People v. Nguyen

• Decision Date: 02 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. S154847.,S154847.
• Citation: 46 Cal. 4th 1007,209 P.3d 946,95 Cal.Rptr.3d 615
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Vince Vinhtuong NGUYEN, Defendant and Appellant.

209 P.3d 946

95 Cal.Rptr.3d 615

46 Cal. 4th 1007

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Vince Vinhtuong NGUYEN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S154847.

Supreme Court of California.

July 2, 2009.

Mary J. Greenwood, Public Defender, Seth Flagsberg, Deputy Public Defender; The Law Offices of Douglas L. Rappaport, Douglas L. Rappaport and Michelle M. Thomson, for Defendant and Appellant.

Seth Flagsberg, Deputy Public Defender (Santa Clara); and Michael Ogul, Chief Deputy Public Defender (Solano), for California Public Defenders Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Jonathan Laba; Maureen Pacheco; Marsha Levick; Neha Desai; and Jessica Feierman for Pacific Juvenile Defender Center, Juvenile Law Center, Juvenile Division of the Los Angeles Public Defender, Alternate Public Defender, National Center for Youth Law and Youth Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Dallas Sacher, for Sixth District Appellate Program as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson and Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. de Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, René A. Chacón, Laurence K. Sullivan, Eric D. Share and Amy Haddix, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Steve Cooley, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Lael Rubin, Phyllis Asayama and Roberta Schwartz, Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Galit Lipa and Michael S. Romano, San Francisco, for Criminal Defense Clinic and Mills Legal Clinic of Stanford Law School as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

BAXTER, J.

California's Three Strikes Law (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d))¹ increases the maximum sentence for an adult felony offense upon proof that the defendant has suffered one or more qualifying "prior felony convictions"—a term that specifically includes certain prior criminal adjudications sustained by the defendant, while a minor, under the juvenile court law. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(3), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601 et seq.) Does the United States Constitution allow such use of a prior juvenile adjudication even though there was no right to a jury trial in the juvenile proceeding? Like the majority of recent decisions to address the issue, we conclude the answer is yes.

The question arises in the following context: A series of United States Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (Apprendi), establishes an adult criminal defendant's general right, under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, to a jury finding beyond reasonable doubt of any fact used to increase the sentence for a felony conviction beyond the maximum term permitted by conviction of the charged offense alone. (E.g., Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 711, 714, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (Ice); Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 274-275, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (Cunningham); Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 303-305, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (Blakely); Apprendi, supra, at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348.) Apprendi found this principle inherent in the common law tradition, in effect when the Sixth Amendment was adopted, that any fact crucial to the maximum punishment for an offense was, for that purpose, an "element" of the offense, and thus equally subject to the requirements of indictment or presentment, proof beyond reasonable doubt, and jury trial. (Apprendi, supra, at pp. 476-485, 120 S.Ct. 2348.)

Here, in adult felony proceedings, the complaint charged, for purposes of sentence enhancement, that defendant previously had sustained a juvenile adjudication which qualified as a "prior felony conviction" under the Three Strikes Law. By statute, California affords an adult criminal defendant the right to a jury trial on whether he or she "has suffered" an alleged prior conviction. (§§ 1025, subds.(a), (b), 1158.) Defendant waived that jury-trial right in this case. Documentary evidence presented to the court indicated that, in a prior juvenile proceeding, defendant, then 16 years old, had admitted committing an aggravated assault, and an adjudication to that effect had been entered accordingly. On this basis, the sentencing court in this case found the prior conviction allegation true. Applying the "second strike" provision of the Three Strikes Law, the court doubled defendant's sentence for the current offense.

Nonetheless, defendant claims the Apprendi rule barred use of the prior juvenile adjudication to enhance his maximum sentence in the current case because the prior juvenile proceeding, though it included most constitutional guarantees attendant upon adult criminal proceedings, did not afford him the right to a jury trial. (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971) 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (McKeiver); People v. Lara (1967) 67 Cal.2d 365, 398, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202; In re Daedler (1924) 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467; see Welf. & Inst.Code, § 702.) He bases this claim on language employed by the United States Supreme Court to justify an exception to the Apprendi rule—i.e., that "the fact of a prior conviction," used to enhance the maximum sentence for a later offense, need not be proved to a jury beyond reasonable doubt, but may simply be found by the sentencing court. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435; Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224, 239-247, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (Almendarez-Torres); see Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227, 248-249, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (Jones).)

The high court has given several reasons for treating "the fact of a prior conviction" differently from other sentencing facts that may increase the maximum punishment for an offense. The court has noted that "recidivism" is a highly traditional basis for a court to increase a current offender's sentence, and that, unlike a typical "element," this factor relates not to the circumstances of the current offense, but only to punishment. Finally, in remarks upon which defendant primarily relies, the court has stressed that prior convictions have been obtained in proceedings which themselves included substantial procedural protections, including proof beyond reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial. (Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 488, 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435; Jones, supra, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311; see Almendarez-Torres, supra, 523 U.S. 224, 243-244, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350.)

On this basis, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that, under Apprendi, the absence of a jury-trial right in juvenile proceedings bars the use of prior juvenile adjudications to increase the maximum sentence for a subsequent adult felony offense. In essence, the Court of Appeal found Apprendi requires a jury-trial right at some point in the determination of any fact that may increase the maximum sentence for an adult felony conviction.

But the People urge that, because juvenile law adjudications of criminal conduct are subject to virtually all constitutional protections that apply to adult criminal trials— particularly including the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—they fairly and reliably demonstrate the defendant's "recidivism." Thus, the People argue, if a prior juvenile proceeding included all the rights and guarantees constitutionally applicable therein, the resulting adjudication satisfies Apprendi's justifications for the "prior conviction" exception, and is properly included within that exception, even though it did not include the right to a jury trial. Even if the "prior conviction" exception does not apply, the People assert, California complies with the basic holding of Apprendi by affording the right to a jury trial in the current case as to the sentencing "fact" therein at issue—i.e the existence of the prior juvenile adjudication.

We generally agree with the People. As noted, Apprendi requires, at most, the right to a jury trial in the current criminal proceeding with respect to any sentencing fact that may increase the maximum punishment for the underlying conviction. California statutory law afforded defendant the right to have a jury determine the existence of the sentencing fact here at issue—whether he suffered a "prior felony conviction" as defined by the Three Strikes Law—but he waived that right.

In any event, we find nothing in the Apprendi line of cases, or in other Supreme Court jurisprudence, that interferes, under the circumstances here presented, with what the high court deemed a sentencing court's traditional authority to impose increased punishment on the basis of the defendant's recidivism. That authority may properly be exercised, we conclude, when the recidivism is evidenced, as here, by a constitutionally valid prior adjudication of criminal conduct. As we explain below, the high court has expressly so held in analogous circumstances. (See Nichols v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 738, 114 S.Ct. 1921, 128 L.Ed.2d 745 (Nichols ).) We will therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

An amended complaint, filed in December 2004, charged defendant Vince Vinhtuong Nguyen² with four felony counts: possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (§ 12022.1, subd. (a)(1)), possession of ammunition by an ex-felon (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)), possession of a billy (§ 12020, subd. (a)(1)),³ and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The amended complaint also charged two misdemeanors, being under the influence of a controlled substance (id., § 11550, subd. (a)) and possession of drug paraphernalia (id., § 11364, subd. (a)). Finally, for sentencing purposes the amended...