People v. Mueller
| Citation | 2021 IL App (2d) 190868,187 N.E.3d 1245,453 Ill.Dec. 507 |
| Decision Date | 08 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2-19-0868 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anna L. MUELLER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
2021 IL App (2d) 190868
187 N.E.3d 1245
453 Ill.Dec. 507
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Anna L. MUELLER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 2-19-0868
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.
Filed July 8, 2021
James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and James K. Leven, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Tricia L. Smith, State's Attorney, of Belvidere (Patrick Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Leslie Martin, of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 After causing a motor vehicle accident, defendant, Anna L. Mueller, was convicted of two counts of aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol ( 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(2)(D), (d)(1)(G) (West 2016)) and one count of aggravated driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (id. § 11-501(a)(1), (d)(2)(D)). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting the results of two blood alcohol tests that were taken in a hospital emergency room following the accident. We affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On October 14, 2016, the State filed a bill of indictment charging defendant with three counts of alcohol-related driving offenses. Count I of the indictment charged defendant with aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol (id. § 11-501(a)(2), (d)(2)(D), (d)(1)(G)), alleging that defendant drove under the influence of alcohol at a time when defendant had four prior violations of driving under the influence of alcohol. Count II charged defendant with aggravated driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (id. § 11-501(a)(1), (d)(2)(D)) at a time when defendant had four prior violations of driving under the influence of alcohol. Count III charged defendant with aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol
(id. § 11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(G)), alleging that defendant drove under the influence of alcohol at a time when her driving privileges were revoked for a violation of section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code or a similar out-of-state offense. On November 16, 2016, defendant was arraigned before the Honorable Philip J. Nicolosi for these offenses and entered a plea of not guilty.
¶ 4 On June 28, 2017, defendant filed a motion to quash her arrest and suppress evidence, seeking to suppress the results of three separate blood alcohol tests from blood draws that all had been taken at Swedish Covenant Hospital (the hospital) following the accident. Regarding the first blood draw (the medical blood draw), defendant suggested that her fourth amendment rights were violated when paramedics—who were acting as State agents—took her to the hospital against her will, where her blood was drawn "for no medical reason but instead to assist police." See U.S. Const., amend. IV.
¶ 5 Regarding the second blood draw (the administrative blood draw), defendant argued that her fourth amendment rights were violated when her blood was drawn "without authority and without consent." While defendant acknowledged that she gave a Belvidere police officer, Officer Zapf,1 her "purported consent" after being read the "Traffic Crash Warning to Motorist" (the faulty warning) "pursuant to 625 ILCS 5/11-501.6," she claimed that this consent was invalid because it was predicated on false information.
¶ 6 Finally, regarding the third blood draw that was taken at the hospital (the jail blood draw), defendant argued that there was no medical purpose justifying the draw, that the procurement of the draw was not grounded in statute, and that defendant had not consented to the draw, which was subsequently procured without a warrant.
¶ 7 On October 5, 2017, the State responded to defendant's motion, suggesting that "neither the State, nor any of its agents, played any part" in obtaining the medical blood draw and that the draw was "made in the regular course of providing medical treatment." While defendant argued that she did not consent to the medical blood draw, the State contended that, based on the paramedics’ observations, defendant was "not suitable to refuse care." The State next conceded that Officer Zapf read defendant the wrong warning before obtaining her consent to complete the administrative blood draw.2 However, the State contended that the only available remedy for this error was to lift and rescind defendant's summary suspension and not to suppress the results of the blood test. Furthermore, according to the State, the question of consent was misplaced because "[t]he [a]ppellate [c]ourt held that consent is no longer a requirement for the admission of the results of chemical tests into evidence." Finally, in response to defendant's arguments concerning the legality of the jail blood draw, the State reported that it would not seek to admit that final draw.
¶ 8 On October 10, 2017, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. On that date, five witnesses were called to testify: Anita Bowers, Robert Palin, Shane Schultz (Shane), and Lauren
Schultz (Lauren) (Lauren is of no relation to Shane).3
¶ 9 Bowers testified that she was employed as an emergency room nurse at the hospital. Relying on her previously composed notes to aid in her testimony, Bowers confirmed that she was working on April 21, 2016, when defendant first entered the hospital's emergency room. She first examined defendant at approximately 8:20 p.m. At that time, she learned that defendant was in a vehicular accident. While Bowers assessed defendant, defendant told her that she was drinking wine earlier that day. Bowers noticed that defendant had a "skin tear to the right forearm"; defendant told her that the injury resulted from a fall at home. From her notes, Bowers recalled learning that defendant was reportedly ambulatory at the scene of the accident and that she denied any new pain directly resulting from the accident. Bowers's triage assessment of defendant indicated that defendant was in "no apparent distress" and that she was "uncomfortable, slender, well nourished, [and] well groomed." Bowers also indicated that defendant was "belligerent with slurred speech" and that she was "challenging when asked questions."
¶ 10 Defense counsel began to question Bowers about the other driver involved in the accident—Michael Scarpetta—who also received treatment at the hospital. When the State questioned the relevance of Scarpetta's medical records, defense counsel indicated that his injuries were directly relevant to the statutory warning that Officer Zapf read to defendant before obtaining her purported consent for the administrative blood draw. Specifically, defense counsel indicated that the section 11-501.6 warning "only applies in [personal injury] accidents when somebody other than the defendant has a [c]ategory A injury" and that, if Scarpetta did not have such an injury, section 11-501.6 "should not have been dealt with" and was "improperly a mechanism" by which the State obtained consent for the administrative blood draw. During this exchange, the State once again acknowledged that Officer Zapf read defendant the incorrect statutory warning prior to the administrative blood draw. Eventually, Bowers testified that Scarpetta experienced pain in his chest and shin following the accident. She further indicated that Scarpetta had "bruising and a hematoma" on his shin and that the airbags in his vehicle were deployed as a result of the accident.
¶ 11 Palin testified that he was a registered nurse employed by the hospital and that he worked an overnight shift in the emergency room beginning on April 21, 2016. Referring to his notes on defendant's medical charts, Palin testified that he had first seen defendant at approximately 8:25 p.m. on April 21, 2016. At that time, defendant showed "no apparent distress" and was "slender, uncomfortable, well nourished, well groomed, *** belligerent, [had] slurred speech," and "was challenging staff when asked repeated questions." Palin noted that defendant was "in no apparent distress" and was reportedly "ambulatory" at the scene of the accident. While defendant was apparently able to walk, her "gait was unsteady." Palin testified that defendant "initially attempted to refuse transport" to the hospital and that she was "awake but confused."
¶ 12 Palin further reported that the administrative blood draw was "obtained
at the request of the Illinois State Police" at approximately 9:14 p.m.4 Palin testified that he personally participated in that blood draw. Upon further questioning, Palin confirmed that the blood draw "was done per the police request."
¶ 13 On cross-examination, the State asked Palin whether his "job [was] to assess the patient for medical needs, [and] not to assist the police in legal proceedings." Palin answered in the affirmative. The State then asked whether "it wasn't until later for the [administrative...
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