People v. Nelson

Decision Date20 May 1965
Docket NumberNo. 38784,38784
Citation33 Ill.2d 48,210 N.E.2d 212
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Percy NELSON, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Sam Adam and Anthony F. Mannina, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Ronald Butler, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

HERSHEY, Justice.

The defendant, Percy Nelson, was indicted and tried for murder in the criminal court of Cook County. Upon a finding of guilty he was sentenced to a term of 50 to 80 years in the penitentiary. On this writ of error he contends (1) that the trial court erred in quashing his subpoena requesting the results of ploygraph examinations of all persons tested with regard to the case; (2) that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof; (3) that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (4) that the court erred in allowing the testimony of a witness who had been in the courtroom during the testimony of another witness in violation of the court's order excluding witnesses; and (5) that the sentence was unreasonably and unconscionably severe.

On the night of October 16, 1963, Henry O'Connor was shot and killed in his automobile in Chicago. The defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with the crime, as was one Harold Newell.

The evidence against the defendant consists primarily of the testimony of Harold Newell. Newell testified that he had been at the deceased's home during the afternoon of October 16, 1963, watching television. Later that evening he and deceased left in the deceased's car and drove to Newell's house where they saw defendant waiting nearby. Newell further testified that defendant forced him out of the car and drove away in the car with the deceased.

After a recess Newell was recalled to the witness stand where he contradicted his earlier testimony by stating that he had killed Harold O'Connor at the direction of the defendant. He testified that defendant had offered to pay him $500 if he would kill O'Connor; that the day before the murder defendant gave him $180 and promised to give him more later; and that on the following day defendant went to his home and gave him an additional $80. He further testified that he met the deceased and drove him to a lakefront area where he shot O'Connor several times, threw the revolver in the lake and returned home in a taxi.

A police officer testified that O'Connor had acted as an informer against defendant in a narcotics case and was scheduled to testify against defendant several days subsequent to the day of the murder.

Newell's wife, who had been present in the courtroom during the testimony of her husband in contravention of the trial court's order excluding witnesses, corroborated her husband's testimony that defendant had come to their house and left money on the evening of October 14.

Testifying in his own behalf, defendant denied killing Henry O'Connor and also denied that he ever gave any money to Harold Newell for the murder of O'Connor.

Defendant's initial contention is that he was deprived of due process of law by virtue of the denial of his request for the production of the results of polygraph examinations given by the police to all persons in connection with the death of Henry O'Connor. In support of this contention he relies upon the case of Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, wherein the court held that 'the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, * * *.' (373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197.) A polygraph operator's opinion as to the truthfulness of a lie detector subject has never been recognized by this court as admissible evidence on the issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence, (People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260), and therefore the dictates of the Brady case do not require the production of such results. It is undisputed that defendant was afforded access to all prior statements made by witnesses, including those statements made during the polygraph tests. It further appears from the record that defendant was aware of the results of the lie detector test given to the State's chief witness, Newell. In our opinion the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request for the production of the lie detector results.

Defendant further contends that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof in that he was charged as a principal with the crime of murder, whereas the proof at most indicated he was only an accessory...

To continue reading

Request your trial
40 cases
  • People v. Clark
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 4 Mayo 1979
    ...nature as to mislead the accused in making his defense or expose him to second jeopardy from the same offense. (People v. Nelson, 33 Ill.2d 48, 52, 210 N.E.2d 212 (1965); People v. Moore, 368 Ill. 455, 457, 14 N.E.2d 494 (1938); People v. Merrill, 76 Ill.App.2d 82, 87-88, 221 N.E.2d 145 (19......
  • People v. Ceja
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 17 Abril 2003
    ...proof is that the defendant was only an accomplice. People v. Nicholls, 42 Ill.2d 91, 100, 245 N.E.2d 771 (1969); People v. Nelson, 33 Ill.2d 48, 51-52, 210 N.E.2d 212 (1965). Courts permit this pleading practice because accountability is not a separate offense, but merely an alternative ma......
  • People v. Banks
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 4 Diciembre 1985
    ...but is only a factor to be considered by the trier of fact in passing upon the credibility of such a witness. People v. Nelson (1965), 33 Ill.2d 48, 52-53, 210 N.E.2d 212; People v. Hobson (1979), 77 Ill.App.3d 22, 24-25, 32 Ill.Dec. 940, 396 N.E.2d The reality of the circumstances here is ......
  • People v. Nicholls
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 29 Enero 1969
    ...of a polygraphic examination cannot properly be introduced as evidence either of guilt or innocence of an accused. (People v. Nelson, 33 Ill.2d 48, 51, 210 N.E.2d 212; People v. Boney, 28 Ill.2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920; People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260.) The trial court properl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT