People v. Naylor

Decision Date26 February 2007
Docket NumberNo. 1-04-3731.,1-04-3731.
Citation864 N.E.2d 718
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John NAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Cook County, Chicago (James Fitzgerald, Anthony O'Brien, Tamerla Eleby, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Cook County, Chicago (Patrick F. Cassidy, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.

Presiding Justice McBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following an August 2004 bench trial, defendant, John Naylor, was found guilty of four felony narcotics charges: possession of heroin with intent to deliver while on Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) property, delivery of heroin on CHA property, possession of heroin with intent to deliver and delivery of heroin. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years' imprisonment and imposed a total of $2,720 in fines, assessments, costs and fees.

Defendant appeals, arguing that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted his prior conviction for aggravated battery because the conviction was entered 14 years prior to trial; (2) three of defendant's convictions should be vacated because they are lesser included offenses of delivery of a controlled substance on CHA property; (3) defendant should be awarded $5-per-day presentence credit for the 101 days he was in custody prior to sentencing toward his $2,000 fine for possession of a controlled substance; and (4) the statute mandating that persons convicted of drug-related offenses be assessed a $5 fee for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund (Spinal Cord Fund) violates defendant's due process rights because there is no rational relationship between the sale of a controlled substance and the public interest in the Spinal Cord Fund.

The following evidence was presented at defendant's August 2004 bench trial. The State proceeded at trial on four of the six counts from defendant's indictment: possession of a heroin with intent to deliver while on CHA property, delivery of heroin on CHA property, possession of heroin with intent to deliver, and delivery of heroin.

Officer John Lewis testified that he is a Chicago police officer assigned to the narcotics and gang investigation section.

On March 9, 2000, Officer Lewis was working in the vicinity of 4429 S. Federal in Chicago. 4429 S. Federal is part of the Robert Taylor Homes, which is property owned by CHA. On that date, Officer Lewis, in conjunction with other officers, was conducting an operation to suppress narcotics activity in Robert Taylor Homes. Officer Lewis's role was to make a controlled narcotics purchase.

Officer Lewis was in civilian dress. He entered the Robert Taylor Homes at about 10:20 a.m. He went to the north fourth-floor stairwell. He met an individual who asked Officer Lewis if he wanted "white," which Officer Lewis understood to mean heroin. Officer Lewis identified that individual as defendant. Officer Lewis responded to defendant that he wanted one foil packet. Officer Lewis paid with a $10 bill of prerecorded "1505 funds." The serial number from the bill was recorded prior to the purchase. Officer Lewis exchanged the $10 bill for one tinfoil packet containing a white powder he suspected was heroin. Officer Lewis then left the stairwell.

Officer Lewis saw defendant again 10 to 15 minutes later when defendant was being led out of the building by Officer William McKenna. Officer McKenna then returned the $10 prerecorded bill to Officer Lewis. He inventoried the $10 bill and the tinfoil packet.

On cross-examination, Officer Lewis stated that he made one purchase that day. Officers Boggan, Boyd and Espinosa were also present in the stairwell when Officer Lewis made his purchase. Defendant was standing with a couple of other individuals. Officer Boyd was standing behind Officer Lewis in line for a purchase. Officer Lewis said all four officers made purchases. Then, they all exited the building. Officer Lewis did not know from whom the other officers purchased. Each of the officers returned to his vehicle and radioed the physical and clothing descriptions of the individuals. Defendant was arrested along with a few other individuals. From inside his unmarked car, Officer Lewis saw defendant being brought out of the building. Officer Lewis admitted that he did not see Officer McKenna recover the $10 bill from defendant.

Detective Deon Boyd testified that he is currently a detective with Area 2 homicide in the Chicago police department, but in March 2000, he was a police officer assigned to the organized crime, narcotics, section.

On March 9, 2000, Detective Boyd was working in the vicinity of 4429 S. Federal in Chicago. He was working as an undercover officer at a CHA housing complex. He was working with Officer Opal Espinosa and also saw Officers Lewis and Boggan at that location. Once at that location, he was told by several people to go to the fourth-floor stairwell.

When he reached the fourth-floor stairwell, Detective Boyd saw a line of individuals making narcotics purchases. Officer Lewis was leaving the line when Detective Boyd reached the line. When Detective Boyd got to the front of the line, he came into contact with a man he identified as defendant. Detective Boyd asked defendant to get two packages of narcotics. He had a $20 bill of "1505 prerecorded funds" with him for the purchase. The serial number of the $20 bill had been prerecorded. Detective Boyd tendered the $20 bill in exchange for two tinfoil packets. Detective Boyd opened the packets and saw a white powder substance that he suspected was heroin. Detective Boyd then exited the stairwell.

