People v. Norwood
| Decision Date | 21 May 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 45196,45196 |
| Citation | 54 Ill.2d 253,296 N.E.2d 852 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Ronald L. LORWOOD, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Hume, Clement, Hume & Lee, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., of Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Kenneth L. Gillis and William D. Wolter, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
The defendant, Ronald L. Norwood, was convicted of murder after a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, and was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 14 nor more than 20 years. The appellate court affirmed (People v. Norwood (1972), 5 Ill.App.3d 130, 283 N.E.2d 256), and we allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
The issues raised on this appeal concern allegedly improper and unconstitutional restrictions upon defense counsel's efforts to impeach the State's principal witness.
Shortly after 2 o'clock on Sunday afternoon, January 11, 1970, Jackson Jones was shot and killed in a schoolyard located at 37th Street and Ellis Avenue in Chicago. The defendant's cousin, William Washington, who was 15 years old, testified that on that day the defendant, age 17, came to his home on the south side of Chicago between 11:30 A.M. and noon, and that the two walked around the neighborhood for a while. The defendant asked if he could carry the .38-caliber revolver that Washington had in his pocket, and Washington gave it to him. They continued to walk around until just after 2 P.M. when they encountered Jones. The defendant suggested that they rob him, but Washington testified that he refused because he was acquainted with Jones, whereupon the defendant said he would do it himself. Washington began to walk away, and when he was about 30 feet away from the defendant he heard Jones refuse to give up his money and then heard a shot. When he turned he saw Jones lying on the ground. The defendant then threw him the gun and took $13 from the deceased's pocket. Washington testified that they fled down an alley, where he threw the gun into a garbage can. The defendant later gave him $6 of the money he had taken from Jones.
The defendant denied that he shot or robbed Jones. He admitted that he was in the area of the murder on the day in question, but stated that he did not arrive there until after 3 P.M. He testified that he was at his west-side home that morning until 2 P.M., when, in response to a telephone conversation he had just had with his cousin, William Washington, he left to go to his cousin's home. The defendant's testimony was corroborated by that of his mother, who testified that she had telephoned him at home at approximately 1:35 P.M. and that he had answered. The defendant's girl friend, Sheila Harden testified that he had telephoned her from his home on the day of the crime. The defendant had testified that he called her around 11:30 A.M. and again at 5:30 P.M. She did not remember the second call, and was unable to remember the exact time of the first, but said that it was some time between 10 A.M. and 2 P.M. She also testified that during the conversation the defendant said that his cousin Billy was with him. This contradicted the defendant's testimony.
It is evident from this summary of the evidence that the credibility of William Washington was critical, for if his testimony was not believed the defendant could not have been convicted. All of the defendant's contentions in this court center about his charge that the trial judge improperly restricted his efforts to attack Washington's credibility. We approach those contentions with the following observations in mind: People v. Maggio (1927), 324 Ill. 516, 529, 155 N.E. 373, 378; see also, People v. Baker (1959), 16 Ill.2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 1; People v. Derrico (1951), 409 Ill. 453, 100 N.E.2d 607; People v. Moshiek (1926), 323 Ill. 11, 153 N.E. 720.
The defendant first asserts that he was misled because an order which directed that the 'past police record' of the witness Washington be produced and be made available to him at the trial was not complied with. We have examined the record and we find no such order. The order that was entered upon the defendant's motion for discovery read as follows: 'It is further ordered that all Grand Jury minutes and all police reports pertinent to this indictment be made available at the time of trial.' We do not read the defendant's request for discovery as including the past police records of the witness unconnected with this indictment, but even if those records were requested, it is clear that the trial judge did not order them produced. The record thus does not sustain the contention that the defense was hampered by an unexpected change of position on the part of the trial judge.
The broader contention, that the defendant's cross-examination of Washington was improperly restricted, presents a more serious problem. The basic objective of that cross-examination was to impair the credibility of the witness on the ground that he had been promised leniency in exchange for his testimony against the defendant in this case. And while the decisions that have been cited show that it has consistently been held that proof of arrests, indictments and charges of commission of...
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