People v. Nebbitt

• Decision Date: 01 August 1960
• Docket Number: Cr. 7214
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Maurice NEBBITT, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 8

7 Cal.Rptr. 8

183 Cal.App.2d 452

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Maurice NEBBITT, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 7214.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 1, 1960.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 22, 1960.

Hearing Denied Sept. 20, 1960.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

LILLIE, Justice.

Defendant was convicted by the trial court of having marijuana in his possession in violation of Section 11530, Health & Safety Code. His motion for new trial was denied and he was sentenced to the County Jail for 180 days. He appeals on the ground that there was no probable cause for his arrest and that the search and seizure resulting therefrom were unlawful.

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to respondent, discloses that the officers who originally arrested defendant on grand theft auto (SECTION 503, VEHICLE CODE )¹ had reasonable cause to believe him guilty of the charge, and that the subsequent seizure of marijuana cigarettes from the car in which he was riding and his jacket found in the vehicle, was valid. As Officers Maloof and Bernard were riding in a police car on Adams Boulevard around 4 p. m. on November 29, they observed a vehicle bearing no front license plate traveling in the opposite direction. They made a U-turn and, noticing thereon no rear license plate, stopped the car, which was being driven by James Smith accompanied in the front seat by defendant. Officer Maloof asked Smith for his driver's license, which he produced; then he asked if the vehicle was his, to which he responded that it was not. He said he did not know to whom the car belonged but that he had gotten it an hour before from a Mr. Curtis, who was a car dealer, and from whom he had previously purchased a car, and who had 'loaned him this car as a loaner while his car was being repaired.' Thereupon, Maloof looked at the temporary registration sticker on the windshield of the car, which bore the name of Lillian Smith, 702 Vernon Avenue, as having purchased the vehicle on November 3 from Tom Curtis. Maloof asked Smith if he knew Lillian Smith; he said he did not. Smith produced nothing in documentary form to show either that he had purchased a car from Tom Curtis or was using the one he was deiving with the owner's permission; Maloof testified: 'If he (Smith) had had anything documentary, I wouldn't have bothered him.' Smith's statements as to how he obtained the vehicle, appearing to be inconsistent with information disclosed on the registration sticker; his lack of knowledge of the owner of the car which vehicle displayed no license plates; the unlikelihood of Curtis, the dealer, being able to give Smith the car as a 'loaner' when it had only recently been purchased from him by a third person whom Smith did not know; and defendant, self-conceded friend of Smith, and his passenger, having no information concerning the car's owner and Lillian Smith, its recent purchaser, all inclined the officers to a 'very strong suspicion' that they had taken and/or were driving the vehicle without consent of the owner (Section 503, Vehicle Code), whereupon they arrested the two men. Thereafter as a normal procedure before impounding the vehicle, the officers began an inventory of all personal property found therein. Maloof picked up a jacket on the front seat where defendant had been sitting and noticed in plain sight a brownish cigarette; he did not know whether it had fallen out of the jacket or had been lying under it. However, inasmuch as it appeared to him to be marijuana, the officer then searched the jacket and found another such cigarette in the left hand pocket. With the two cigarettes (later determined to be marijuana) in one hand and the jacket in the other, Maloof asked '(W)hose are these?' Defendant answered 'That's my jacket. I don't know anything about anything else.' The officer then searched the vehicle but found nothing more. Smith and defendant were taken to the police station where Mr. Curtis was called; he said that Smith had permission to use the vehicle. Later in the day in the presence of Maloof at the station, Smith said to defendant: 'Man, you better tell the truth about those cigarettes. I don't want to go to jail for something you have done.' Defendant then told the officers he had purchased them about a week before somewhere on Central Avenue but that he had been drunk and no longer remembered how many he had bought.

Defendant testified at the trial that prior to his arrest he showed Officer Bernard his driver's license, social security card and identification card; that Smith showed Maloof a contract of sale from Curtis for Smith's own car which was being repaired; that he had no knowledge of the marijuana cigarettes prior to their discovery by officers and that the day preceding, defendant's jacket, for some time, had been hanging in the tackroom at the end of the barn at the race track where he was employed, to which others had access.

