenants.They heard crashing and moaning noises downstairs, apparently in connection with the breaking and entering the assault on Mr. Thomas.Shortly after hearing the strange sounds emanating from the floor below, two masked men burst into their flat and robbed both of them.Neither tenant was able to positively identify their assailants.

Due to a general lack of evidence linking anyone to the crime, this homicide remained an "open file" for more than six months.Nearly eight months elapsed before charges were brought against defendants.

In November, 1977, a Detroit Police homicide sergeant traveled to Indiana and discussed the Thomas homicide with Umberto Iafrate, who had been arrested along with defendants Monasterski and Munde, after allegedly committing a burglary there.Iafrate was offered immunity in exchange for his testimony against Monasterski, Munde, and John Brown, the other codefendant allegedly involved in the Thomas homicide.¹Agreeing to cooperate, Iafrate was not charged with any crime arising out of the activities on March 24, 1977.

On November 16, 1977, Detroit authorities obtained murder warrants against Munde and Monasterski.A detainer was filed with Indiana authorities on the same date.Following their convictions and sentencings in Indiana, defendants were returned to Michigan and were arraigned on the warrant in the instant case on December 12, 1978.Trial was ultimately set for April 30, 1979.

Defendants brought motions to dismiss, based in part upon alleged noncompliance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act(hereinafter, IAD), M.C.L. § 780.601 et seq.;M.S.A. § 4.147(1) et seq., which were denied.Defendants brought several other pretrial motions as well, including a motion to preclude the introduction of evidence of alleged prior similar acts.Following the denial of the latter motion, which was challenged by way of interlocutory appeal, this Court reversed the trial judge and issued an order disallowing any testimony concerning alleged similar acts, irrespective of whether such testimony would come from the informant, police officers, or by alleged prior victims.

The testimony of informant Iafrate was the heart of the prosecution's case against the defendants.Although his testimony was subject to the order issued by this Court that he was not to testify concerning alleged prior similar acts by the defendants, during trial Iafrate in fact gave such testimony in response to the defendants' cross-examinations.A joint motion for mistrial was subsequently made and denied.

The first four issues that merit discussion are common to both Monasterski and Munde and will, therefore, be discussed first.The last two issues are pertinent only to defendant Munde and will be considered separately at the end of our opinion.

The first question on appeal is whether the IAD is applicable to the facts of this case and, if it is, whether Article IV(c) was violated because defendants were not tried within 120 days of their transfer to Michigan.

Article IV(c) of the IAD provides as follows:

"(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this Article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance."

Article V(c) of the IAD provides the statutory remedy in the event that Article IV(c) is violated:

"(I)n the event that an action on the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice * * *."

The threshold issue which we must decide is whether, under the facts of this case, the IAD should even apply.The people claim that it should not, contending that defendants were extradited under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, M.C.L. § 780.1 et seq.;M.S.A. § 28.1285(1) et seq.

As the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1838, 56 L.Ed.2d 329(1978), "the provisions of the Agreement are triggered only when a 'detainer' is filed with the custodial (sending) State by another State (receiving) having untried charges pending against the prisoner * * *."Although the IAD does not define "detainer", legislative history reveals that it is simply " 'a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction'."Id., 359, 98 S.Ct. 1846.SeeS.Rep. No. 91-1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in (1970)U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 4864, 4865 (1970).

In the instant case, on November 16, 1977, the same date that the local police authorities obtained an arrest warrant against defendants, a certified copy of the warrant was sent to the sheriff in Elkhart County, Indiana, along with the following letter:

"Dear Sir: Enclosed are certified copies of our warrant, No. 77-08731, charging Raymond Monasterski and John Munde * * * with the crimes of Murder First Degree and Robbery Armed.The above subjects are presently in your custody and it is requested our warrants be allowed as detainers.Very truly yours, Kesse Koehler, Commander"(Emphasis added.)

This letter is sufficient to constitute a detainer.In People v. Beamon, 83 Mich.App. 121, 132, 268 N.W.2d 310(1978), another panel of this Court held that a letter from the Recorder's Court clerk to officials at Terre Haute, Indiana, which advised of charges pending against defendant who was incarcerated in Terre Haute, was a detainer.This ruling is in accord with the definition of detainer that appears in the legislative history of the Federal enactment of the IAD as previously quoted.

Although the filing of a detainer with the sending state is a necessary condition for the triggering of the IAD, it is not, in itself, sufficient.The purpose of the IAD is to require states to dispose of detainers in an expeditious manner in order to prevent interference with a prisoner's participation in programs of treatment and rehabilitation.Consistent with this purpose, and in light of Article IV of the IAD, which references the lodging of a detainer only to prisoners who are "serving a term of imprisonment in any party state * * *", many courts have taken the position that the IAD does not apply unless the prisoner is actually serving a term of imprisonment in the sending state.See Anno.: Validity, construction, and application of interstate agreement on detainer, 98 A.L.R.3d 160, 185.

Several panels of this Court have reached the same conclusion.In People v. McLemore, 95 Mich.App. 536, 547, 291 N.W.2d 109(1980), for example, the Court held that "a prisoner who is in custody solely pending prosecution on criminal charges does not yet have a program of rehabilitation to be disrupted.* * * (T)he Agreement does not apply unless the prisoner is actually serving a term of imprisonment."See alsoPeople v. Butcher, 46 Mich.App. 40, 207 N.W.2d 430(1973).

The IAD does not apply in the instant case because defendants had not embarked upon a program of rehabilitation in Indiana.Both were being held in a county jail in Indiana pending "extradition".The detainers were filed before defendants were tried in Indiana, and there is nothing in the record that would indicate that any rehabilitation program had begun.While it is true that the defendants were sentenced prior to being sent to Michigan, we do not consider that fact particularly important since the detainer was lodged prior to their...