People v. Norwood
| Decision Date | 16 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-04-1177.,1-04-1177. |
| Citation | 841 N.E.2d 514 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kelvin NORWOOD, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Aaron M. Forester, Jay Williams, Schiff Hardin, LLP, Chicago, for Defendant-Appellant.
Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Michelle Katz, C. Thor Martin, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
A jury found defendant Kelvin Norwood guilty of aggravated arson and first degree murder committed in an exceptionally brutal or heinous manner indicative of wanton cruelty. The trial court sentenced him to an extended term of 100 years for first degree murder and a consecutive term of 20 years for aggravated arson. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of defendant's other crimes and bad acts; (2) the State minimized its burden of proof during closing argument; and (3) the trial court improperly denied defendant's motion to waive a jury determination of the wanton cruelty, extended-term sentencing issue. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On Monday evening, January 31, 2000, firefighters responding to a fire discovered Maryanne Norwood's charred remains in her Chicago apartment. She died of multiple stab wounds and her apartment was burned at some point after her death. Defendant, the victim's son, was arrested in Springfield on February 1, 2000, and later charged with multiple crimes, including first degree murder accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, arson, burglary of a trucking company, possession of a stolen motor vehicle from the trucking company, and possession of burglary tools.
Defendant demanded a jury trial but moved to waive his rights pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to have a jury determine whether exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior existed. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that defendant could not request a jury trial on the charges and waive the jury determination on the particular factual issue related to the imposition of an extended-term sentence. Defendant also moved to dismiss the brutal and heinous behavior counts as invalid, arguing the additional fact was not an element of first degree murder. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the State properly alleged brutal and heinous behavior in the charging instrument. Defendant also moved to bifurcate the hearing to prove the existence of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior only after and if the jury returned a guilty verdict for first degree murder. The defense argued it would be very prejudicial for the jury to consider defendant's guilt or innocence simultaneously with evidence, like graphic photographs, associated with the brutal and heinous nature of the crime. The trial court denied the motion, noting that the photographic evidence was admissible regardless of the extended-term sentencing issue.
The court granted defendant's motion to sever the counts of burglary, possession of the stolen truck, and possession of burglary tools. However, the court reserved ruling on the admissibility of evidence concerning the burglary, stolen truck, and circumstances of defendant's arrest as relevant other-crimes evidence with regard to the murder and arson charges. The court reasoned that the relevance and prejudice of the other-crimes evidence would be better understood in context during the course of the trial.
At the trial for murder and arson, the State presented evidence that the victim rented an apartment above her landlords, Willie and Hazel Hubbard, for about six years before the fire. About December 1999, the victim introduced defendant to her landlords and asked if defendant could live with her. Defendant sat in the Hubbards' living room with Mr. Hubbard while the victim spoke with Mrs. Hubbard in the kitchen. The Hubbards allowed defendant to move into the victim's apartment.
On Thursday, January 27, 2000, the victim, during a telephone conversation with her sister Amy Harrison, explained that she wanted to "put [defendant] out." The victim also had two telephone conversations with her sister Annie Bibbs about 10:30 p.m. and 1 a.m. The victim also had an hour-long telephone conversation with defendant's girlfriend Connie Burage, who had been dating defendant for a month after meeting him at a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. When defendant returned Burage's telephone call about 1 a.m., she asked him why he took the victim's money and what was going on. Defendant responded that he lost his job, was depressed and wanted to get high.
On Friday morning, January 28, 2000, Burage telephoned the victim, who said she did not want defendant to stay at her apartment anymore. The victim also spoke with Harrison, stating that she wanted to help defendant get off drugs and into church. She also wanted defendant, who was giving her a hard time, to leave.
On Saturday afternoon, January 29, 2000, the victim told Bibbs that she was going to take defendant to a minister to get him help. The victim also went downstairs and gave Mrs. Hubbard a dish of mixed greens. Neither the Hubbards nor the victim's sisters heard from the victim after Saturday.
When defendant and Burage spoke on Saturday, defendant said he would go to a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, but Burage decided not to go. Defendant called Burage about 9:30 p.m. and said he would go home after the meeting to get the victim's car and then buy some groceries for dinner at Burage's place. However, defendant never went to Burage's place that night. Burage telephoned the victim's apartment several times after 10 p.m., but no one answered and the answering machine did not respond. There was still no answer when Burage called at 7 a.m. Sunday morning.
About 10 a.m. on Sunday, defendant called Burage and said he had gone to work that morning at Roosevelt Moving Company. (However, the owner of Roosevelt Moving testified that defendant had worked on Saturday but not after that day.) Defendant told Burage that he did not go to her place last night because he and the victim were arguing, she was "tripping," and she did not want him to go to Burage's home. Thereafter, defendant drove the victim's car to Burage's home and said the victim had gone shopping with one of her sisters. (However, Bibbs and Harrison testified that they did not see the victim on Sunday.) Defendant drove Burage to a Narcotics Anonymous meeting and borrowed $10 from her, saying it was for bus fare for a job interview the next day.
On Monday, January 31, defendant drove Burage to work using the victim's car. Later, about 9 p.m., defendant went to Burage's house and explained that he did not need to pick up the victim from work because she left early and was already home. (However, the victim's supervisor testified that, to his knowledge, the victim never appeared for work on January 31.) Defendant left Burage's home about 9:20 p.m. with money from Burage to purchase food for her and her children, but he failed to return.
About 10 p.m. at the victim's apartment building, Mrs. Hubbard heard the hallway smoke alarm and called to her husband, who was lying on his bed. Smoke detectors were installed in the victim's bedroom and at the landing right outside her apartment. The Hubbards met in their living room and talked briefly. The smoke alarm stopped ringing, and Mr. Hubbard heard footsteps coming down the stairs. He opened his apartment door and saw smoke coming from the second floor. In the lighted hallway, he met defendant, who stood only three feet away and appeared to be clutching something under his arm. Mr. Hubbard was not wearing his prescription glasses at the time. Defendant said that everything was okay and he had merely burned some chicken. Mrs. Hubbard heard the conversation from inside her living room and recognized defendant's voice from earlier conversations with him. Defendant left the building, and Mr. Hubbard went back into his apartment. When smoke started to enter the Hubbards' apartment, Mr. Hubbard went upstairs and found the victim's apartment doorknob was hot to the touch. He summoned the fire department.
Mr. Hubbard was 75 years old and, about one year after the fire, had surgery to remove a tumor behind one of his eyes. He insisted, however, that his vision at the time of the offense was unaffected. Furthermore, his grand jury testimony indicated that he opened the victim's apartment door but immediately closed it because the smoke was so intense and the fire was hot.
The fire department discovered the victim's charred remains lying facedown in her living room. Expert testimony established that the fire resulted from a human act and had two points of origin: one near the living room couch close to the victim's body, and the other in the bedroom on a bed. The victim sustained multiple stab wounds and blunt force trauma before the fire was set. Blows to her face broke her teeth and cheekbones and caused lacerations on her mouth and swelling in her head. She was stabbed several times, including above her left eyebrow, on her neck, behind her left ear, in her back, and on her elbow. The multiple stab wounds caused her death.
Detectives investigating the homicide discovered the victim's car at Flash Trucking, where defendant had been recently employed. During the early morning hours of February 1, 2000, Flash Trucking employees found that a Mack truck was missing. Furthermore, truck keys, a fuel card and tollway card were stolen from the office. Outside of Flash Trucking, an evidence technician recovered a plastic folder containing defendant's identification and wallet-sized...
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