People v. Mortel
| Decision Date | 21 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2017–01003,Ind. No. 15–00395 |
| Citation | 152 N.Y.S.3d 68,197 A.D.3d 196 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Patricia MORTEL, appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Del Atwell, East Hampton, NY, for appellant.
Thomas E. Walsh II, District Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Carrie A. Ciganek and Amanda Doty of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, ROBERT J. MILLER, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.
Law enforcement personnel assigned to this case intercepted approximately 89,000 communications in connection with their investigation. Through this and other evidence, they learned that a certain 2001 Ford Explorer would be transporting a quantity of narcotics through a certain location on a particular night. New York State Police Troopers assigned to this case were briefed at the beginning of their shift about the situation and directed to stop and search the vehicle if they encountered it. The State Troopers drove on a highway and waited for the vehicle to appear. Approximately six hours after their shift began, the State Troopers observed the subject vehicle on the highway. The vehicle was stopped by the State Troopers, the defendant and her codefendant were arrested, and a large quantity of cocaine was recovered from the vehicle.
Although the State Troopers were directed to stop and search the vehicle, they were not provided with a warrant. It is undisputed that none of the law enforcement personnel involved in this case ever sought or obtained a warrant in connection with the stop, the search, or the seizure of the subject evidence. The People later asserted a series of exceptions to the constitutional warrant requirements to justify the actions of law enforcement. The County Court accepted and adopted all of the People's inconsistent factual theories, and ultimately upheld the warrantless search. Based on the evidence recovered, the defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and sentenced to eight years in prison and five years of postrelease supervision.
"The guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures found in both the State and Federal Constitutions ( U.S. Const 4th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 12 ) is designed to protect the personal privacy and dignity of the individual against unwarranted intrusions by the State" ( Matter of Patchogue–Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 66, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456, 510 N.E.2d 325 ; see People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 378 N.E.2d 99 ). To assure such protection, "save for few specifically established and well-defined exceptions, the determination of whether the desire of the police to conduct a search or seizure is supported by probable cause is entrusted in the first instance to a neutral Magistrate" ( People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d at 557, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 378 N.E.2d 99 ; see People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 306, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 501 N.E.2d 556 ; People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 559, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 330 N.E.2d 631 ).
It is a "fundamental precept ‘that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the acknowledged exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement’ " ( People v. Sanders, 26 N.Y.3d 773, 776, 27 N.Y.S.3d 491, 47 N.E.3d 770 [emphasis added], quoting People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 109, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940, 612 N.E.2d 298 ; see People v. Jimenez, 22 N.Y.3d 717, 721, 985 N.Y.S.2d 456, 8 N.E.3d 831 ; People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d at 557, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 378 N.E.2d 99 ). " ‘Where a warrant has not been obtained, it is the People who have the burden of overcoming th[e] presumption’ of unreasonableness" ( People v. Sanders, 26 N.Y.3d at 777, 27 N.Y.S.3d 491, 47 N.E.3d 770, quoting People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d at 557, 406 N.Y.S.2d 736, 378 N.E.2d 99 ).
Here, the People failed to sustain their burden at the suppression hearing. As detailed more fully below, the People failed to adequately demonstrate the applicability of the proffered exceptions to the search warrant requirements of the State and Federal Constitutions. Accordingly, the County Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the physical evidence recovered as a result of the police action in this case, and the judgment must be reversed.
The defendant, Patricia Mortel, and her codefendant, Aaron Parker, were both charged by indictment with one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. By omnibus motion, the defendant moved to suppress, among other things, physical evidence. Specifically, she sought to suppress a quantity of cocaine that had been recovered from a vehicle after it was stopped by law enforcement officials.
At a hearing pursuant to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, the People presented, inter alia, the testimony of two members of the New York State Police who were involved in the arrest of the defendant. At the conclusion of the hearing, the County Court, among other things, credited the testimony of the People's witnesses and concluded that the stop and the ensuing search of the vehicle were lawful under the State and Federal Constitutions. The court cited two alternative grounds to support its conclusion that the subject vehicle had been lawfully stopped. The court cited to three alternative grounds to support its conclusion that the cocaine had been lawfully recovered from the vehicle. Based upon these alternative grounds, the court denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the cocaine that had been recovered from the subject vehicle.
The defendant subsequently stood trial. The jury convicted the defendant of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, but acquitted her of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. On December 20, 2016, the County Court imposed sentence.
On appeal, the defendant contends, inter alia, that the County Court should have granted that branch of her omnibus motion which was to suppress the physical evidence recovered from the vehicle. The defendant asserts that the People failed to sustain their burden at the suppression hearing since the evidence failed to establish either a valid reason for stopping the vehicle, or searching it. In response, the People contend that the court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion based on each of the alternative grounds cited in its decision and order.
As indicated, the County Court cited two alternative grounds for its determination that the subject vehicle was lawfully stopped. The court first concluded that the State Troopers had probable cause to stop the vehicle by virtue of "the fellow-officer rule." In this regard, the court cited to testimony that law enforcement officials had intercepted approximately 89,000 communications, and that some of these communications indicated that there would be a quantity of narcotics in the vehicle on the night in question.
The County Court alternatively determined that the State Troopers were entitled to stop the vehicle because testimony at the hearing showed that the State Troopers had reasonable cause to believe that a traffic infraction had been committed. In this regard, the court credited the testimony of one of the State Troopers who testified that he observed the subject vehicle exceed the maximum speed limit and fail to maintain its lane.
The County Court asserted three alternative grounds to support its conclusion that the evidence was lawfully recovered from the vehicle after the stop was initiated. First, the court concluded that the intercepted communications and the application of the fellow officer rule provided a lawful basis for the search of the vehicle at the outset of the traffic stop.
The County Court alternatively concluded that the State Troopers were authorized to search the subject vehicle under the "automobile exception" to the Fourth Amendment. In this regard, the court noted that one of the State Troopers had reportedly detected the odor of marihuana when he initially approached the vehicle after it was pulled over.
Finally, the County Court determined, as a third alternative ground, that the cocaine was properly recovered pursuant to a valid inventory search. In this regard, the court stated that one of the State Troopers ran the registration of the vehicle and learned that it had been suspended due to lapsed insurance. Accordingly, the court alternatively concluded that the cocaine was recovered in connection with a valid inventory search.
The defendant contends that the County Court erred insofar as it determined that the State Troopers were authorized to stop the vehicle. As indicated, the court cited two alternative grounds for this determination: (1) the stop of the vehicle was properly based on information received by the State Troopers from other law enforcement officials which indicated that the vehicle contained narcotics, and (2) the stop of the vehicle was properly based on a series of traffic infractions that one of the State Troopers witnessed while they followed the vehicle.
On appeal, the People maintain that "[t]he evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established that New York State Police Troopers Caban and Tierney had probable cause to stop ... the vehicle ... based upon information given to them by investigators with the Rockland County Drug Task Force that defendant's vehicle contained cocaine." The People further argue that "[t]he information provided to the Troopers by fellow law enforcement officers gave the Troopers probable cause to stop ... the...
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