People v. Moore

• Decision Date: 26 May 1988
• Citation: 525 N.E.2d 740,530 N.Y.S.2d 94,71 N.Y.2d 1002
• Parties: , 525 N.E.2d 740 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gerald MOORE, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Eddie HALL, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Pierre DAVIS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 94

530 N.Y.S.2d 94

71 N.Y.2d 1002, 525 N.E.2d 740

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gerald MOORE, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Eddie HALL, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Pierre DAVIS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 26, 1988.

Jennifer S. Brand and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant in the first above-entitled action.

John Gemmill and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Marsha Taubenhaus and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant in the third above-entitled action.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Catherine M. Cook and Amyjane Rettew, New York City, of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty. (Ivan Vogel, New Gardens, of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Ann M. Donnelly and Amyjane Rettew, New York City, of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled action.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division in each case should be affirmed.

The defendants in these three cases challenge the use of prior convictions, obtained on guilty pleas, as the basis for sentencing them as predicate felons. Each defendant argues that the facts adduced at the plea allocutions were insufficient to establish the elements of the crime.

Initially, we note that defendants may challenge predicate convictions in this context only on constitutional grounds (CPL 400.21). A guilty plea may be involuntary, and therefore unconstitutionally obtained, either because the defendant did not voluntarily and intelligently waive the protections afforded by the Constitution or because the defendant did not know the nature of the charges against him ( Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257, n. 13, 49 L.Ed.2d 108). However, merely showing that the defendant did not expressly admit a particular element of the crime in the factual allocution is not sufficient, by itself, to raise a constitutional claim; all of the circumstances surrounding the plea must be considered to determine whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him ( People v. Nixon, 21 N.Y.2d 338, 287 N.Y.S.2d 659, 234 N.E.2d 687, cert. denied sub nom. Robinson v. New York, 393 U.S. 1067, 89 S.Ct. 721, 21 L.Ed.2d 709).

In People v. Moore, 130 A.D.2d 375, 515 N.Y.S.2d 242, defendant contends that his 1983 plea to criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree was insufficient because he never admitted that he knew the property was stolen. However, the record indicates that defendant agreed to plead to this charge on advice of counsel after his suppression motion was denied, that he was aware of the charge, and that he admitted possessing credit cards which did not belong to him. Since it can be inferred from defendant's admission that he knew the credit cards were stolen ( cf., People v. McGowen, 42 N.Y.2d 905, 906, 397 N.Y.S.2d 993, 366 N.E.2d 1347), he understood the nature of the charge, and the elements of the crime to which he pleaded were established. Therefore, the 1983...