People v. Morrow

• Decision Date: 21 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 5-92-0694,5-92-0694
• Citation: 207 Ill.Dec. 607,269 Ill.App.3d 1045,647 N.E.2d 1100
• Parties: , 207 Ill.Dec. 607 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DeCarlos MORROW, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1100

647 N.E.2d 1100

269 Ill.App.3d 1045, 207 Ill.Dec. 607

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.DeCarlos MORROW, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-92-0694.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

March 21, 1995.

Daniel M. Kirwan, Deputy Defender, Rita K. Peterson, Asst. Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial Dist., Mount Vernon, for appellant.

Robert Haida, State's Atty., St. Clair County, Belleville, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Rebecca Sanders, Staff Atty., Office of the State's Attys.Appellate Prosecutor, Mount Vernon, for appellee.

Presiding Justice MAAGdelivered the opinion of the court:

After a jury trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County, defendant, DeCarlos Morrow, was convicted of the murder of Lynne Thomas.The court found that there existed statutory aggravating factors, in that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery and in the course of an attempted or completed aggravated criminal sexual assault.The court sentenced the defendant to a term of natural life in prison.Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence.We affirm.

On December 16, 1990, Lynne Thomas was found dead in the storeroom of the Everything's A Dollar store at St. Clair Square in Fairview Heights, Illinois.The cause of death was ligature by strangulation as a result of plastic bags being tied around the victim's throat and her head and face being encased in a plastic bag secured with an adhesive noose.The victim also showed signs of having been sexually assaulted.

An investigation by Fairview Heights police led to an all-points bulletin being issued for defendant, who was an employee of the store.Defendant was arrested in the early morning hours on December 18, 1990, in St. Louis, Missouri.During an interview with police detectives from St. Louis and Fairview Heights, he confessed to the crime.He later agreed to allow the police to videotape his confession.He was then charged with first-degree murder.

On November 19, 1991, defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession.A hearing on the motion was held, written arguments were submitted, and on January 7, 1992, the trial court denied defendant's suppression motion.Subsequently, the State showed the videotape of defendant's confession to the jury.

On August 12, 1992, during voir dire, defendant made a motion to strike the jury panel, claiming that the State was using its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.The court denied this motion, finding that defendant had not made a prima facie case.

The court instructed the jury on first- and second-degree murder, and defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder on August 18, 1992.The jury found defendant eligible for, but did not impose, the death penalty.On October 8, 1992, the court sentenced defendant to a term of natural life in prison.Defendant's posttrial motions for a new trial and to reconsider sentence were denied.

Defendant raises four issues on appeal:

(1)The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession, because police did not scrupulously honor defendant's exercised right to remain silent;

(2)The trial court erred in finding that defendant failed to present a prima facie case of racial discrimination based upon the State's use of its peremptory challenges;

(3) The second-degree murder statute(720 ILCS 5/9-2(West 1992)) violates defendant's rights to due process under the Illinois Constitution as it places the burden on the accused to prove that he is guilty of a lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense; and

(4)The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to a term of natural life in prison thereby rejecting defendant's potential for rehabilitation.

At approximately 1:25 a.m. on December 18, 1990, St. Louis police officer Joseph Dudley stopped and arrested defendant in St. Louis, Missouri.Dudley testified that he advised defendant that he was under arrest for a homicide occurring in Illinois.Dudley read defendant his Miranda rights, and defendant indicated that he understood his rights and did not want to make any statements or talk at that time.Dudley then delivered defendant to the Area II police station and notified the major case squad of defendant's arrest.Defendant did not request counsel.

At approximately 2:00 a.m., St. Louis Detective Matthew Sheetz of the major case squad took defendant to an interview room.Sheetz testified that Dudley informed him that defendant had been read his Miranda rights, but Dudley did not tell Sheetz that defendant had exercised his right to remain silent.When asked by Sheetz if he had been read his rights, defendant indicated that he had not.Sheetz then advised defendant of his Miranda rights around 2:10 a.m., and defendant indicated that he understood his rights.Again, defendant did not request counsel.Sheetz left defendant alone in the interview room without asking him any questions.

At approximately 2:30 a.m., Fairview Heights Detective Martin McCoy arrived to interview defendant.McCoy, who was leading the interview along with Sheetz, began by reading defendant his rights, and defendant did not request counsel.The defendant again indicated that he understood his rights.He signed a waiver of his rights and agreed to speak with the detectives.The interview lasted about an hour, and then all parties took a break.Defendant was offered but refused food and the use of a restroom.

At approximately 3:51 a.m. detectives resumed the questioning of defendant.During the break, the detectives learned that a fingerprint had been found in the latex glove left at the scene and that defendant was placed at the scene by his companion.Before imparting this knowledge to defendant, Detective McCoy again advised defendant of his Miranda rights.The defendant agreed to talk and was interviewed until 4:00 a.m.

At 4:00 a.m. the officers took another break and offered food and a restroom to defendant.This break lasted 30 minutes, and they returned at approximately 4:36 a.m.Using another consent form, the detectives again advised defendant of his rights.The defendant initialed each section of the form indicating he understood his rights, and he agreed to continue talking with the police.He did not request an attorney and did not exercise his right to remain silent.

During the interview, defendant agreed to make a written statement, which defendant dictated to Detective McCoy.McCoy read the statement back to defendant, and defendant indicated his understanding and agreement by signing the statement.At 5:20 a.m., the officers took a break and again offered defendant food or a restroom.The defendant requested the use of a telephone and was permitted to make a call.

After the break, the detectives asked defendant if he would videotape his statement.He agreed to do so.Police videotaped his statement at approximately 6:20 a.m.On January 4, 1991, the State charged defendant with first-degree murder.720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(West 1992).

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession.He argues that the confession should be suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona(1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, on the ground that police improperly obtained his confession after he indicated a desire to remain silent at the time of arrest.He argues that the frequent repetition of Miranda warnings while in custody served only to show that police detectives would continue to interrogate him even if he did not wish to make a statement.

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that if during custodial interrogation an individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.(Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723.)"[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise."Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 723.

In Michigan v. Mosley(1975), 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, however, the Court rejected the argument that Miranda established a per se proscription on the renewal of questioning by police following a defendant's initial request to remain silent.The Court held that later statements made by a suspect when he earlier expressed a desire to remain silent are admissible if the police "scrupulously honor" the suspect's "right to cut off questioning".Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326, 46 L.Ed.2d at 321.

In Mosley, in determining that the defendant's right to remain silent had been scrupulously honored, the Court noted that the defendant had been fully and carefully advised of his rights before his initial interrogation; that he had then signed a waiver form; and that when he stated that he did not wish to discuss the robberies in question, the police officers immediately ceased the interrogation and made no attempt to persuade him to alter his decision.After an interval of two hours, defendant was questioned again by a different police officer at another location about an unrelated crime, after being given another full set of Miranda warnings.Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-05, 96 S.Ct. at 327, 46 L.Ed.2d at 321-22.The record here shows that the defendant's right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored."The evidence at the suppression hearings held on December 11, 1991, and December 20, 1991, was that defendant exercised his right to remain silent after being advised of his Miranda rights by the arresting officer at the time of arrest at approximately 1:25 a.m.The record also shows that defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights at approximately 2:00 a.m. by Detective Sheetz while waiting in an interview room at the stationhouse.In neither situation did either...