People v. Neal

Decision Date14 July 2003
Docket NumberNo. S106440.,S106440.
Citation72 P.3d 280,1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650,31 Cal.4th 63
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kenneth Ray NEAL, Defendant and Appellant.

Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant.

John T. Philipsborn, San Francisco, and Charles D. Weisselberg, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Louis Vasquez, Janet Neeley, Robert P. Whitlock and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

It long has been settled under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that an involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. (See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 U.S. 278, 285-286, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682.) In Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (Miranda), recognizing that any statement obtained by an officer from a suspect during custodial interrogation may be potentially involuntary because such questioning may be coercive, the United States Supreme Court held that such a statement may be admitted in evidence only if the officer advises the suspect of both his or her right to remain silent and right to have counsel present at questioning, and the suspect waives those rights and agrees to speak to the officer. The court further held in Miranda that if the suspect indicates that he or she does not wish to speak to the officer or wants to have counsel present at questioning, the officer must end the interrogation. In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880,68 L.Ed.2d 378 (Edwards), the high court held that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel, the officer may not resume questioning on another occasion until counsel is present, unless the suspect voluntarily initiates further contact. In Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (Harris), the court held that although a statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be introduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief, Miranda was not intended to grant the suspect license to lie in his or her testimony at trial, and thus if an ensuing statement obtained in violation of Miranda is voluntary, the statement nonetheless may be admitted to impeach a defendant who testifies differently at trial.

In People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212, we addressed the issue whether a law enforcement officer's intentional continuation of interrogation of a defendant, in spite of the defendant's invocation of his or her right to counsel—in deliberate violation of Miranda—renders the statement obtained by the officer inadmissible even for impeachment purposes. We concluded that in light of the emphasis in Harris that Miranda should not be interpreted to permit a defendant to testify falsely at trial with impunity, under Harris the officer's misconduct in Peevy did not affect the admissibility of the statement as impeachment evidence. (Id. at pp. 1193-1194, 1203-1205, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212.)

In the present case, we address an issue related to the question before us in Peevy but nonetheless distinct. Here, a law enforcement officer, in his initial custodial interrogation of defendant, intentionally continued interrogation of defendant in deliberate violation of Miranda in spite of defendant's repeated invocation of both his right to remain silent and right to counsel—indeed, as we shall see, defendant nine times requested to speak with an attorney. Furthermore, the officer here not only continued the questioning improperly but badgered defendant, accusing him of lying and informing defendant that "this is your one chance" to help himself and that "if you don't try and cooperate ..., the system is going to stick it to you as hard as they can." Despite this badgering, defendant did not admit his guilt at that session. After the session ended, however, defendant was placed in custody and kept in jail overnight without access to counsel or other noncustodial personnel and without food or drink or toilet facilities. The following morning, defendant asked to speak to the officer, who thereafter met with him, resumed questioning, and ultimately obtained two confessions from him.

Prior to trial, the trial court granted a motion by defendant to suppress the portion of his initial exculpatory statement obtained in violation of Miranda (except for impeachment purposes), but denied his motion to suppress his two subsequent confessions. At defendant's trial on a charge of murder, the People introduced defendant's two confessions as part of their case-in-chief but did not introduce any portion of his initial exculpatory statement for any purpose. The issue presented here—which the People themselves characterize as a "close question"—is whether defendant acted voluntarily in initiating further contact with the officer on the day following the initial interrogation session, and whether defendant acted voluntarily in making the confessions that followed shortly thereafter.

As we shall explain, we conclude that in light of all the surrounding circumstances—including the officer's deliberate violation of Miranda; defendant's youth, inexperience, minimal education, and low intelligence; the deprivation and isolation imposed on defendant during his confinement; and a promise and a threat made by the officer—defendant's initiation of further contact with the officer was involuntary, and his two subsequent confessions were involuntary as well. As a result, we conclude not only that those confessions were inadmissible in the People's case-in-chief because they were obtained in violation of Edwards, but also that they were inadmissible for any purpose because they were involuntary. The consequence of the officer's misconduct—the absolute inability to introduce the confessions at trial—is severe, but is intended to deter other officers from engaging in misconduct of this sort in the future.

