People v. Munday

Decision Date05 October 1917
Docket NumberNo. 11342.,11342.
Citation117 N.E. 286,280 Ill. 32
PartiesPEOPLE v. MUNDAY.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Appellate Court, Second District, on Error to Circuit Court, Grundy County; Samuel C. Stough, Judge.

Charles B. Munday was convicted of conspiracy and brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Carter, C. J., and Cartwright and Craig, JJ., dissenting.John E. Hogan, of Taylorville, and William A. Rogan and Edward H. Morris, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Maclay Hoyne, State's Atty., of Chicago, Frank H. Hayes, State's Atty., of Morris, and James H. Wilkerson, of Chicago (Edwin J. Raber, Edward E. Wilson, and W. H. Holly, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

COOKE, J.

Charles B. Munday, plaintiff in error, and William Lorimer, Sr., Harry W. Huttig, Thomas McDonald, Charles G. Fox, and John K. Segrave, were jointly indicted by a special grand jury in the criminal court of Cook county, the indictment consisting of 30 counts, charging them with the crime of conspiracy. The first count charges the defendants, and divers other persons whose names were unknown to the grand jury, with conspiracy to wrongfully obtain, by false pretenses, money from the public generally and from the following named corporations: The La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank, the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank, the State Bank of Calumet, the Broadway State Bank, the International Trust & Savings Bank, the Rosehill Cemetery Company, the Farmers' Bank of Bethalto, the Citizens' State Bank of Alhambra, Ill., the State Bank of Oconee, and the Illinois State Bank. The second court charges the defendants, and divers persons whose names were unknown to the grand jury, with conspiring to cheat and defraud, by subtle and fraudulent schemes and practices, the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank, the Broadway State Bank, the Calumet State Bank, the International Trust & Savings Bank, and the Illinois State Bank, of their property by false pretenses, and by entering into an unlawful, fraudulent and collusive agreement and understanding with the officers and directors of said banks, whereby such officers and directors were to unlawfully turn over to the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank, and to the defendants, and to divers corporations and concerns controlled by the defendants, the money and property of said banks in exchange for notes, mortgages, bonds, drafts, and certificates of deposit of little or no value, as the defendants and the officers and directors of said banks well knew, and to cause said banks to purchase from the defendants, and from the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank and other corporations and firms which the defendants controlled and operated, notes, mortgages, bonds, bills of exchange, and certificates of deposit at a price greatly in excess of their real value, as the defendants well knew. The third count charges the defendants with conspiracy to cheat and defraud the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank, by the defendants Lorimer, Munday, McDonald, and Fox, who were salaried officers and employés of the bank, turning over to the defendants the money and property of the bank in exchange for notes, drafts, bonds, stocks, bills of exchange, securities, and mortgages of little or no value. The fourth count charges the defendants Lorimer, Munday, Fox, McDonald, and Huttig with conspiracy to procure fraudulent, bad, and desperate loans to be made by the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank to Lorimer, Munday, McDonald, and Fox, all salaried officers or employés of the bank, and to certain firms and corporations controlled by Lorimer and Munday, and in the management and control of which they were actively engaged, without first having said loans approvedby the board of directors of the bank. The fifth count charges the defendants Munday, Huttig, McDonald, Fox, and Segrave, and divers other persons whose names were unknown to the grand jury, with conspiracy to obtain certain trust funds from the Rosehill Cemetery Company by false pretenses, and to cheat and defraud the Rosehill Cemetery Company by subtle schemes and practices, and by entering into an agreement whereby the defendants Huttig and Munday, who were, respectively president and secretary and treasurer of the Rosehill Cemetery Company were to transfer to the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank, and to Lorimer, Munday, Huttig, and Segrave, and to divers corporations and concerns controlled by them, the said trust funds in exchange for mortgages, notes, drafts, securities, and certificates of deposit of little or no value, as the defendants well knew. The sixth count charges the defendants, and divers other persons whose names were unknown to the grand jury, with conspiring to obtain goods, funds, and property from the stockholders, creditors, customers, and depositors of the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank by publishing and circulating a false and untrue statement showing said bank to be solvent, when, as the defendants well knew, the said bank was, and for a long time had been, insolvent, but which condition was not known to the said stockholders, creditors, customers, and depositors of the bank. The ninth count charges the defendants with conspiracy to cheat and defraud the Rosehill Cemetery Company by purchasing, as officers of the cemetery company and with trust funds of the cemetery company, certificates of deposit of the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank, of which they were officers and agents, well knowing that said certificates of deposit were of little or no value. The tenth count charges the defendants with conspiracy to obtain money and property from the International Trust & Savings Bank by means of the confidence game, and the eleventh count charges them with conspiracyto obtain money and property from the same bank by means of false pretenses. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and twentieth counts charge the defendants with conspiracy to obtain money and property from the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank, the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank, the State Bank of Calumet, and the Broadway State Bank, respectively, by means of false pretenses or by means of the confidence game. The nineteenth count charges the defendants with conspiring to obtain money, notes, stocks, bonds, securities, bills of exchange, and drafts of the public. The twenty-first count charges the defendants with conspiring to obtain money and securities from the depositors of the State Bank of Calumet. The twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-sixth counts are the same as the twenty-first, except the Broadway State Bank, the International Trust & Savings Bank, the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank, and the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank, respectively, are named in the respective counts in the place of the State Bank of Calumet. The twenty-seventh count charges the defendants with conspiracy to embezzle the money and property of the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank. The twenty-eighth count charges the defendants with conspiracy to deceive the State Auditor and bank examiners by making and causing to be made false statements pertaining to and affecting the liabilities and assets of the La Salle Street Trust & Savings Bank. The twenty-ninth count charges the defendants with conspiring with the officers and directors of the Ashland-Twelfth State Bank, the Broadway State Bank, and the State Bank of Calumet to deceive the State Auditor by falsely representing to him that the capital stock of the said banks had been paid in in cash pursuant to law, and thereby induce the auditor to issue certificates authorizing said banks to transact banking business. The twenty-fifth count was quashed, and upon motion of the state's attorney the court entered a nolle prosequi as to the seventh, eighth, and thirtieth counts.

