People v. Myers
| Decision Date | 06 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 82964 |
| Citation | 404 N.W.2d 677,158 Mich.App. 1 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randy Lee MYERS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., G. Michael Hocking, Pros. Atty., and K. Davison Hunter, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
State Appellate Defender by Karla K. Goodman, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
Before BEASLEY, P.J., and R.B. BURNS and LOSTRACCO, * JJ.
Defendant, Randy Lee Myers, was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, and was sentenced to the mandatory life imprisonment provided in the statute. He appeals as of right, raising four issues.
First, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession made on April 5, 1984, because he did not receive a Miranda 1 warning in a prior interview with the police on March 30, 1984. Prior to trial, a Walker 2 hearing was held on August 21 and 22, 1984, to determine whether defendant's April 5, 1984, confession should be suppressed. Defendant did not testify at the Walker hearing and stated to the court that he did not wish to testify.
On March 30, 1984, the police had interviewed defendant and he had told them that he knew nothing about the victim's death and gave them no information which would lead them to believe that he was involved in the homicide. In connection with that interview, a police detective testified that he interviewed defendant because the investigation at that time was focused on people defendant allegedly brought to the scene of the murder on the night before the murder. At the interview, defendant was not under arrest. However, during the interview on March 30, 1984, the name of Kim Gregg came up. On April 4, 1984, Gregg was brought in for questioning and confessed to having participated in the murder of the victim, giving a statement implicating defendant. On April 5, 1984, defendant was arrested and interrogated, after being given his Miranda rights. During this interrogation, defendant admitted that he stabbed the victim, after which a tape-recorded statement was taken, which was read to the jury during the testimony of the police detective.
On appeal, defendant claims that he was the focus of the murder investigation on March 30, 1984, and, therefore, should have been given Miranda warnings prior to his interview by the police. Because defendant supplied the police with Kim Gregg's name in his March 30, 1984, interrogation, he says that Gregg's statement on April 4, 1984, was the tainted fruit of illegal police action. Accordingly, defendant argues that there was a direct causal connection between such illegality and defendant's April 5, 1984, confession.
Finding that there was no connection between defendant's March 30, 1984, statement and his April 5, 1984, confession, the trial court also concluded that defendant's March 30, 1984, statement was given in the course of a criminal investigation and under circumstances that did not require defendant to be advised of his Miranda rights. The trial court specifically noted:
"Further, the court finds: 1) It was not a custodial environment; 2) It was not a coercive environment; 3) There was no deprivation of freedom; 4) The Defendant was not under arrest; 5) The Defendant was not focused as the only suspect and the interview was not accusatory of him and permitted him to leave; and 6) The Defendant was apparently capable of fully comprehending and understanding the investigation interview, regardless of whether or not he had previously utilized a controlled substance."
Our review of the record reveals evidentiary support for the trial court's findings. While there has been some division of opinion in this Court over whether to apply the "focus" standard 3 or the "custody" standard 4 to determine when Miranda warnings must be given, we believe that under either the focus or the custody standard defendant is not entitled to have the alleged fruit of his March 30, 1984, statement to the police suppressed because it was made without benefit of the Miranda warnings. On March 30, defendant was merely one of many people the police interviewed in connection with the victim's murder. At that time there was no evidence linking defendant to the killing, nor did the police appear to consider him a prime suspect. Also, he was not deprived of his freedom in any significant way. He was not under arrest and could have left the State Police post at any time during his interview. Therefore, we do not believe that defendant was the focus of the murder investigation on March 30, 1984.
Review under the custody standard discloses that on March 30, 1984, defendant was not under arrest and voluntarily went to the State Police post. While there, he was free to leave at any time. During the interview, defendant was not questioned in a continuous, overbearing way or in a menacing manner. Furthermore, after receiving defendant's permission to search his truck and prior to the search, the police allowed defendant to remove any illicit drugs that may have been in his truck. After the interview, the police did not appear to consider defendant a suspect and allowed him to leave the police post in his truck. Thus, we conclude that defendant was not in custody on March 30, 1984. If there was a causal connection between defendant's giving the police the name of Kim Gregg and defendant's confession (and we are not inclined to believe there was), it was not police generated. 5 Thus, we conclude that there was no error in denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession made on April 5, 1984, because of the failure to give Miranda warnings before his statement on March 30, 1984.
Defendant's second argument is that the trial court erred in ruling that his confession of April 5, 1984, was voluntary and admissible. Defendant's support for this argument is his claim that he validly asserted his right to counsel during the interrogation of April 5, 1984, but before he made his recorded confession. Defendant says that once this assertion of the right to counsel had been made, the police could no longer proceed in questioning him until and unless defendant spoke with an attorney.
The officers spoke with defendant for between thirty and forty-five minutes prior to turning on a tape recorder and obtaining defendant's confession. There are differing versions, all given by Detective Sergeant Kowalski of the Michigan State Police, as to what discussion there was regarding an attorney during this time. A portion of the preliminary examination transcript, which was also read at the Walker hearing, discloses the following:
Sgt. Kowalski also gave the following testimony at the Walker hearing:
Defendant's Miranda rights had been explained to him prior to this part of the conversation and were again explained to him at the beginning of the tape-recorded confession. Both the defense and the prosecution refer to the following language in Miranda as the prime statement of defendant's rights in this regard:
6
Following Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held as follows in Edwards v. Arizona: 7
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Siler
...discretion. People v. Burgess, 153 Mich.App. 715, 722-723, 396 N.W.2d 814 (1986), lv den 428 Mich. 868 (1987); People v. Myers, 158 Mich.App. 1, 17, 404 N.W.2d 677 (1987). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the dete......
-
People v. Daniels
...on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Holliday, 144 Mich.App. 560, 573, 376 N.W.2d 154 (1985); People v. Myers, 158 Mich.App. 1, 16-17, 404 N.W.2d 677 (1987). We find no abuse of discretion here. The jacket was relevant to show the location of the wounds, which in turn wer......
-
Robinson, Matter of
...exercise of discretion will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of clear abuse of such discretion. People v. Myers, 158 Mich.App. 1, 17, 404 N.W.2d 677 (1987). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi......
-
Craig v. White, No. 00-70002 (E.D. Mich. 2/28/2001)
...in having counsel requires cessation of police interrogation. People v. White, 477 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Myers, 404 N.W.2d 677 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). We hold that the trial court properly concluded that defendant did not invoke his immediate right to counsel when he mi......