People v. Moss
| Docket Number | SC 162208 |
| Decision Date | 10 June 2022 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN ANTONYA MOSS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Argued on application for leave to appeal December 8, 2021
Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack Justices: Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch
John A Moss was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(d) (), after he pleaded no contest to the charge in the Berrien Circuit Court. The charge stemmed from allegations made by defendant's adoptive sister. In exchange for his plea, the court, Donna B. Howard J., dismissed the other charges that had been brought against defendant, including another count of CSC-III, MCL 750.520d(1)(b) (), and a fourth-offense habitual-offender enhancement, MCL 769.12. Defendant and the complainant did not have a birth parent in common, but they were both adopted by the same woman. The court used the police report to establish the factual basis for the plea, finding that defendant and the complainant had engaged in sexual intercourse and that they were related as brother and sister by the adoption. After sentencing defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing for the first time that he was not related to the complainant by either blood or affinity. The trial court denied the motion, determining that, although the adoptive siblings were not related by blood, they were related by affinity. Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals; the Court denied the application in an unpublished order entered August 21, 2017 (Docket No. 338877). Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and after hearing oral argument on the application, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. 503 Mich. 1009 (2019). The Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeals to address whether a family relation that arises from a legal adoption is either effectively a blood relation, as that term is used in MCL 750.520b through MCL 750.520e, or a relation by affinity, as that term is used in MCL 750.520b through MCL 750.520e. On remand, the Court of Appeals, Shapiro, P.J., and Servitto and Letica, JJ., affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, reasoning that defendant and the complainant were effectively related by blood. 333 Mich.App. 515 (2020). Having found that they were related by blood, the Court considered it unnecessary to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by affinity, but it did so anyway because of the remand order and concluded that they were not related by affinity. Defendant again sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant defendant's application for leave to appeal or take other action, and it directed the parties to submit briefs addressing whether the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that defendant and the complainant were effectively related by blood for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d), such that there was an adequate factual basis for defendant's no-contest plea. 507 Mich. 939 (2021).
In a per curiam opinion signed by Chief Justice McCormack and Justices Zahra, Viviano, Bernstein, Clement, and Cavanagh, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
Persons who are related by adoption but who otherwise do not share an ancestor in common are not related "by blood" for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d), which criminalizes sexual penetration with another person when the other person is related to the actor by blood or affinity to the third degree. Defendant and the complainant, who were adoptive siblings, were not related by blood for purposes of the statute, and the Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise. Because the order directing oral argument on the application only asked the parties to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by blood, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that defendant and the complainant were not related by affinity was left undisturbed. Because an adequate factual basis for defendant's plea did not exist in light of the Courts' legal rulings, remand to the trial court for further proceedings was required.
1. MCR 6.302(A) provides that a court may not accept a guilty plea unless the court is convinced that the plea is accurate. A trial court must establish a factual basis for a plea to ensure the plea's accuracy. The factual basis for a plea is insufficient if it does not establish grounds for finding that the defendant committed the crime charged. MCL 750.520d(1)(d) provides that a person is guilty of CSC-III if the person engages in sexual penetration with another person and that other person is related to the actor by blood or affinity to the third degree and the sexual penetration occurs under circumstances not otherwise prohibited by Chapter LXXVI of the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.520 et seq. In People v Zajaczkoswski, 493 Mich. 6 (2012), the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "relationship by blood" as used in the first-degree criminal sexual conduct statute, MCL 750.520b, to mean a relationship between persons arising by descent from a common ancestor or a relationship by birth rather than marriage. That interpretation also applies to the phrase "related to the actor by blood" in MCL 750.520d(1)(d). Because a relationship formed by adoption does not arise by descent from a common ancestor or by birth, persons who are related by adoption but who otherwise do not share an ancestor in common are not related "by blood" for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d).
2. The Court of Appeals' analysis of MCL 710.60 to resolve the issue of whether defendant was related to the complainant for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d) was flawed because (1) numerous sections in the Adoption Code distinguished and continue to distinguish between relationships by blood and relationships by adoption; (2) the Adoption Code can only change the law, not the genetic makeup of an adopted child or the child's adoptive parents, and MCL 710.60 focuses on the rights and duties of adoptive parents and adopted individuals, not on biological makeup; and (3) the Court of Appeals' analysis would impermissibly enlarge the CSC-III statute by creating a constructive crime, allowing prosecution when the actor is only effectively related by blood to the complainant rather than actually related by blood. Defendant and the complainant were not related by blood because there was no DNA evidence establishing that they were related to the third degree, no evidence that they shared a common ancestor, and no evidence that they were related by birth.
Court of Appeals judgment reversed in part, and case remanded to the trial court.
Justice Welch, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the Court's holding that adoptive siblings are not related "by blood" for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d) but wrote separately because, under that statute, the Legislature considers adoptive siblings to be related by affinity. Justice Welch would have addressed whether adoptive siblings are related by affinity to the third degree for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d) because it involved a controlling legal issue for which the Court could have provided a solution. The term "affinity" is defined as a relationship by marriage or by ties other than blood. In People v Armstrong, 212 Mich.App. 121 (1995), the Court of Appeals applied that definition to conclude that stepsiblings were related by affinity under the criminal sexual conduct statutes. The Armstrong rationale dictates that adoptive relationships are included within the term "affinity" as used in MCL 750.520d(1)(d); the Court of Appeals erred in this case by applying the Armstrong reasoning to the "blood" prong in MCL 750.520d(1)(d), instead of to the "affinity" prong. It would be patently absurd to hold that the Legislature intended what is essentially an incest statute to cover relationships between stepsiblings and not adoptive siblings. Thus, for purposes of MCL 750.520d(1)(d), "affinity" includes both step and adopted relationships. A review of the historical amendments of the criminal sexual conduct act supports that the drafters omitted the word "adoption" in the statutes concerning criminal sexual conduct with the understanding that those relationships would fall within the imprecise term "affinity." Moreover, defendant failed to offer any plausible, rational basis for enacting a criminal sexual conduct statute that would extend to step relationships but not to adoptive relationships.
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
At issue in this case is whether adopted siblings who do not share a common ancestor are related "by blood" for purposes of the crime of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(d). We hold that such persons are not related "by blood" under the statute. As a result, there was not an adequate factual basis for defendant's no-contest plea.[1] We reverse, in part, the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the circuit court.
Defendant John Moss, was charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender with two counts of CSC-III, one for being related to the complainant by blood or affinity to the third degree, contrary to MCL 750.520d(1)(d), and one for using force or coercion, contrary to MCL 750.520d(1)(b).[2] At the time of the offense, defendant was 25 years old, and the complainant for the CSC-III charges, his adoptive sister, was 17 years old. Defendant and the complainant do not have a birth parent in common, but they were both...
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