People v. Municipal Court (Hinton)

Decision Date15 December 1983
Citation149 Cal.App.3d 951,197 Cal.Rptr. 204
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent, Gary Lewis HINTON, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 68853.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

[149 Cal.App.3d 952] Ira Reiner, Los Angeles City Atty., Jack L. Brown, Supervisor, Appellate Section, and Pamela Victorine, Deputy City Atty., for petitioner.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Los Angeles County Public Defender, Laurence M. Sarnoff, Barry A. Taylor and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, on behalf of defendant and real party in interest.

LUI, Associate Justice.

In this mandamus proceeding, the People seek a peremptory writ to vacate a sentencing order. The order placed a third time drunk driving offender in an alcohol rehabilitation facility, rather than county jail, as a [149 Cal.App.3d 953] condition of probation. We hold that Vehicle Code section 23171, subdivision (a), requires incarceration in county jail as a condition of probation for such third time offenders. This requirement is not satisfied by placement in an alcohol rehabilitation facility. We therefore issue the peremptory writ sought herein.

FACTS

The facts are not in dispute. Real party in interest, Gary Lewis Hinton (defendant), entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor complaint charging violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) (driving under the influence of alcohol). He admitted to two prior drunk driving convictions within the preceding five years.

Over the objection of the People, the trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed defendant Hinton on summary probation on the condition that he serve "120 days in County Jail or other custodial facility." The trial court, however, stayed the jail term and required defendant "to enroll in the Warm Springs Rehabilitation Program ... and remain in the program for 120 days .... [p] Upon showing the Court that you have completed the 120-day program ... the Court will give you credit towards the 120 days imposed in the County Jail." 1 The People sought review of this order by means of a petition for writ of mandate. At the direction of the Supreme Court we issued an alternative writ.

CONTENTION

The People contend the sentencing order allowing defendant to satisfy the mandatory jail term required for third time offenders by residence at an alcohol rehabilitation facility was in excess of the court's jurisdiction. Defendant controverts this contention.

DISCUSSION
The Provisions of Vehicle Code Section 23171, Subdivision (a), Are Mandatory

In this appeal we are asked to resolve conflicting interpretations of Vehicle Code section 23171, subdivision (a), which provides in pertinent part: [149 Cal.App.3d 954] "If the court grants probation to any person punished [for a third offense of specified Vehicle Code provisions all occurring within five years], in addition to the provisions of Section 23206 and any other terms and conditions imposed by the court, the court shall

impose as conditions of probation that the person be confined in the county jail for at least 120 days but not more than one year and pay a fine of at least three hundred ninety dollars ($390) but not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)...." (Emphasis added.)

In interpreting a criminal statute, the major consideration is legislative intent. (1 Witkin, Cal.Crimes, (1963), § 11, p. 13.) The primary source of legislative intent is the language of the statute. "[T]he court should not seek hidden motives or objects which do not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history." (Id., at § 14, p. 16; People v. Vaughn (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 622, 629, 16 Cal.Rptr. 711.)

Vehicle Code section 23171 states that the court "shall" impose a jail term as a condition of probation. The word "shall" in ordinary usage means "must" and is inconsistent with the concept of discretion. (See People v. Municipal Court (Lozano ) (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 767, 778, 303 P.2d 375.)

As if the provisions of Vehicle Code section 23171 did not give sufficient direction to the court regarding the imposition of a jail term, the Legislature added Vehicle Code section 23206, subdivision (c), which provides: "(c) The court shall not absolve a person who is convicted of [driving under the influence of alcohol] from the obligation of spending the minimum time in confinement, ..."

Thus, to construe "shall" in this context as being anything other than a mandatory legislative direction to the trial court would defy principles of both statutory construction and common sense.

Vehicle Code Section 23171, Subdivision (a), Does Not Authorize Placement in an Alcohol Rehabilitation Facility

Defendant urges that the requirement that third time offenders placed on probation "be confined in county jail" is satisfied by placement in the "functional equivalent" of an alcohol rehabilitation facility. Thus, he urges that the phrase "county jail" should not be construed literally but rather by reference to other statutes in which the term appears. He relies on the case of People v. Sylvestry (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 169 Cal.Rptr. 575, to support this contention.

[149 Cal.App.3d 955] Sylvestry involved a defendant who spent 90 days in a rehabilitation facility prior to her conviction for violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550 (using or being under the influence of opiate). After conviction, the trial court imposed a 90-day county jail sentence as a condition of probation to satisfy the mandatory requirement of Health and Safety Code section 11550 that a convicted defendant "be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days." The trial court, relying on the provisions of Penal Code section 2900.5, 2 applied 90 days of presentence credit which the defendant had accrued in the rehabilitation facility to the county jail term imposed. As a result, the defendant was not required to spend any time in county jail despite the mandatory provisions of Health and Safety Code section 11550.

