People v. Nastasio
| Citation | 30 Ill.2d 51,195 N.E.2d 144 |
| Decision Date | 26 November 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 37067,37067 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Joseph NASTASIO, alias Anthony Noletti, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Robert S. Cohen and Hugh J. Graham, Springfield, for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Raymond L. Terrell, State's Atty., Springfield , for appellee.
The defendant was indicted, tried before a jury and convicted of the felony of attempting to escape jail while he was an inmate therein waiting to be tried for the crime of taking indecent liberties with a minor.
On April 28, 1961, a hole approximately 24 by 30 was discovered in the prisoner section of the Sangamon County jail. The evidence indicated that this hole had been chiseled through three of the four layers of the outer brick wall of one of the upper cell blocks by certain of the prisoners, including the defendant, over a period of several days. The work was accomplished behind a blanket which was placed over the work area for the apparent purpose of being dried.
The defendant during this time was being held awaiting trial on felony charges of taking indicent liberties with a minor. He was also being held pursuant to recent felony convictions of assault with intent to commit a crime against nature and assault with intent to commit rape. The sheriff testified that the defendant had been designated by him as a 'floor boy' and as such was not confined to his individual cell at night, but was permitted access to the entire cell block. He also had the duty of seeing that each prisoner received his food and was to report any disturbances to the sheriff. During the period that the hole was being dug the defendant did not report any unusual activity.
He did admit that he knew of the digging, but claimed that he did not participate therein and that he never stated that he intended to leave. The sheriff testified that upon discovering the hole he questioned the defendant who claimed that he tried to tell the sheriff of its existence the day before the hole was discovered. However, the sheriff further testified that he talked to the defendant several times during the period that the hole was dug and that the defendant did not mention same.
The Criminal Code provides that a prisoner who attempts to escape from custody shall, 'if awaiting trial for or convicted of a misdemeanor, be guilty of a misdemeanor * * * or he shall, if awaiting trial for or convicted of a felony, be guilty of a felony * * *.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, par. 228b.
In seeking a reversal here the defendant makes many and various contentions, the first being that the indictment is insufficient because the charge is set forth only in the language of the statute. As a result it allegedly does not sufficiently describe the nature of the charge, so as to enable defendant to prepare a defense thereto and plead the judgment in bar of a later prosecution. (Ill.Const., art. II, sec. 9, S.H.A.) In support of the foregoing he points out that the indictment is defective because it does not set forth in detail what act the defendant consummated in furtherance of his attempted escape nor does it allege that the escape was unsuccessful.
Recently, this court had before it the case of People v. Hill, 17 Ill.2d 112, 160 N.E.2d 779, in which the defendant was charged with unlawful escape from jail. We there stated: This same rationale is applicable to the instant case and the indictment in our opinion is sufficient. The authority cited by the defendant which holds defective indictments drafted under the general attempt section of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 38, par. 581) is not applicable here. People v. Glickman, 377 Ill. 360, 365, 36 N.E.2d 720.
The defendant next contends that the sole evidence of his guilt is the uncorroborated oral testimony of accomplices, and that the same is insufficient proof of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An examination of the record discloses that nine witnesses testified as to the events which occurred. Some of them were accomplices, but not all. However, all were confined in the county jail at the time of the attempted escape. George Harry Tanner testified that the defendant gave him the end of a mop for use in making the hole and which he said to Tanner and other prisoners would be completed in three or four days. He also warned Tanner to keep his mouth shut. The witness Tommy Lee Ford related a conversation in the cell of the defendant in which the defendant said he would be the first out of the hole when it was finished, but that he would dig in a different spot. Ford also testified that the defendant acted as lookout for the diggers. Tanner and another witness, Frank Chimento, stated that they saw the defendant working in the hole and heard the defendant say he would be the first out of the hole; also that he warned the other prisoners not to say anything after the digging was discovered. Herman Strader testified that the defendant told him to keep his mouth shut. The testimony of Frank Chimento also verifies much of the above testimony inasmuch as he also heard the defendant warn the other prisoners to keep their mouths shut and that he would be one of the first out of the hole when the same was completed. Two of the above witnesses, Tommy Lee Ford and Herman Strader, were not accomplices in the crime, and neither were indicted for the offense charged here, nor is there any testimony in the record that they participated in the attempted break.
The defendant claims that the testimony of Chimento is not worthy of belief, because he was granted immunity when he appeared before the grand jury. In the case of People v. Flaherty, 396 Ill. 304, 71 N.E.2d 779, this contention was made and this court therein stated that a conviction may be based on the testimony of an accomplice if it is of such a character as to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt even though the witness admits that he expects leniency. People v. Johnston, 382 Ill. 233, 46 N.E.2d 967; People v. Wagman, 311 Ill. 330, 142 N.E. 743.
We are of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to justify the finding of the guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the cases cited as contrary is People v. Palmer, 26 Ill.2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236. However, in that case we held that the evidence of an accomplice is competent, even without corroboration, and a conviction based thereon will be sustained if the trier of facts is convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Perroni, 14 Ill.2d 581, 592, 153 N.E.2d 578.
The defendant further complains about the court's action in reference to certain testimony to the effect that the witness George Harry Tanner had a dislike for the defendant. On cross-examination the defense counsel was permitted to question the witness about this dislike, which was readily admitted by the witness. On re-direct he was then asked as to the reason for this dislike and he stated that it was because the defendant had acted as district attorney in a kangaroo court held in the jail in which he (the witness) was sentenced to be tattooed on the buttocks, and also because the defendant had forced him to engage in a sex act with him. There was no error in the admission of this testimony as it was not objected to in the trial court and any objection here comes too late. (People v. Prohaska, 8 Ill.2d 579, 134 N.E.2d 799.) The defendant argues, however, that because he received certain adverse publicity through the news media in the years 1958 and 1959 in connection with a murder charge and certain alleged sexual crimes, the court should not have allowed this line of questioning, even though no objection was made. There is nothing in the record concerning these matters, however, and their effect, if any, upon the defendant's trial two to three years later cannot now be ascertained. No reversible error was committed by the trial court by the admission of this testimony.
The defendant next contends that it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to allow the defendant to explain certain evidence offered by the prosecution and admitted by the trial court relating to the charges upon which the defendant was being held. In the course of the trial it was...
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