Plaintiff in error made a motion to quash the indictment, which was overruled as to all except the twenty-fifth count. He then entered a motion, supported by affidavit, praying for a bill of particulars. This motion was allowed in part and overruled in part, and a bill of particulars in accordance with the order of the court was furnished. Thereafter, on April 9, 1915, he entered a plea of not guilty and obtained a change of venue from Cook county, the cause being transferred to Grundy county for trial of the charge against him. A motion made by plaintiff in error in the circuit court of Grundy county for a more specific bill of particulars was denied and the cause was set for trial. On September 27, 1915, the cause was called for trial, and plaintiff in error interposed a challenge to the array, which was overruled. The jury impaneled to try the cause found Munday guilty, and fixed his punishment at five years' confinement in the penitentiary. Munday sued out a writ of error from the Appellate Court for the Second District, where the record of the circuit court was reviewed and the judgment was affirmed. This writ of error has been sued out by plaintiff in error to obtain a reversal of the judgments of the circuit and Appellate Courts.

The taking of evidence in this case extended over a period of several weeks. A multitude of transactions in which plaintiff in error and his codefendants had participated, and which resulted in financial loss to stockholders and depositors of various banks, were investigated, and this evidence tended strongly to show that plaintiff in error was guilty of the crime as charged in various counts of the indictment. On the other hand, plaintiff in error testified in his own behalf and offered other evidence from which the jury could have found that plaintiff in error was not guilty of the crime of conspiracy as charged in the indictment. As the judgment must be reversed for errors hereinafter noted, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for a new trial, we refrain from commenting upon any of the evidence...

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