People v. Morris

• Decision Date: 18 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 68971,68971
• Citation: 143 Ill.Dec. 300,554 N.E.2d 235,136 Ill.2d 157
• Parties: , 143 Ill.Dec. 300 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Tyrone MORRIS, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 235

554 N.E.2d 235

136 Ill.2d 157, 143 Ill.Dec. 300

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Tyrone MORRIS, Appellee.

No. 68971.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 18, 1990.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Sol. Gen., and Terence M. Madsen, Jack Donatelli and Arleen C. Anderson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for people.

Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, and Patrick M. Carmody, Asst. Defender, Office of the State App. Defender, Elgin, for appellee.

Justice CALVO delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Tyrone Morris, was found guilty by the circuit court of Du Page County of the offense of possession of an altered temporary registration permit in violation of section 4-104(a)(3) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-104(a)(3)). A temporary registration permit is commonly known as a license-applied-for sticker. The penalty classification for a violation of section 4-104(a)(3) of the Code is a Class 2 felony. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-104(b)(2).) A Class 2 felony carries a penalty of three to seven years of imprisonment. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(5).) Defendant was convicted of having altered the expiration date on his temporary registration permit from February 12, 1988, to August 12, 1988.

Defendant filed a post-trial motion in arrest of judgment in which he argued the statute defining the offense of possession of an altered temporary registration permit was unconstitutional. In his motion, defendant noted that Public Act 83-1473, effective January 1, 1985, increased the penalty for the altered permit offense from a Class 4 to a Class 2 felony. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-104(b)(2); Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-104(b)(2).) Defendant also noted that the classification of the penalty for the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 4-103(a)(1), (b)) was the same as the classification of the penalty for the offense of altering a temporary registration permit. Defendant argued the increased penalty violated his rights of due process and proportionate penalties as guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.

The circuit court granted defendant's motion. The circuit court held the penalty provided by subsection (b)(2) of section 4-104 of the Code unconstitutional in that the penalty was disproportionate to the offense committed by defendant. The court did not enter a judgment of conviction. The State appealed to the Appellate Court, Second District. This court then granted the State's motion to transfer its appeal to this court.

The issue on appeal is whether the penalty provided by section 4-104(b)(2) for violation of section 4-104(a)(3) of the Code is constitutional, as applied in this case.

Section 4-104(a)(3) of the Code provides:

" § 4-104. Offenses relating to possession of titles and registration. (a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:

* * * * * *

3. A person to possess any manufacturers statement of origin, salvage certificate, junking certificate, display certificate or certificate of title, temporary registration permit, registration card, license plate or registration sticker knowing it to have been stolen, converted, altered, forged or counterfeited." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-104(a)(3).)

Section 4-104(b)(2) of the Code provides: "A person convicted of violation of subsection 3 of paragraph (a) of this Section is guilty of a Class 2 felony." Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-104(b)(2).

It is well established that under the State's police power, the legislature has wide discretion to prescribe penalties for defined offenses. (People v. Dixon (1948), 400 Ill. 449, 453, 81 N.E.2d 257.) "To be a valid exercise of police power, the legislation must bear a reasonable relationship to [the interest] which is sought to be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such objective." (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill.2d 111, 115, 34 Ill.Dec. 838, 398 N.E.2d 829.) The determination of reasonableness is a matter for the courts. Such legislation will not be invalidated "unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the very broad and general constitutional limitations applicable." People ex rel. Carey v. Bentivenga (1981), 83 Ill.2d 537, 542, 48 Ill.Dec. 228, 416 N.E.2d 259.

Article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution is applicable to all legislative enactments. Article I, section 2, provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law * * *." (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2.) When reviewing a statute under the due process clause of our constitution, the test "focuses on the purposes and objectives of the enactment in question." (People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill.2d 410, 417, 38 Ill.Dec. 575, 403 N.E.2d 1029.) It has been consistently stated by this court "that the standard of a proper exercise of the police power is whether the statute is reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety and general welfare." Heimgaertner v. Benjamin Electric Manufacturing Co. (1955), 6 Ill.2d 152, 159, 128 N.E.2d 691.

Section 4-104 of the Code is part of the general statutory scheme entitled "ANTI-THEFT LAWS." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, ch. 4, art. I.) The purpose of the anti-theft laws "is to protect automobile owners against theft and to protect the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen automobiles." (People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile (1982), 89 Ill.2d 506, 510, 60 Ill.Dec. 934, 433 N.E.2d 1301.) Defendant altered the temporary registration permit on his own vehicle. No evidence was presented which indicated the alteration contributed in any way to any vehicle theft-related crime.

Under the facts of this case, we conclude the circuit court was correct in holding unconstitutional the penalty of a Class 2 felony for the alteration by an owner of an automobile of the temporary registration permit for that automobile. A Class 2 penalty for a person who alters a temporary registration permit for a vehicle which he or she owns or to which he or she is legally entitled is not reasonably designed to protect automobile owners against theft, nor is it reasonably designed to protect the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen motor vehicles. Such a penalty is violative of the due process clause of our constitution, and may not stand.

We also find the penalty of a Class 2 felony for altering the temporary registration permit for a vehicle which one owns or to which one is legally entitled violates the guarantee of proportionate penalties in our constitution. Article I, section 11, of the constitution provides, in pertinent part: "All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11.) Article I, section 11, of the constitution requires "the legislature, in defining crimes and their penalties, to consider the constitutional goals of restoring an offender to useful citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense." People v. Taylor (1984), 102 Ill.2d 201, 206, 80 Ill.Dec. 76, 464 N.E.2d 1059.

In the arguments before the circuit court on defendant's motion in arrest of judgment, defendant pointed out that the penalty for unauthorized possession of a certificate of title is a Class 4 felony (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 4-104(a)(1), (b)(1)), and display of an unauthorized registration sticker is a Class A misdemeanor (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 4-104(a)(4), (b)(3)).

When the circuit court ruled on defendant's post-trial motion, reference was made to the appellate court decision in People v. Bryant (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 996, 117 Ill.Dec. 539, 520 N.E.2d 890. The appellate court in Bryant held sections 4-103(a)(1) and (b) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 4-103(a)(1), (b)) unconstitutional as violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and proportionate penalties. The defendant in Bryant was convicted of the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, which is classified as a Class 2 felony. This court reversed the appellate court in People v. Bryant (1989), 128 Ill.2d 448, 132 Ill.Dec. 415, 539 N.E.2d 1221. Our decision in Bryant had not yet been announced when the circuit court, in the case at bar, determined the penalty provided by subsection (b)(2) of section 4-104 of the Code was unconstitutional.

In Bryant, this court noted that "[i]t is a primary rule of statutory construction that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect." (Bryant, 128 Ill.2d at 454-55, 132 Ill.Dec. 415, 539 N.E.2d 1221, quoting People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill.2d 469, 475, 60 Ill.Dec. 632, 433 N.E.2d 674.) We further noted that the plain language of the statute in question best indicates the drafter's intent, and "[w]here the intent can be ascertained from the statutory language it must be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction." (Bryant, 128 Ill.2d at 455, 132 Ill.Dec. 415, 539 N.E.2d 1221.) The error committed by the appellate court in Bryant was looking beyond the plain language of the statute in question to the legislative history to determine the intention of the legislature in increasing the penalty for a violation of section 4-103(a)(1) of the Code from a Class 3 to a Class 2 penalty.

In Bryant, the appellate court, by relying on the legislative history of the statute, concluded the legislature intended to treat individuals found guilty of the offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle less severely than members of organized motor vehicle theft groups, or members of "chop shop" operations, found...