Detective Boyd and Officer Espinosa then returned to their undercover vehicle and informed the enforcement team of defendant's description. After the enforcement team arrived on the scene, they apprehended defendant and several other individuals. Detective Boyd saw defendant with Officer McKenna. Officer McKenna later returned the $20 bill of prerecorded funds to Detective Boyd. He inventoried the tinfoil packets and the $20 bill.

On cross-examination, Detective Boyd said he thought three or four people were arrested that day. He knew one individual that was arrested was Kohler Parks, from whom he saw Officer Espinosa buy drugs. He did not see from whom Officers Lewis or Boggan purchased drugs.

The State offered a stipulation that, if called to testify, Timothy Tripp, a forensic chemist with the Illinois State Police crime cab, would state that he tested the powder from each of the tinfoil packets submitted by Officer Lewis and Detective Boyd. He would testify that the substance in the packet recovered from Officer Lewis tested positive for the presence of heroin and that one of the packets submitted by Detective Boyd tested positive for heroin. The defense did not object to this stipulation.

The State rested after the stipulation was entered. Defendant then moved for a directed finding, which the trial court denied.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He said that on March 9, 2000, he was living in apartment 902 at 4429 S. Federal. He said he was arrested that day by the Chicago police department. He denied being in possession of money from drug sales. Defendant said that all he remembered was being arrested with a lot of people and placed in a "paddy wagon." He denied selling drugs that day.

Defendant said he was coming down the stairs from his apartment when he was jumped and sprayed in his face with mace. He remembers asking for a paramedic because his eyes were burning.

On cross-examination, defendant said he did not remember which floor he was on when the police sprayed him with mace. He repeated several times that all he remembered was getting sprayed. He said that when he left his apartment, he was going to pick up his son from kindergarten.

After defendant testified, the State offered a certified copy of defendant's 1990 conviction for aggravated battery as rebuttal evidence. Defendant's attorney objected to its admission based on the length of time since defendant's release as being more than 10 years. The trial court overruled defendant's objection and admitted the certified copy of the conviction.

The trial court found defendant guilty on all counts. At a November 2004 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced to six years' imprisonment based on "four counts of guilty." The trial court also imposed a total of $2,720 in fines, fees, assessments, and costs, including a $2,000 drug assessment and $5 fee for the Spinal Cord Fund.

This appeal followed.

Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly admitted his prior conviction for aggravated battery because defendant's prior conviction occurred more than 10 years before his current trial. The State initially responds that defendant has waived this issue on appeal by failing to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. In the alternative, the State maintains that the trial court properly allowed the prior conviction as impeachment because defendant's sentence on that charge extended into the 10-year period between defendant's release from prison and defendant's arrest and trial.

Defendant concedes that he failed to raise this issue in his posttrial motion, but asks this court to review this issue as plain error. Supreme Court Rule 615(a) states that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). "Under the plain error rule, issues not properly preserved may be considered by a reviewing court under two limited circumstances: (1) where the evidence is closely balanced, so as to preclude argument that an innocent person was...

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4 cases
  • Clay v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Georgia
    • April 11, 2012
    ......See Washington v. Ong, No. 63825–4–I, 2009 WL 4024841, at *3 (Wash.Ct.App.2009); Illinois v. Naylor", 372 Ill.App.3d 1, 309 Ill.Dec. 477, 864 N.E.2d 718, 724 (2007); Whiteside v. Indiana, 853 N.E.2d 1021, 1027–1028(I) (Ind.Ct.App.2006).     \xC2"......
  • People v. Naylor
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • July 24, 2008
  • People v. Farrell
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 16, 2007
    ......Instead, the courts have repeatedly endorsed the test as set forth in Montgomery (see, e.g., People v. Naylor, 372 Ill.App.3d 1, 6, 309 Ill.Dec. 477, 864 N.E.2d 718, 722 (2007)) and specifically rejected the newer versions of Rule 609 (People v. Yost, 78 Ill.2d 292, 295, 35 Ill.Dec. 755, 399 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 (1980)). The Montgomery opinion concluded, "In our opinion, the provisions of [proposed Rule 609] ......
  • People v. Naylor
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • May 1, 2007
1 books & journal articles
  • Witness
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Trial Objections
    • May 5, 2022
    ...convictions were not recent, it could not be said that the trial court applied the balancing test improperly. People v. Naylor, 864 N.E.2d 718, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). Under the Montgomery rule that permits the admission of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes if less than ten year......

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