At the trial defendant's objection to the introduction in evidence of the two marijuana cigarettes, on the ground they were secured as the result of an illegal search and seizure, was overruled. The issue before us is whether there was probable cause for the arrest of defendant, and the validity of the subsequent search and seizure of the narcotic.

It is conceded that no warrant was involved; thus for the arrest to be valid the officers must have had reasonable cause to believe that Smith and defendant had taken and/or driven the vehicle without consent of the owner, a felony (Section 836, subd. 3, Penal Code; Section 503, Vehicle Code). As to what constitutes 'reasonable cause', there is no formula for its determination, each case being dependent on its own facts and circumstances (Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374; People v. Wickliff, 144 Cal.App.2d 207, 300 P.2d 749). 'Reasonable cause' is defined by our Supreme Court 'to be such a state of facts as would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime (citation). Probable cause has also been defined as having more evidence for than against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room for doubt (citations)' (People v. Ingle, 53 Cal.2d 407, 2 Cal.Rptr. 14, 17; People v. Fischer, 49 Cal.2d 442, 317 P.2d 967; People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799). As to how reasonable cause shall be determined in a given case, the court shall consider the facts and circumstances presented or apparent to the officer at the time he was required to act (People v. Evans, 175 Cal.App.2d 274, 345 P.2d 947; People v. Hollins, 173 Cal.App.2d 88, 343 P.2d 174; People v. Silvestri, 150 Cal.App.2d 114, 309 P.2d 871). In this connection it should be borne in mind that the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trial court and, as it had a right to do, it accepted the testimony of the police officers relative to what occurred prior to defendant's arrest, and rejected the latter's version of the same.

We deem the information and circumstances presented to the police officers at the time they arrested the two men for grand theft auto to constitute reasonable cause for them to believe they had committed the offense; the evidence in the record before us and considered by the lower court is sufficient to sustain its finding of reasonable cause. The vehicle in which defendant, a friend of Smith, was riding and which was being operated by the latter on a public highway displayed neither front nor rear license plates, whereupon the officers stopped the car. They told the officers neither was the owner, they did not know to whom the automobile belonged, and that Smith had borrowed it an hour before from Curtis, a used car dealer; however, the registration sticker on the windshield showed the car to have been purchased some three weeks before, on November 3, from Curtis by a third person, not known to either Smith or defendant. Although they produced identification cards to the officers, they did not produce any kind of documentary evidence to show that the car had been loaned to them either by the registered owner or Curtis, or that Smith had previously purchased a car from the latter. It was this information the officers had in their possession at the time they arrested the two men.

Relative to the propriety of the officers in stopping the car in the first instance, it is clear under Sections 5200, 5201, 5202, Vehicle Code, requiring display of license plates, that the vehicle was being operated on a public highway in violation of the law; and that they were not only justified in stopping it but it was their duty as law enforcement officers to do so (People v. West, 144 Cal.App.2d 214, 300 P.2d 729). The unlawful operation of a vehicle which supports the validity of such official conduct does not refer alone to the manner in which the car is being driven, but extends as well to the absence of certain equipment thereon, such as license plate illumination (People v. Sanson, 156 Cal.App.2d 250, 319 P.2d 422) and license plates (People v. Galceran, 178 Cal.App.2d 312, 2 Cal.Rptr. 901), and the use of defective equipment or that which fails to comply with the provisions of the Vehicle Code, such as faulty stop signals (People v. Zubia, 166 Cal.App.2d 620, 333 P.2d 349), defective taillights (People v. Sanson, 156 Cal.App.2d 250, 319 P.2d 422), and the like. By reason of the failure of the vehicle, which Smith and defendant were using, to display license plates the officers not only were justified in stopping the driver for a violation of the law but were confronted with a reasonable suspicion that the car had been stolen.

Having...