People v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 06 May 1983 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 60012 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven MORGAN, Defendant-Appellant. 123 Mich.App. 27, 333 N.W.2d 163 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[123 MICHAPP 29] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Deputy Chief, Asst. Pros. Atty., and Rosemary A. Gordon, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Rene A. Cooper, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before BRONSON, P.J., and BEASLEY and CYNAR, JJ.
Defendant pled guilty to charges of armed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.83; M.S.A. Sec. 28.278, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (the armed robbery), M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). He appeals as of right.
Defendant's armed robbery conviction must be reversed because the trial judge did not inform him that he could not be placed on probation if he pled guilty to that offense. People v. Rogers, 412 Mich. 669, 316 N.W.2d 701 (1982). The people cannot rely on our decision in People v. Greene, 116 Mich.App. 205, 323 N.W.2d 337 (1982), rev'd 414 Mich. 896, 323 N.W.2d 4 (1982), which was recently reversed by the Supreme Court.
The people's argument that the decision in Rogers, supra, should not be given retroactive effect does not apply here. Trial courts have been required[123 MICHAPP 30] to comply with GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(f) since its adoption. In Rogers, the Court decided that reversal was the required remedy for violation of GCR 1963, 785.7(1)(f). Because the Supreme Court did not impose on trial courts a new rule of law but merely set forth a new remedial rule to be followed by appellate courts, our application of Rogers to this case is not retroactive.
We need not consider defendant's claim that the trial court erred by failing to inform him of a mandatory minimum sentence for armed robbery.
Defendant, in general, requests that his conviction for felony-firearm, based on the armed robbery, be reversed. He has presented, and we see, no reason why his felony-firearm conviction should be reversed. That plea was properly taken in accordance with the court rules and there is no logical connection between its validity and the defect in the armed robbery plea. 1 The only plausible reason for reversing defendant's felony-firearm conviction is to bring more pressure to bear on prosecutors and trial courts in order to secure compliance with the guilty plea rules. We believe that the remedies now in place are adequate for this purpose.
Defendant's armed robbery conviction is reversed; his other convictions are affirmed.
I agree with the majority in holding that the trial court's failure to advise defendant that the offense of armed robbery is not probationable requires the [123 MICHAPP 31] setting aside of the armed robbery plea. 1 However, I do not agree that defendant's guilty plea to felony firearm need not be vacated, since the guilty plea to that offense was taken in conformity with the court rules.
The felony firearm statute provides in pertinent part: 2
The statute can be applied only to augment or enhance a sentence imposed on the underlying offense. 3 When the Legislature said that the sentence for the felony-firearm conviction "shall be in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the felony", it did not intend that a sentence for felony-firearm could be imposed when there was no conviction of the underlying felony or if the conviction of the underlying felony is vacated.
[123 MICHAPP 32] In People v. Lewis, 4 the Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and an underlying felony need not be convicted of the underlying felony in order that a conviction of the felony-firearm charge may stand. I do not believe that the Lewis decision is applicable where, as here, the convictions were based on guilty pleas and the underlying felony must be vacated because of a defect in the plea-taking procedure of that felony.
In the within matter, defendant's plea-based conviction of possession of a firearm in the commission of an armed robbery cannot stand unless his plea-based conviction of the underlying felony remains intact. Since felony-firearm is a derivative offense, it cannot stand alone. 5 I would...
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