We therefore shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which concluded that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress his two confessions, and that in any event any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In finding no error, the Court of Appeal did not adequately take into account the circumstances establishing involuntariness, especially the officer's deliberate violation of Miranda. Further, we conclude that the Court of Appeal could not have properly concluded that the admission of the confessions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lastly, we note that at any retrial the confessions will be inadmissible for any purpose, because they were involuntary.1

I

Defendant Kenneth Ray Neal was charged with the murder of Donald Collins and pleaded not guilty (Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)). Following trial, a jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of second degree murder. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, imposing a term of imprisonment of 15 years to life.

A

Viewed in the light most favorable to the ensuing judgment, the evidence presented by the People at defendant's trial, including two confessions that defendant made to Detective Mario Martin of the Tulare County Sheriffs Office, reveals the following facts.

On April 3, 1999, the murder victim, Donald Collins, 69 years of age, six feet three inches in height, and 240 pounds in weight, resided in a small studio apartment at Sequoia Dawn, an apartment complex for retired persons located in Springville in Tulare County. Living with him was defendant, who was 18 years of age, five feet 10 inches tall, and approximately 143 pounds. Collins had met and befriended defendant some years earlier, when Collins was a child care worker and defendant a resident at Pioneer Home, a group home for boys located in Porterville in Tulare County. Collins often would refer to defendant as his grandson; defendant, however, usually would not refer to Collins as his grandfather. Some weeks before April 3, Collins had wired money to defendant, who then was in Oklahoma, to enable him to return to Tulare County by bus. Collins gave defendant keys to his apartment and also to his automobile.

On the evening of April 3, after Collins set two cheeseburgers to cook on an electric griddle and turned on an exhaust fan, he settled into an easy chair in front of a television. As Collins was seated, defendant strangled him from behind by tightening an electrical cord around his neck, deliberately and with substantial force, for a considerable period of time—perhaps from three to seven minutes. Defendant had taken the electrical cord from the electric griddle, and had cut off its ends with a kitchen knife. Collins may have consumed some wine during the afternoon, but apparently was unimpaired. Defendant consumed some vodka around the same time, but did not become intoxicated. The triggering cause of defendant's attack was an argument he had with Collins some 30 minutes earlier, concerning which television programs to watch. The underlying cause was somewhat deeper: Collins was homosexual but long had been simply a good friend of defendant's, never having made any sexual advances toward him. But on two occasions within a week of the killing, as defendant was sleeping, Collins had made unwelcome advances, attempting to touch defendant's penis.

After the killing, defendant wiped surfaces throughout the apartment to eliminate his fingerprints. In addition, defendant wrote the following note, which he left on a dining room table: "Dad Im Sorry I did not mean it really Your foster son Jon Adkins. [¶] 3/4/99 morning Bitch ass [¶] J.A." Adkins was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
487 cases
  • People v. Gayanich, A113729 (Cal. App. 4/27/2007)
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • April 27, 2007
    ...doubt that the assumed error did not contribute to the verdict. (People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86; People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1221-1222; .) For Blakely error to require reversal, the error " `must have affected the out......
  • People v. Molano
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • June 27, 2019
    ...circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the [encounter]" ....’ " ( People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 80, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.)At the station, Dudek again read the Miranda rights, and defendant acknowledged that he understood them. He concedes t......
  • People v. Dykes
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • June 15, 2009
    ...of the California Constitution. (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 267, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 67, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) To determine the voluntariness of a confession, courts examine "`whether a defendant's will was overborne' by......
  • People v. Henderson
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • July 30, 2020
    ...Chapman standard.Such compelling evidence is absent here. Instead, this case is arguably weaker than that in People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280, where we reversed a conviction due to the erroneous admission of the defendant's confessions. In that case, the v......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Search and seizure
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Volume 1
    • March 30, 2022
    ...guilty verdict. People v. Meza (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 604, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 and People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86. In Meza , the test result obtained from the officer-directed blood draw should have been suppressed, but the Court found “harmless error......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books California Drunk Driving Law - Volume 1-2 Appendices
    • March 30, 2022
    ...v. Nava (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1807, §7:84.1 People v. Navarette (2016) 4 Cal. App. 5th 829, 849–50, §§4:23, 9:103.1 People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86, §7:83.3 People v. Neal (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 820, §10:26.29 People v. Nelson (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, §8:23 People v. Nelson (20......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT