People v. Municipal Court (Runyan)

• Citation: 143 Cal.Rptr. 609,574 P.2d 425,20 Cal.3d 523
• Parties: , 574 P.2d 425, 2 A.L.R.4th 681 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the PASADENA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent; Donald Gene RUNYAN, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. L.A. 30722.
• Decision Date: 20 January 1978
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

Page 609

143 Cal.Rptr. 609

20 Cal.3d 523, 574 P.2d 425, 2 A.L.R.4th 681

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT FOR the PASADENA JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent;

Donald Gene RUNYAN, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

L.A. 30722.

Supreme Court of California.

Jan. 20, 1978.

Rehearing Denied March 9, 1978.

[20 Cal.3d 525]

Page 610

[574 P.2d 426] Byron B. Gentry, City Pros., and Martin H. Wegman, Deputy City Pros., for plaintiff and appellant

[20 Cal.3d 526] Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., David R. Chaffee, Frederick R. Millar, Jr., Sandy Kriegler and Juliet H. Swoboda, Deputy Attys. Gen., John K. Van de Kamp, Dist. Atty., Harry B. Sondheim and Roderick W. Leonard, Deputy Dist. Attys., Burt Pines, City Atty., Los Angeles, and Mark A. Rosenbaum, Deputy City Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

No appearance for defendant and respondent.

Lewis R. Titus, Jr., Altadena, Horn & Hoppe and Michael J. Hoppe, Jr., Pasadena, for real party in interest and respondent.

RICHARDSON, Justice.

In this case we inquire whether courts may permit a defendant in a criminal case to depose prosecution witnesses prior to trial, despite the defendant's failure to establish, as required by statute (Pen.Code, § 1335 et seq.), that the witnesses are about to leave the state or are unlikely to attend the trial. We conclude that although courts possess broad inherent powers to provide for discovery in criminal cases, they should decline to exercise those powers in a manner which would ignore present statutory limitations or which would create a different, more extensive deposition procedure than that presently prescribed by statute.

In 1975 a complaint was filed in municipal court charging real party, Donald Gene Runyan, with drunk driving (Veh.Code, § 23102, subd. (a)), obstructing a public officer (Pen.Code, § 148), and vandalism (Pen.Code, § 594, subd. (a)). Shortly after the complaint was filed, real party's counsel filed a pretrial discovery motion seeking, among other things, to depose the police officers involved in the various charges. (Real party evidently intends to assert police brutality and falsification of evidence as defenses to these charges.)

Real party's motion was granted by the municipal court, despite objection by the People to the effect that the statutory conditions for invoking deposition procedure had not been met. The People thereupon unsuccessfully sought a writ of prohibition in superior court. The People [20 Cal.3d 527] have appealed denial of the writ. (See Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); Burrus v. Municipal

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[574 P.2d 427] Court (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 233, 235, 238, 111 Cal.Rptr. 539.)

There is statutory authorization for the "conditional examination" of witnesses in criminal cases. Penal Code section 1336 provides that "When a material witness for the defendant, or for the people, is about to leave the state, or is so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the trial, the defendant or the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined conditionally." Sections 1337 through 1345 describe the procedures for deposing such witnesses. Significantly, no provision is made for deposing witnesses who are not encompassed within the category of persons described in section 1336. On the contrary, section 1341 expressly provides that, "If, . . . the witness is not about to leave the state, or is not sick or infirm, . . . the examination cannot take place." It is not disputed that real party's application herein did not contain the requisite statutory allegations.

There are two aspects to real party's primary argument. The courts possess an inherent power to issue discovery orders in criminal cases. They may exercise that power to order the taking of depositions of material witnesses even though defendant has failed to comply with those mandates of the Penal Code described above. We agree with real party's first premise, but reject the second, concluding that these powers may not be exercised in a manner which conflicts with express statutory provisions.

In Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 900, 522 P.2d 305, 308, we recently expressed a controlling principle: "Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation. (Citations.) A defendant's motion to discover is addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice so demand. (Citations.)" (Italics added.) Pitchess expressly recognized that legislative silence on the subject of discovery "means that it has left to the courts the adaptation of common law concepts." (P. 536, 113 Cal.Rptr. p. 900, 522 P.2d p. 308, summarizing with approval a similar statement by Chief Justice Traynor in Shively v. Stewart (1966) 65 Cal.2d 475, 479, 55 Cal.Rptr. 217, 421 P.2d 65.) We stated the same principle in Hill v. Superior [20 Cal.3d 528] Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816, 112 Cal.Rptr. 257, 259, 518 P.2d 1353, 1355, footnote 3: "This court has developed rules of criminal discovery in the absence of legislation. (Citations.)" (Italics added.)

The exercise of a judicial power over criminal discovery which inheres in courts when the Legislature is silent must be tempered and restrained when the Legislature has spoken. In the matter before us the Legislature, pursuant to a constitutional grant, has expressed itself on the subject of depositions in criminal cases and has plainly declined to extend deposition procedures beyond those present confines carefully described in Penal Code section 1336. Accordingly, as will appear, we conclude that it would be inappropriate to exercise our inherent powers in conflict with existing legislation. As we have previously insisted, "The courts should only exercise those common law powers which are not otherwise repugnant to or inconsistent with our Constitution and statutes; inherent powers should never be exercised in such a manner as to nullify existing legislation or frustrate legitimate legislative policy." (Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649, 654, 94 Cal.Rptr. 398, 401, 484 P.2d 70, 73, italics added; see Martin v. Superior Court (1917) 176 Cal. 289, 296-297, 168 P. 135.)

An examination of the constitutional foundations of the criminal discovery rules reveals that before 1974, article I, section 13, of the California Constitution provided in pertinent part that: "The Legislature also shall have power to provide for the taking, in the presence of the party accused and his counsel, of depositions of witnesses in criminal cases, other than cases of homicide where there is reason to believe that

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[574 P.2d 428] the witness, from inability or other cause, will not attend at the trial." (Italics added.) By reason of the foregoing language of section 13, the state Constitution itself "seem(ed) to qualify the right to depositions in criminal cases . . . ." (Clark v. Superior Court (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 739, 741, 12 Cal.Rptr. 191, 192.)

In Clark, the court held that a defendant in a criminal case has no right to take the depositions of witnesses except in the limited situations permitted by the Constitution and statutes. The court further observed that the only relevant cases from other states had denied the right to take such depositions, and that "It is significant that the Legislature, over the years, has seen fit to provide for the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases only in the limited situations set forth in the before-mentioned code sections (Pen.Code, § 1335 et seq.)." (P. 741, 12 Cal.Rptr. p. 192.) [20 Cal.3d 529] The Clark court also found it "highly significant" that although the Legislature had liberalized civil discovery procedures in 1957, "it made no change in the statutes concerning depositions in criminal cases." (P. 742, 12 Cal.Rptr. p. 193.)

Clark also emphasized several relevant considerations, noting that the prosecution has no right to depose the defendant or his witnesses, that "(T)he right to take depositions should be a mutual one," and that defendant has reasonable alternative means of discovery, such as interviewing prosecution witnesses. (Pp. 742-743, 12 Cal.Rptr. p. 193.) It concluded that "If it is deemed advisable to change such a long-established procedure, such change should be made by the Legislature rather than by the courts, if for no other reason than that provision as to the manner of taking such depositions must be made. The defendant would be required necessarily to be present, and certainly a notary public's office or the office of the defendant's attorney (places in which depositions in civil cases may be taken) would hardly be fit places for the taking of the depositions of defendants in criminal cases, particularly defendants then in a jail or penitentiary. Also protection would have to be provided against using the taking of a deposition as merely an excuse for a junket trip for a confined defendant." (P. 743, 12 Cal.Rptr. p. 193.) Several Court of Appeal cases subsequent to Clark are in accord with its holding and with its underlying rationale. (See People v. Bowen (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 267, 277-280, 99 Cal.Rptr. 498; Everett v. Gordon, (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 667, 671, 72 Cal.Rptr. 379; People v. Oakley (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 520, 524, 59 Cal.Rptr. 478; People v. Mersino (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 265, 269, 46 Cal.Rptr. 821; Yannacone v. Municipal Court (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 72, 74-75, 34 Cal.Rptr. 838; see generally Comment, Depositions as a Means of Criminal Discovery, 7 U.S.F.L.Rev. 245.)

It is argued, however, that...