People v. Nix

• Decision Date: 30 December 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 103072,No. 1,1
• Citation: People v. Nix, 556 N.W.2d 866, 453 Mich. 619 (Mich. 1996)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Terressa L. NIX also known as Teressa Nix, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 866

556 N.W.2d 866

453 Mich. 619

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Terressa L. NIX also known as Teressa Nix, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 103072.

Calendar No. 1.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Oct. 8, 1996.

Decided Dec. 30, 1996.

[453 Mich. 621] Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Richard Thompson, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Richard H. Browne, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, for the People.

State Appellate Defender by David A. Moran, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Michael Thomas, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Saginaw, amicus curiae for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

OPINION

MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH, Justice.

This case presents us with the question whether defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated. The Court of Appeals concluded that such a violation had occurred, and reversed defendant's conviction. We now affirm.

I

Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree premeditated murder and one count of felony murder. ¹ The victim was kidnapped by defendant's boyfriend, Robert Hogans, ² who locked the victim in the trunk of her own car while he, often accompanied by defendant, used the car for six days. The victim ultimately died from a combination of dehydration and methanol poisoning, which resulted from the ingestion of windshield washer fluid.

At trial, the prosecution's theory was that defendant was guilty of the murder both directly and under an aiding and abetting theory. After completion of the prosecution's case in chief, defendant made a motion for directed verdict. After hearing oral arguments on the motion, the court issued a written order granting the motion on July 19, 1991, which in its entirety states:

The Defendant having come before this Court charged with one count of first-degree premeditated murder and with one alternative count of first-degree felony murder; Defendant having made an oral motion for directed verdict arguing that she owed no legal duty to aid the victim; the prosecution having responded that Defendant was responsible as an aider and abettor to the kidnapping and murder that formed the basis for the first-degree felony murder count, and further arguing that Defendant had assumed a legal duty to aid the victim; this Court having heard these respective arguments on July 16 and 17, 1991, and having fully considered both the arguments and the submitted case law offered by the parties in support, and this Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises:

IT IS ORDERED that, as a matter of law, Defendant owed no legal duty to the victim and therefore could not be convicted of either charge as a matter of law.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that entry of the directed verdict and all further proceedings in the trial are stayed until August 2, 1991, to permit the prosecution to seek appellate review of this legal ruling.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is granted a $10,000 personal bond until further order of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the jury is not discharged, but instead is ordered to return to their daily lives while the trial is adjourned and until summoned by this Court to return for completion of the proceedings, and is instructed that they are to continue to refrain from discussing this case, reading about this case, or listening to any news reports concerning this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The prosecutor filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which, on August 2, 1991, issued an order stating in relevant part:

Pursuant to MCR 7.205(D)(2), the Court orders that that part of the lower court order of July 19, 1991 which holds that defendant could not legally be convicted of felony murder is reversed and set aside, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. See M.C.L. § 767.39; MSA 28.979, People v. Kelly, 423 Mich. 261, 278-279 [378 N.W.2d 365] (1985), and People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 733-734 [299 N.W.2d 304] (1980).

On August 16, 1991, this Court denied leave to appeal that order. 437 Mich. 1060.

On remand, the trial judge recalled the original jury, but ultimately discharged it on the basis of what the judge characterized as manifest necessity, after concluding that the original jurors had insufficient memory of the proceedings. Accordingly, a new jury was empaneled, a new trial was conducted, and defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. ³ Defendant received a sentence of seven to fifteen years.

On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that it "constitutes a violation of her constitutional protections against double jeopardy." 208 Mich.App. 648, 649, 528 N.W.2d 208 (1995). Relevant to the issue actually presented in this appeal, the Court of Appeals opinion states:

The question presented in this appeal is whether a trial court may avoid application of double jeopardy by staying entry of the order granting the directed verdict pending an appeal by the prosecutor. We conclude that such a procedural device cannot be used as a means of avoiding defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

* * * * * *

Although the court couched the order as a simple legal question and made an effort to avoid double jeopardy problems by keeping the original jury empaneled, the legal import of this holding was a directed verdict of acquittal. The court found that the prosecutor failed to establish an essential element of his case. The court judged defendant's case on the merits and made a finding of insufficiency. This is precisely the type of ruling that is not appealable. [Id. at 650-651, 528 N.W.2d 208.]

We granted leave, 450 Mich. 971, 549 N.W.2d 561 (1996), and now affirm.

II

In Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962), the trial court, during presentation of the prosecutor's case in chief, "directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal as to all the defendants, and a formal judgment of acquittal was subsequently entered." Id. at 142, 82 S.Ct. at 671. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the district court was without power to direct the acquittals, and ordered the case remanded to the trial court. On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court held as follows: "The Court of Appeals thought, not without reason, that the acquittal was based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation. Nevertheless, '[t]he verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed ... without putting [the petitioners] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.' " Id. at 143, 82 S.Ct. at 672 (citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 [1896] ).

In United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354-55, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977), the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle from Ball and Fong Foo, stating: "[W]e have emphasized that what constitutes 'an acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of the judge's action. Rather, we must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." (Citations omitted.) ⁴

In People v. Anderson, 409 Mich. 474, 486, 295 N.W.2d 482 (1980), this Court acknowledged and applied this legal principle:

To be sure, the judge did not say that he was directing a verdict, and no formal judgment of acquittal was entered. The determination of what the judge did, however, does not turn on how the judge characterizes his actions. "[T]he trial judge's characterization of his own actions cannot control the classification of the action."24 What constitutes an "acquittal" is not controlled by the form of the judge's action.25

To decide how a trial judge's action should be characterized, the reviewing court "must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged."26 There is an acquittal and retrial is impermissible when the judge "evaluated the Government's evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction". 27

The application of this law to the facts of this case is straightforward.

III

The prosecutor's attempt at revisionist history of the principles underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause notwithstanding, the controlling case law, of both the United States Supreme Court and this Court, is clear and unambiguous. ⁵ The trial court's grant of defendant's motion for directed verdict bars any further proceedings relative to the charges brought against defendant. The trial court's attempt to circumvent the clear dictates of double jeopardy jurisprudence by purportedly staying the effect of its legal determination is without any effect whatsoever. The trial court's decision not to discharge the jury is also without any legal effect.

Essential to our decision is the fact that the trial court's July 19, 1991, order was a binding legal resolution, based on the trial judge's evaluation of all the evidence presented by the prosecution in its case in chief, of the two counts brought against defendant, under both a direct theory and an aiding and abetting theory. The fact of this ruling precludes appellate inquiry into its legal correctness, Martin Linen Supply, supra at 571, 97 S.Ct. at 1354-55, and, accordingly, completely undermines the prosecutor's law-of-the-case argument.

The dissent's strained reading of Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978), and United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), obfuscates the clear (and clearly stated) standard for what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the...