People v. Morris

• Decision Date: 10 April 1968
• Docket Number: Cr. 6741
• Citation: 260 Cal.App.2d 848,67 Cal.Rptr. 566
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shannon Lorifce MORRIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 566

67 Cal.Rptr. 566

260 Cal.App.2d 848

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shannon Lorifce MORRIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 6741.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

April 10, 1968.

Leo M. Cook, Ukiah, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. of State of California, Edward P. O'Brien, Robert R. Granucci, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

SALSMAN, Associate Justice.

Appellant was charged with forcible rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. 3); statutory rape (Pen.Code, § 261, subd. 1), and lewd and lascivious conduct (Pen.Code, § 288). The latter charge was dismissed before trial. A jury found him guilty of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a lesser offense included within the charge of statutory rape. He appeals.

We need not detail the evidence. Appellant's contentions relate purely to questions of law. His contention that the court committed prejudicial error in failing to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence is well taken, and compels reversal of the judgment.

In instructing the jury, the trial judge did not use the standard jury instructions found in CALJIC. Rather, he formulated his own instructions, and it is apparent from their text, considered as a whole, that he sought to couch them in language more meaningful and familiar to the layman than that used in the form book. The purpose is commendable, but as prior cases show, the peril is great. (See People v. Castro, 68 Cal.App.2d 491, 497, 157 P.2d 25, and cases cited.)

Appellant requested the court to read CALJIC 21 to the jury. This instruction is an exact quotation of Penal Code, section 1096. It begins by informing the jury of the presumption of innocence that stands in favor of every defendant accused of a crime and states that the effect of the presumption is to require the state to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It then defines reasonable doubt in words long accepted as a proper definition of that term. (People v. Miller, 171 Cal. 649, 651--652, 154 P. 468; Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320, 52 Am.Dec. 711.) But the trial judge rejected appellant's request and used his own instruction, elaborating upon the definition of reasonable doubt in terms he believed more comprehensible to the layman than the terms of the statute. Unfortunately, however, the judge at no time told the jury that appellant was presumed innocent until the contrary was proved, or that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt rested upon the People. This, appellant contends, deprived him of a fundamental right. We agree.

Penal Code, section 1096 declares in part that 'A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal * * *.' These significant words express a cardinal rule of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. The presumption, intended originally to ameliorate the severity of the early English common law (5 A.L.R.3rd 76), serves not to protect the guilty but to prevent conviction of the innocent. (People v. Hill, 77 Cal.App.2d 287, 293, 175 P.2d 45, and cases cited; Witkin, Calif.Crim.Proc., § 339, p. 332; 14 Cal.Jur.2d 405.) It has been described as a fundamental right and an essential element of due process of law. (See 22--A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 581 pp. 335--337, and cases cited.) It is the capstone in the protective arch of a citizen's rights when accused of crime. Although the right to have the jury instructed on the presumption of innocence is not found in the express language of either the federal Constitution or the Constitution of California (see Reynolds v. United States, 9 Cir., 238 F.2d 460), it has been a part of our statutory law since statehood. (Stats.1851, ch. 29, p. 252, § 365.) The recent enactment of our Evidence Code has not diminished its force of effect. (See Evid.Code, § 501.)

The rule is firmly established that a trial court is required to give instructions on general principles of law governing the case before it, even though not requested by the parties. (People v. Wade, 53 Cal.2d 322, 334, 1 Cal.Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116, and cases cited.) In a criminal case such as the one we now consider, the duty to instruct upon general principles of law is all the more obvious, where the defendant himself requests the instruction, as he did here. In People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 890, 129 P.2d 367, our Supreme Court said that an instruction is necessary '* * * if it is vital to a proper consideration of the evidence by the jury.' No instruction could be more vital than the one omitted here, since in every criminal case it directs the jury to put away from their minds all suspicions arising from arrest, indictment, arraignment, and the appearance of the accused before them in his...