People v. Municipal Court (Byars)

• Decision Date: 31 January 1978
• Citation: 143 Cal.Rptr. 491,77 Cal.App.3d 294
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT OF the SANTA MONICA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent; Ronald BYARS and Michael Byars, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 52517.

Page 491

143 Cal.Rptr. 491

77 Cal.App.3d 294

The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The MUNICIPAL COURT OF the SANTA MONICA JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent Ronald BYARS and Michael Byars, Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 52517.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 31, 1978.

Hearing Denied May 11, 1978.

Richard L. Knickerbocker, City Atty., and James W. Webster, Deputy City Atty., for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow and Andrew D. Amerson, Deputy Attys. Gen., as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Lawrence Taylor, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

THOMPSON, Associate Justice.

In People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 258, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 478, 561 P.2d 1164, 1166, our Supreme Court held that "trial courts have the authority to recuse prosecuting attorneys in appropriate circumstances." Here we must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate to justify trial court action barring participation by a prosecuting attorney where: (1) a city attorney is charged by law with the obligation both of prosecuting misdemeanors within the city and of defending civil actions against the city and its agents; (2) a claim is pending against the city and its agents asserting liability to the defendants in the criminal prosecution arising out of the same incident which is the basis of the prosecution; (3) there is no evidence of personal, as opposed to purely professional and official, involvement of anyone in the prosecutor's office in the civil litigation; and (4) there is no evidence supporting an inference that the prosecutor is improperly utilizing the criminal proceeding as a vehicle to aid his function of defending claims against his employer.

We conclude that in that set of circumstances there is neither such conflict of interest nor appearance of impropriety as justifies action barring the city attorney from carrying out his prosecutorial function. We, therefore, order that a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to vacate its order barring the city attorney from acting as prosecutor in a criminal proceeding pending against real parties in interest.

Facts

Real parties in interest, Ronald and Michael Byars, were arrested by the Santa Monica police. On August 30, 1977, the Santa Monica City Attorney filed a misdemeanor complaint against them alleging that real parties in interest had committed battery and had resisted a public officer. On September 15, 1977, pursuant to Government Code section 900 et seq., Ronald and Michael Byars filed a claim for damages with the City of Santa Monica. The claim relates to the same altercation giving rise to the criminal complaint, and the arresting officers and the city are potential defendants in a lawsuit flowing from the incident. The claim asserts facts supporting causes of action for false arrest, battery, and invasion of privacy.

On September 20, 1977, Ronald and Michael Byars filed a motion in the criminal proceeding seeking to bar the Santa Monica City Attorney from acting as prosecutor, and seeking also a dismissal of the proceeding. The trial court granted the motion to bar the city attorney from performing his prosecutorial function in the pending criminal proceeding. We recite the evidence adduced at hearing on the motion in the light most favorable to the ruling of the trial court.

The City of Santa Monica is self-insured to the extent of the first $250,000 of damages payable by reason of a police officer's conduct within the scope of his employment. The city may be liable for actual damages resulting from such conduct but not for punitive damages. The Santa Monica City Attorney will defend both the city and its officers in any lawsuit brought upon the Byars' claim.

The city attorney is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Santa Monica City Council. The Santa Monica City Charter obligates the city attorney to prosecute misdemeanors and to appear for the city and its officers and employees in any civil proceeding to which they are a party.

At the hearing on the motion, the Byars' counsel disclaimed any reliance upon personal involvement of the city attorney or "individual prejudice." There is no evidence that prosecution of the civil action is being utilized to aid the defense of the claim against the city and its agents.

The trial judge stated that, based upon his own prior experiences as a city councilman and as a city attorney, he was aware that "a (c)ity (a)ttorney is cognizant of civil liability for which he is responsible, and that he is very aware that his tenure is dependent upon his successful handling of those cases." The court found that: "(w)here the (c)ity (a)ttorney has the responsibility of protecting the (c)ity against pecuniary loss by way of civil prosecutions (sic ), and he also has the duty to prosecute the individuals involved, . . . his discretion might be affected thereby as far as plea bargaining, et cetera (sic )." It found further that "if there is not actual conflict of interest there certainly is the appearance of a conflict of interest."

The trial court "recused" the City Attorney of Santa Monica and, because the district attorney had noted a conflict of interest, issued an order to show cause to the Attorney General to secure the latter's appearance as the prosecuting agency.

Acting through the Santa Monica City Attorney, the prosecution petitioned this court for a writ of mandate seeking review of the trial court order. Concluding that review by way of petition for writ of mandate is appropriate (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d 255, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164), we issued our alternative writ.

Discretion of Trial Court

The issue at bench reaches us on petition for writ of mandate. Thus, we can overturn the determination of the trial court only if that court acted in excess of its jurisdiction or there is no rational basis in the record supporting the manner in which the court exercised the power and discretion vested in it. (See State Farm etc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432, 304 P.2d 13; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 465, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701.)

Here the trial court possessed the power to bar the city attorney from prosecuting a particular case. (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 261, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164.) The issue thus is whether the record in the case at bench encompasses a rational basis for the trial court's action.

We conclude it does not.

The power to bar a duly authorized prosecutor or prosecuting agency from participation in a particular case exists only "in appropriate circumstances." (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 258, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164.) Those circumstances exist where factors extraneous to the prosecutor's official function impinge upon his obligation of prosecutorial impartiality, i. e., his interest " 'in a criminal prosecution . . . not that (he) shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.' " (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 266, 137 Cal.Rptr. at p. 483, 561 P.2d at p. 1171 quoting Berger v. United States (1935) 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314.) If such circumstances are present, or there is an undue appearance of their presence, then a trial court acts within its discretion if it bars the prosecutor from participation in the criminal proceeding. (People v. Superior Court (Greer), supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 266-267, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476, 561 P.2d 1164.)

Here the record is barren of any factor extraneous to the Santa Monica City Attorney's official function which impinges upon his obligation of prosecutorial impartiality. It is similarly barren of any evidence supporting the inference or implication that the criminal prosecution is in fact being utilized to reduce the city's civil liability exposure.

The record discloses nothing more than the proposition that the city attorney represents his municipality both as prosecutor and civil defender. While Judge Minter, who heard the motion, recited that his previous experience led him to the conclusion that the prosecutor's desire for tenure in office through success in civil litigation might lead him to be biased in the criminal proceeding, there is no...