The Appellate Department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, construing Penal Code section 2900.5 and Health and Safety Code section 11550 together, affirmed the award of presentence credits, noting: " '[S]tatutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together and harmonized if possible.' (County of Placer v. Aetna Cas. etc. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 188-180 [323 P.2d 753].) If two constructions of a penal provision are possible, we must use the one favorable to the accused. (People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 143 [169 P.2d 1].) ... [p] ... To read section 11550 so narrowly that only jail can qualify is to read out all meaning to section 2900.5. Our application of 2900.5

to 11550 mandatory jail time harmonizes the two sections in preference to an absurd result." (Sylvestry, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d Supp, pp. 8-9, 169 Cal.Rptr. 575.)

Sylvestry is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. As the present case does not involve a question of presentence credits, the fact that Penal Code section 2900.5 authorizes such credit for time served in a rehabilitation facility is of no relevance. Unlike the court in Sylvestry, we are not called upon to harmonize two competing statutes but to interpret the plain meaning of Vehicle Code section 23171, subdivision (a), alone. That section requires confinement "in county jail" and does not mention placement in a rehabilitation facility.

Furthermore, the provisions of Penal Code section 2900.5 are largely irrelevant under the sentencing scheme created by Vehicle Code sections 23171, subdivision (a), and 23202. That scheme effectively precludes the [149 Cal.App.3d 956] accrual of credit for time spent in a rehabilitation facility prior to conviction and directly bars such placement after conviction.

Prior to conviction, the scheme is carried out by means of Vehicle Code section 23202, subdivision (a), which provides: "In any case in which a person is charged with a violation of [driving under the influence], prior to acquittal or conviction, the court shall not suspend or stay the proceedings for the purpose of allowing the accused person to attend or participate, ... in any ... treatment program for persons who are habitual users of alcohol or other alcoholism program, ..."

After conviction, the scheme is carried out by the mandatory language of Vehicle Code section 23171, subdivision (a), which, under our construction of that section, requires the court to impose a county jail term upon conviction. 3

At oral argument, defendant's counsel suggested that a literal interpretation of the term "county jail" might invalidate ongoing programs in various cities where persons sentenced pursuant to section 23171, subdivision (a), were placed in city...

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11 cases
  • People v. Allen
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 29 Noviembre 1993
    ... ... Ralph G. ALLEN, Defendant and Appellant ... No. B074134 ... Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California ... Nov. 29, 1993 ... Review Denied March ... November 15, 1990, the City Attorney filed a three-count complaint against Allen in the municipal court charging him with a violation of section 19401, subdivision (a) for failure to file personal ... [Citation.]" (People v. Municipal Court (Hinton) (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 951, 954, 197 Cal.Rptr. 204.) The Legislature could not have made it ... ...
  • People v. Weatherill
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 28 Noviembre 1989
    ... ... William Troy WEATHERILL, Defendant and Appellant ... No. B042229 ... Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California ... Nov. 28, 1989 ... Review Denied March ... Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 261, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732.) ...         Disaster ... (See People v. Municipal Court (Hinton) (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 951, 197 Cal.Rptr. 204; Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, ... ...
  • People v. Avol
    • United States
    • California Superior Court
    • 7 Abril 1987
    ... ... Crim. A. 23579, 23580 ... Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California ... April 7, 1987 ...         [192 Cal.App.3d Supp. 4] ... (People v. Municipal Court (Hinton) (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 951, 954-955, 197 Cal.Rptr. 204.) Here, however, no ... ...
  • People v. Superior Court (Beasley)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 15 Agosto 1984
    ... ... (People v. Municipal Court (Hinton) (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 951, 197 Cal.Rptr. 204.) Not only did the Legislature use the words "shall impose," but also admonitions were ... ...
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2 books & journal articles
  • Punishment
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Volume 2
    • 30 Marzo 2022
    ...shall qualify as mandatory time in jail. This language appears to overrule the holding in People v. Municipal Court (Hinton) (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 951, and People v. Darnell (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 806, that third or more offenders cannot substitute post-conviction residential alcohol treatme......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Appendices
    • 30 Marzo 2022
    ...§12:14.3 People v. Municipal Court (Gonzales) (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 114, §§9:117, 9:117.2 People v. Municipal Court (Hinton) (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 951, §§10:35.5, 10:42 People v. Municipal Court (Sansone) (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 199, §9:39.7 People v. Municipal Court for Cent. Judicial Dist. ......

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