People v. Moore, 74.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 74.,74. |
| Citation | 10 N.W.2d 296,306 Mich. 29 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. MOORE. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Cameron Moore was convicted of first degree murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Genesee County; Philip Elliott, judge.
Before the Entire Bench.
Gilbert Y. Rubenstein, of Flint, for appellant.
John L. Roach and Sherman M. Bean, both of Flint, special prosecutors.
Defendant Cameron Moore was tried by jury, convicted of murder of the first degree, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Act No. 328, § 316, Pub.Acts 1931 (Comp.Laws Supp.1940, § 17115-316 [Stat.Ann. § 28.548]). Having obtained leave, he appeals.
About 7 o'clock in the evening of November 28, 1932, two armed men entered a store in the city of Flint, held up the two employees, Frost and McLaughlin, and took the money from the cash register. As they were leaving the store, McLaughlin grappled with one of them. They fired several shots, fatally wounding McLaughlin, who died without regaining consciousness. Employee Frost held one of them, Stephen Schmeidl, until police arrived and arrested him, the other escaping in an automobile driven by an accomplice. Schmeidl pleaded guilty to murder of the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
In 1939 defendant Cameron Moore and his brother, John Douglas Moore (referred to in the record as Douglas Moore), were located in an Illinois prison, were returned to Michigan, and charged with the murder of McLaughlin. They were tried by jury, and both were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant Cameron Moore's motion for a new trial was denied, and he appeals. His brother, co-defendant Douglas Moore, has not appealed.
Defendant contends that the evidence presented does not support the jury's verdict. The testimony of the Moore brothers indicates that they were both professional criminals, had been arrested many times, and had served several prison sentences. Employee Frost identified defendant's brother, Douglas Moore, as one of the men who entered the store and shot McLaughlin. There was no testimony directly identifying defendant Cameron Moore as the driver of the car in which the two men escaped from the scene of the crime. However, following his arrest, Schmeidl made a statement to the police that he and the Moore brothers came to Flint for the purpose of robbery; that in committing the crime in question the three of them, armed with revolvers, drove to the store; and that he and Douglas Moore entered the store while defendant Cameron Moore remained in the car and afterward drove his brother Douglas from the scene. In his statement Schmeidl described in detail the facts and circumstances regarding the robbery and murder and the Moore brothers' participation. During the trial Schmeidl denied making such statement to the police and, while admitting his part in the commission of the robbery and murder, denied that the Moore brothers participated with him. He refused to name or to identify the two men who were with him.
There was positive testimony by two or more witnesses that in the afternoon of the day the crime was committed, defendant Cameron Moore, his brother Douglas, and Schmeidl were together in an apartment of questionable repute in Flint; that the three of them left the apartment together about 6:30 o'clock; and that the Moore brothers returned without Schmeidl at 8:30 and remained in the apartment until about midnight. A woman and another man, who were in the apartment at that time, identified the Moore brothers and Schmeidl as being there together. There was also testimony indicating that the automobile in which the three men drove from Detroit to Flint was the same car which was used at the time the crime was committed and in which the Moore brothers left the apartment about midnight. Defendant and his brother Douglas denied that they were in Flint on the day of the crime, but they produced no testimony corroborating their whereabouts on that day. The above-discussed testimony, together with other evidence, clearly presented a question of fact as to defendant Cameron Moore's guilt, for consideration by the jury. The jury are the judges of the facts; they saw and heard defendant and other witnesses and were in a better position to determine the credibility and weight to be given their testimony. We are convinced that there was ample evidence, though circumstantial in nature, from which the jury could reasonably find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime charged. We should not interfere with the jury's determination.
Defendant contends further that the trial court erred in denying his motion, made prior to trial, to quash the information on the ground that upon the preliminary hearing the examining magistrate arbitrarily limited and restricted his counsel's cross-examination of witness Gladys Gould (Dillon). He also contends that the trial court erred in admitting the transcript of the testimony of witness Gould taken at the preliminary hearing. In his brief defendant argues that the reading of such testimony abridged his constitutional right of confrontation by witnesses against him. Michigan Const.1908, art. 2, § 19, provides in part: ‘In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’
It appears that witness Gould was one of the women who lived in the apartment in Flint where defendant, his brother, and Schmeidl spent a part of the afternoon and evening the day of the crime. At the preliminary hearing witness Gould testified that the three men and another woman and man were present with her in the apartment. She also testified in detail as to conversation and events that took place there during the afternoon and evening. It appears that at the time of the preliminary hearing witness Gould resided in Indiana and had been brought to Flint for examination. The record shows that at the conclusion of her examination the following occurred:
‘Mr. Roth: That is correct.’
The name of Gladys Gould was endorsed on the information, but she was not present at the trial. The prosecution placed a police officer on the stand who testified, in substance, that he had gone to Indiana for the purpose of locating witness Gould and returning her to Flint; that he could not locate her and was advised that she and her husband had gone to Florida. During the trial, upon the court's instruction, a police officer made...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Harrison
...510, 182 N.W.2d 820 (1970); People v. Spears, 241 Mich. 67, 216 N.W. 398 (1927); or even after trial has begun, People v. Moore, 306 Mich. 29, 10 N.W.2d 296 (1943), cert. den., 321 U.S. 787; 64 S.Ct. 783, 88 L.Ed. 1078 (1944); People v. Powers, 203 Mich. 40, 168 N.W. 938 (1918); People v. B......
-
United States v. Lynch
...v. Huddleston, 304 Ky. 811, 202 S. W.2d 637, 639 (1947); People v. Myers, 239 Mich. 105, 214 N.W. 130, 131 (1927); People v. Moore, 306 Mich. 29, 10 N.W.2d 296, 298 (1943); Stevens v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 216, 232 P.2d 949, 954 (1951). State v. Carr, 67 S.D. 481, 294 N.W. 174 (1940) is a case ......
-
People v. Moss
...verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the decision of the jury should not be disturbed by an appellate court. People v. Moore, 306 Mich. 29, 33, 10 N.W.2d 296 (1943). 'In a criminal case the reviewing court must examine the record to determine whether the evidence was ample to warran......
-
People v. Parker
...with another defendant must demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying a motion for separate trial. People v. Moore, 306 Mich. 29, 38, 10 N.W.2d 296 (1943); People v. Rogers, 39 Mich.App. 157, 161, 197 N.W.2d 292 (1972). A motion for severance on the ground that a codefenda......