People v. Morris
| Decision Date | 22 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 2-4,Nos. 96606,97136 and 98081,s. 96606,s. 2-4 |
| Citation | 537 N.W.2d 842,450 Mich. 316 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Otis MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Bruce HADLEY, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Omott C. MOREAU, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Jeffrey L. Sauter, Prosecuting Attorney, and William M. Worden, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Charlotte, for the people in Morris and Hadley.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Richard Thompson, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Janice A. Kabodian, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, for the people in Moreau.
Deming & Maurer by John H. Deming, Grand Ledge, for Morris.
State Appellate Defender by Sheila N. Robertson, North Lansing, for Hadley.
Michael J. McCarthy, Redford, for Moreau.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Donald Martin, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training, and Appeals, Lansing, for amicus curiae Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
Defendants in the three cases before us have been convicted of multiple controlled substance offenses and sentenced to serve consecutive prison terms. Defendants challenge the consecutive nature of their sentences, arguing that their crimes do not fit within the relevant statutory provision mandating consecutive sentences. Consideration of this issue requires us to decide the scope of offenses included in the term "another felony" as used in the controlled substances act provision mandating that a sentence imposed for violation of certain enumerated controlled drug offenses "shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony." M.C.L. § 333.7401(3); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401)(3) (emphasis added). As an extension of this question in the case of defendant Hadley, we must also determine if a trial court is required to impose consecutive sentencing under § 7401(3) where a defendant is sentenced in the same proceeding for conviction of two offenses, the first covered under the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3), but the second not covered by that provision.
We hold that the term "another felony" as used in § 7401(3) includes any felony for which the defendant has been sentenced either before or simultaneously with the controlled substance felony enumerated in § 7401(3) for which a defendant is currently being sentenced. The phrase applies to felonies violative of any provision of the controlled substances act, including additional violations of the same controlled substance provision as that for which the defendant is being sentenced, or any other felony. Further, sentences imposed in the same sentencing proceeding are assumed, for the purposes of § 7401(3), to be imposed simultaneously. Therefore, where any of the felonies for which a defendant is being sentenced in the same proceeding are covered by the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of § 7401(3), the sentence for that felony must be imposed to run consecutively with the term of imprisonment imposed for other felonies.
Because defendants Morris, Hadley, and Moreau were sentenced to consecutive terms pursuant to § 7401(3), we affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Defendant Otis Morris was charged in Ingham County with delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine 1 and convicted of that charge on April 6, 1989. While on bond pending sentencing for the April 6 conviction, he sold less than fifty grams of cocaine to undercover Michigan State Police officers on three separate occasions, the first two transactions occurring in Ingham County and the third transaction in Eaton County. Morris was sentenced on May 31, 1989, to a prison term of five to twenty years for his April 6 conviction.
In June, 1989, Morris was charged in Ingham County with two counts of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine and charged in Eaton County with one count of that same offense. 2 As noted, all three charges arose from the sales to undercover police while defendant was free on bond. In Eaton County, a supplemental information was filed charging him as an habitual offender. 3 On September 8, 1989 defendant was convicted of both counts charged in Ingham County. On September 18, 1989, Morris was also convicted of the cocaine delivery charge in Eaton County. At a separate hearing on October 31, the habitual offender charge was dismissed.
On September 19, 1989, Morris was sentenced in Ingham County to concurrent terms of ten to twenty years for conviction of the two possession charges, to be served concurrently with his term of imprisonment for his original drug delivery conviction. 4 On February 15, 1990, Morris was sentenced in Eaton County to a six- to twenty-year prison term, to be served consecutively to any previous sentence the defendant was currently serving. At the Eaton County sentencing hearing, the trial court found that it was required to impose a consecutive sentence pursuant to § 7401(3).
On appeal from defendant's Eaton County conviction, the Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that consecutive sentencing was mandatory under § 7401(3). Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 19, 1993 (Docket No. 127558). We granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue of consecutive sentencing, and further ordered that the case be argued together with People v. Hadley and People v. Moreau. 446 Mich. 851, 521 N.W.2d 617 (1994).
On August 6, 1986, after a valid police search of his residence, defendant Robert Hadley was charged in an eight-count information with illegally manufacturing, delivering, or possessing with intent to deliver various drugs. 5 The defendant was also charged in a supplemental information as a second or subsequent offender under the pertinent provision of the controlled substances act. 6
Hadley failed to appear for trial in April, 1987, and absconded on bond until arrested and arraigned in October, 1990. On January 14, 1991, defendant pleaded guilty of possession with intent to deliver more than fifty, but less than 225 grams of pethidine and possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of morphine. 7 All other charges against Hadley, including absconding and second offender charges, were dropped.
Hadley was originally sentenced on March 18, 1991, to serve a ten- to twenty-year sentence for the pethidine delivery conviction concurrently with a one- to twenty-year sentence for the morphine delivery conviction. The pethidine sentence was pronounced immediately before the morphine sentence during the same proceeding. Approximately one and one-half hours after the original sentencing proceeding was concluded, it was reconvened, and the number of credit days due the defendant was corrected from 144 to 162. In addition, the circuit court found that § 7401(3) required that the sentences imposed run consecutively.
In a split decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the consecutive sentence. 199 Mich.App. 96, 501 N.W.2d 219 (1993). We granted leave to appeal the consecutive sentencing issue, and ordered that the case be argued with Morris and Moreau. 446 Mich. 851, 521 N.W.2d 616 (1994).
While apparently on probation for a conviction for delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, 8 defendant Omott Moreau sold cocaine to an undercover Oakland County sheriff's deputy on three occasions between June 1 and July 9, 1990. Defendant was convicted on May 7, 1991, of three counts of delivery of more than fifty, but less than 225 grams of cocaine 9 and sentenced to three consecutive prison terms of ten to twenty years. These sentences were also ordered to be served consecutively to Moreau's sentence of one to twenty years imposed for the conviction of his original cocaine delivery charge. At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court stated its opinion that consecutive sentencing was mandatory.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, inter alia, upheld consecutive sentencing of the defendant, citing the provisions of § 7401(3). Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 26, 1993 (Docket No. 141413). Leave to appeal was granted by this Court, to be argued with Morris and Moreau. 446 Mich. 851, 521 N.W.2d 616 (1994).
Our issue in the present cases is one of statutory construction. No challenge has been raised regarding the constitutional validity of § 7401(3) on its face or as applied. See People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 27-43, 485 N.W.2d 866 (1992), see also id. at 43-45, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mallett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and at 72-75, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The defendants assert only that the Legislature did not intend the relevant statutory provision, requiring that the term of imprisonment for one of the enumerated felonies "be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony," M.C.L. § 333.7401(3); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401)(3) (emphasis added), to apply to the circumstances presented in their cases.
The defendants present somewhat distinct positions. Defendant Morris asserts that the statute is intended only to apply to noncontrolled substance offenses that are committed in the same transaction as those offenses enumerated in § 7401(3). Defendant Hadley agrees that application of the consecutive sentencing provision should be limited to noncontrolled substance offenses, but, contrary to Morris, would restrict application of § 7401(3) to such offenses committed in transactions distinct from the...
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