People v. Nguyen, 100217 COSC, 17SA37
|Court:||Supreme Court of Colorado|
|Attorney:||Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: Beth McCann, District Attorney, Second Judicial District Victoria M. Cisneros, Deputy District Attorney Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender Karin B. Williamson, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado|
|Judge Panel:||JUSTICE MARQUEZ dissents, and JUSTICE HOOD and JUSTICE GABRIEL join in the dissent. JUSTICE MARQUEZ, dissenting. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE HOOD and JUSTICE GABRIEL join in this dissent.|
|Opinion Judge:||EID JUSTICE|
|Party Name:||The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Hung Van Nguyen. Defendant-Appellee|
|Case Date:||October 02, 2017|
Interlocutory Appeal from the District Court Denver District Court Case No. 16CR3757 Honorable Brian Whitney, Judge
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: Beth McCann, District Attorney, Second Judicial District Victoria M. Cisneros, Deputy District Attorney Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender Karin B. Williamson, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado
¶1 Defendant Hung Van Nguyen, who only speaks Vietnamese, waived his rights as provided by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), after they were translated to him by a chaplain for the Denver Police Department. The trial court ruled that the defendant's waiver was voluntary, but not knowing and intelligent, because the translation could be considered "confusing." The court therefore suppressed Nguyen's statements.
¶2 The People brought this interlocutory appeal, and we now reverse the trial court's suppression order. The question here is whether the translation "reasonably convey[ed]" to Nguyen his rights under Miranda.
See People v. Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d 777, 781 (Colo. 1998). Primarily at issue is whether the translation, which stated that if Nguyen waived his right to be silent, "[a]ll you say will and may be used as evidence in court, " reasonably conveyed the Miranda warning that anything he said could be used against him in court. We conclude that it did. By informing him that his statements could be used in court, the translation included the concept that the statements could be used against him (as well as for him) in court. The fact that the warning may have left open the possibility that Nguyen's statements could be used in his favor did not countermand the fact that they could be used against him. Secondarily, we address whether the translation reasonably conveyed to Nguyen the warning, as required by Miranda, that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him prior to questioning. We conclude that it did. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings.
¶3 The following facts come from the proceedings before the trial court and appear to be undisputed. A witness told police that "Hung" had stabbed the victim. Riding in a patrol car, the witness directed officers to a home where he believed Hung was located. The witness gave officers a phone number he said belonged to Hung, which an officer called. Nguyen came out of the home, and the witness positively identified him as Hung. Nguyen was handcuffed, transported to the police station, and interrogated. ¶4 Nguyen spoke only Vietnamese. The questioning officer, Detective Vacca, called in Father Dang, a precinct chaplain who speaks Vietnamese, to act as an interpreter. Father Dang was not a certified Vietnamese interpreter. Detective Vacca read Nguyen his Miranda rights one by one, and Father Dang followed with a translation. The exchange, in relevant part, occurred as follows: DETECTIVE VACCA: [S]o you have the right to remain silent.
FATHER DANG: Uh . . . you have the right to be silent . . . silent, alright?
DETECTIVE VACCA: You understand that?
FATHER DANG: Understand?
HUNG NGUYEN: Yes.
. . . .
DETECTIVE VACCA: Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court. You understand that?
FATHER DANG: All you say will and may be used as evidence in court, understand?
. . . .
HUNG NGUYEN: Yeah.
DETECTIVE VACCA: Thank you . . . Uh . . . you have the right to talk to an attorney . . .
. . . .
DETECTIVE VACCA: . . . The right to talk to a lawyer before questioning and have him present during questioning, you understand that?
FATHER DANG: Obviously you have right to talk to a lawyer who represents you before you answer the questions or to let that person represents you before the questions . . . during questioning, understand?
HUNG NGUYEN: Yes.
FATHER DANG: Yes.
DETECTIVE VACCA: If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you without cost before questioning. You understand that?
FATHER DANG: And if you do not have money to hire an attorney the court will instruct you, will appoint a person to you at no cost to represent you before asking questions, understand?
HUNG NGUYEN: Yes.
. . . .
DETECTIVE VACCA: Ok, so I just want to be clear, you understand your Miranda rights and you don't have to talk to me, you can talk to a lawyer instead.
FATHER DANG: Because we want you to understand that you have the right to hire an attorney to represent you and you do not need to answer us right now, understand?
HUNG NGUYEN: Understand[.] Nguyen then spoke with Detective Vacca about the stabbing incident.
¶5 Nguyen filed a motion to suppress his statements, arguing that Father Dang had omitted and mistranslated crucial words, rendering his Miranda waiver ineffective. In particular, Nguyen focused on the fact that Father Dang translated the second Miranda warning as, "[a]ll you say will and may be used as evidence in court, understand, " omitting the words "against you."1 The trial court stated that it "[did not] think the fine points of law as to whether something could be used against him or whether that would be in the average defendant's head in this case" was dispositive of the case, but rather that the translation "could be considered confusing." It found that Nguyen's statements were "voluntary, " but concluded that they were not necessarily "knowing or intelligent." The trial court thus granted Nguyen's motion to suppress the statements.
¶6 The People filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2017) and C.A.R. 4.1, asserting that the Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent. We agree with the People, and we therefore reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand for further proceedings.
¶7 Given the inherently coercive nature of police custodial interrogation, the United States Supreme Court has set forth specific safeguards in order to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In particular, officers must inform a suspect that he has a right to remain silent; that if he waives his right to that silence anything he says may be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to have an attorney present; and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so wishes. Id. at 479. In the absence of a proper advisement, a defendant's statements are not admissible in the prosecution's case in chief. Sanchez v. People, 2014 CO 56, ¶ 11, 329 P.3d 253, 257.
¶8 A valid waiver of one's Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. In this case, the trial court found that the waiver was voluntary, but not knowing and intelligent.2 The trial court, echoed here by Nguyen, concluded that because the translation failed to adequately convey to Nguyen his Miranda rights, his waiver could not be knowing and intelligent. The question before us, then, is whether the translation "reasonably convey[ed]" to Nguyen his Miranda rights. See Mejia-Mendoza, 965 P.2d at 781 (concluding that the translator's statements "failed to reasonably convey to [the defendant] his rights as required by Miranda"); People v. Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d 397, 402 (Colo. 2004) (concluding that "[W]here, as here, the police fail to accurately communicate to the defendant his basic rights under Miranda, and the defendant is therefore unable to understand those rights, any resulting waiver must be deemed constitutionally insufficient"). Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we review this legal question de novo. Aguilar-Ramos, 86 P.3d at 400-01.
¶9 Specifically, Nguyen argues that he was not informed (1) of the fact that his statements could be used against him in a court of law, or (2) that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for him prior to questioning. We address each argument in turn.
¶10 During questioning, Detective Vacca read the Miranda warnings, which Father Dang then translated. As relevant here, Detective Vacca stated, "Anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court. You understand that?" Father Dang translated this warning as, "All you say will and may be used as evidence in court, understand?" Later in the interview, Detective Vacca repeated the question, "[D]o you understand that if you talk to me that anything you say I will use in court against you?" Father Dang translated this as "Hung knows that today what Hung talks to the police will and may be use[d] in court,...
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