People v. Moody, 1–13–0071
| Decision Date | 29 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–13–0715.,No. 1–13–0071 ,1–13–0071 |
| Citation | 403 Ill.Dec. 523,54 N.E.3d 183 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Danyale MOODY, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
54 N.E.3d 183
403 Ill.Dec. 523
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
Danyale MOODY, Defendant–Appellant.
No. 1–13–0071
No. 1–13–0715.
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.
Opinion filed Oct. 29, 2015.
Modified on Rehearing May 5, 2016.
Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Sarah Curry, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
OPINION
Justice COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant Danyale Moody was convicted of first degree murder pursuant to section 9–1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1) (West 2008)) and aggravated kidnapping pursuant to section 10–2(a)(3) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/10–2(a)(3) (West 2008)), and sentenced to consecutive terms of 60 years
and 25 years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his pretrial motion to dismiss the first degree murder charges; (3) the State failed to prove that Illinois had jurisdiction over the murder charges beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) he was denied his right to due process where the jury was not instructed that jurisdiction was an essential element of the offense of first degree murder that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) the trial court erred in issuing a jury instruction on causation in homicide cases, where it was not an issue at trial; (6) the State committed misconduct in closing argument when it erroneously tried to define the reasonable doubt standard for the jury, misstated the law regarding the presumption of innocence, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to defendant, and misstated the facts regarding defendant's identification; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request separate verdict forms supporting the three different forms of first degree murder; and (8) the fines, fees, and costs should be reduced. For the reasons that follow, we reverse defendant's first degree murder conviction and modify the mittimus to reflect a $660 assessment balance.1
¶ 2 In December 2007, defendant and codefendant, Anthony McGee2 were formally charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery, aggravated unlawful restraint, and attempted murder of Frentsi Bridges. Defendant asserted his rights under the Speedy Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103–5 (West 2008) ), demanding trial on December 15, 2007. On August 7, 2009, the State brought a new indictment against defendant and codefendant, charging the men with all three forms of first degree murder (felony, intentional, and strong probability) and aggravated kidnapping of Bridges. The State nol-prossed the original indictment and proceeded to trial on the new indictment. Defendant and codefendant were separately represented, but tried jointly before the same jury.
¶ 3 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the counts of first degree murder on speedy trial grounds. In his motion, defendant detailed that he had spent nearly 18 months in custody preparing for trial on the original charges before the State decided to charge him with first degree murder. Defendant argued that because the State was aware of all the relevant facts alleged in the subsequent indictment at the time of the original indictment, and because all of the offenses were within the jurisdiction of the criminal court of Cook County, the State was required to join the offenses in a single prosecution pursuant to section 3–3 of the Code. 720 ILCS 5/3–3 (West 2008). Defendant further argued that because the State was required to join the charges, but did not, the time within which the trial was to begin on the murder charges was subject to the same statutory speedy trial period as applied to the original charges. As none of the continuances obtained in connection to the original charges could be attributed to defendant with respect to the subsequent murder charges, because they were not before the court when the continuances were obtained, the State violated his right to a speedy trial with respect to
the murder charges. The State responded that it was not required to join the murder charges in the original indictment because the jurisdiction over the murder of Bridges lay within the jurisdiction of more than one court. The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. The following facts were adduced at trial.
¶ 4 Mark Cohill, fire investigator for the Indiana fire department, testified that on May 14, 2007, around 12:37 p.m., Bridges' body was discovered in an abandoned garage at 2274 Adams Street in Gary, Indiana after fire fighters extinguished a fire that had been set to the garage. He examined the exterior of the abandoned brick garage. Cohill noted that fire could not have been started by electricity or gas because there were no utilities hooked up to the building. He examined the interior of the structure and observed a body under a chair. Cohill did not know how long the body had been in the structure prior to the fire. The concrete floor under the body had spalling which was caused by extreme heat and acceleration from an accelerant such as an ignitable liquid like gasoline. Cohill also observed heavy charring on the ceiling and noted that the flames near the area of the chair and body had been very hot. The water used to extinguish the fire was discolored with a rainbow pattern which demonstrated that an ignitable liquid was used. Cohill concluded that the fire was set intentionally.
¶ 5 Dr. Young Kim, an Indiana medical examiner and expert in the field of forensic pathology, performed an autopsy on Bridges in May 2007. An external examination revealed five lacerations on the right side of the back of the head, one laceration on the left side of the back of the head, and a depressed fracture at the back of the skull. Dr. Kim retracted Bridges' scalp and observed a subdural hemorrhage, a subarachnoid hemorrhage, and a subgaleal hemorrhage. He also observed hemorrhaging in the jaw area and the right chest, a laceration of the lip, and three broken teeth. He opined that based on the extensive burns to the face and body, Bridges' was face down and not moving when the fire began. Upon internal examination, Dr. Kim found soot in Bridges' mouth and scant soot in his distal bronchi. He opined that when the body was dropped face down in the garage in Indiana, the pressure from falling could have caused the soot to be deposited in the mouth and the lungs. His coroner's verdict report indicated that the cause of death was “extensive craniocerebral injuries associated with facial and thoracic injuries related to blunt force trauma” and “extensive burns and charred body.”
¶ 6 At trial, Dr. Kim testified on direct examination that he could not be certain whether Bridges was dead or alive when the fire started. He noted that the absence of carbon monoxide in Bridges' body indicated that he was not alive when the fire started; however, he also noted that Bridges' lungs contained fluid which could have been caused by smoke inhalation, indicating that he was alive when the fire started. However, he stated that the cause of death was “extensive head injuries, also facial and chest injuries due to blunt forced [sic ] trauma.” On cross-examination, defendant's attorney asked Dr. Kim if he recalled having a conversation with her and a colleague in August or September of 2009, where he opined that defendant was already deceased at the time of the fire. Dr. Kim responded that he recalled the conversation, but stated that his final opinion regarding the cause of death never changed from his initial autopsy report and indicated that the cause of death was “blunt force trauma and extensive burn, together.” He also indicated that Bridges' wounds were fresh, occurring within two to three hours of his
death and were likely caused by being hit with a blunt object such as a board.
¶ 7 Mariah Price testified that in May 2007 she was dating Bridges. One week before Bridges was kidnapped, she was with him and a man named George. Price, Bridges, and George went to a house and Bridges told Price and George to wait on the corner. Bridges walked through a side gate and down the gangway to the side of the house.3 Later, Price noticed that Bridges had marijuana that she had not seen him with prior to entering the house. She spent the night of May 13, 2007, with Bridges at the home of a woman named Seka. Bridges introduced Seka as his sister. The next morning, around 10 a.m., Price and Bridges were picked up in a Grand Prix by two men that Bridges knew, but she did not know. They drove to the dollar store at 111th Street and Michigan Avenue. Price remained in the car while the front seat...
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Misconduct
...arising from a prosecutor’s closing argument that argues inferences or facts not based on the evidence in the record. People v. Moody , 54 N.E.3d 183, 200-01 (2015). During closing argument, it is improper for a prosecutor to argue inferences or facts not based upon the evidence in the reco......