People v. Oaks

Decision Date15 February 1996
Docket NumberNo. 75541,75541
Citation169 Ill.2d 409,662 N.E.2d 1328,215 Ill.Dec. 188
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
Parties, 215 Ill.Dec. 188 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Douglas E. OAKS, Appellant.

Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, Allen H. Andrews, Asst. Deputy Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Douglas E. Oaks. Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, Springfield, and Larry S. Vandersnick, State's Attorney, Cambridge (Rosalyn Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Arleen C. Anderson and Kathy Shepard, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

Justice HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Henry County, Douglas E. Oaks was convicted of two counts of first degree murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(2), (a)(3)) and one count of aggravated battery of a child (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 12-4.3(a)) for the death of his girlfriend's three-year-old son. Defendant waived his right to a jury at the death penalty hearing. The trial court found defendant eligible for the death penalty because the victim was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7).) The trial court also found that no mitigating factors existed sufficient to preclude imposition of the death sentence (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(h)), and sentenced defendant to death on the two murder counts. Defendant's aggravated battery of a child conviction was vacated as a lesser included offense of the murder convictions. The sentence was stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill.2d Rules 603, 609(a).

On appeal to this court, defendant argues that: (1) the murder and aggravated battery indictments issued against him are duplicitous and void; (2) the statements he made to police should have been suppressed at trial, because they were involuntarily given as the result of promises made to him by his interrogators, and his written statement was taken in violation of his fifth amendment right to counsel; (3) he was denied a fair trial where the State introduced evidence of prior injuries to the victim without establishing that defendant had inflicted them; (4) he was not proven guilty of murder because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew shaking a child could cause death or great bodily harm or would create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm; (5) he was denied a fair trial where the State elicited testimony from a pediatrician that the victim's injuries could not have been caused accidentally but must have been caused intentionally; (6) he was denied due process where the involuntary manslaughter instructions informed the jury that it was the State's burden to prove defendant's guilt of that offense; (7) his waiver of a sentencing jury was not knowing and intelligent because the trial court did not tell him that any one juror could preclude a death sentence; (8) his death sentence should be vacated because the sole eligibility factor was not established where the murder was not exceptionally brutal or heinous and indicative of wanton cruelty; (9) the sentencing court relied on a facially vague statutory aggravating factor, that the murder was accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, at both stages of the death penalty hearing; (10) the sentencing court erroneously rejected a psychiatrist's conclusion that defendant had acted under an extreme emotional disturbance when he killed the victim; (11) the sentencing court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow him to make a statement in allocution; (12) the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and (13) his felony murder conviction and sentence must be vacated because the sentencing court imposed the death penalty for both felony murder and knowing murder though only one person was killed.

In the guilt phase of the trial, the State introduced, inter alia, the following evidence. Michael Weis, a volunteer paramedic for the Cambridge Ambulance Service in Cambridge, Illinois, testified that he and two other emergency medical technicians responded to a 9-1-1 call received at approximately 1:49 p.m. on July 29, 1992. Upon their arrival at an apartment in the Fieldcrest complex in Cambridge, they discovered the three-year-old male victim, Jerry Nelson, lying face down on the floor. Although he had a strong heartbeat, the victim was not breathing and his eyes were fixed and dilated. Weis stated that after he suctioned out the victim's airway in the ambulance, a bloody mucus flowed from his mouth. En route to the hospital, Weis noticed a large Paul Rudy, a physician at Hammond-Henry Hospital, testified that he was working in the emergency room when the victim arrived by ambulance on the afternoon of July 29. Dr. Rudy stabilized the victim by maintaining artificial respiration and then questioned the victim's mother, Tonya Nelson, as to what had happened. Dr. Rudy stated that Tonya's responses and behavior were "totally inappropriate," and that she had given him "a couple different stories," saying that the victim had slipped on a blanket in the bedroom and fallen and hit his head on a dresser and that his bruises were caused when he slipped the previous day and hit his chest on the toilet stool in the bathroom. Dr. Rudy identified photographs that he requested be taken in the emergency room of bruises on the victim's chest, groin and abdomen. Because a brain injury was suspected, a CAT scan was ordered, which showed bleeding in the victim's brain. X rays also showed a fracture of the victim's right clavicle, or collarbone. Because a neurosurgeon was needed, Dr. Rudy arranged for the victim's transport by helicopter to Iowa City, Iowa. Dr. Rudy testified that his diagnosis of the victim was battered child syndrome, noting that the injury shown by the CAT scan "did not happen because he slipped on his blanket in the bedroom." Dr. Rudy further stated that the broken clavicle and bruises were fairly recent injuries and that the broken clavicle would be quite painful, but that when a brain injury or subdural hematoma occurred, the victim "might become immediately unconscious and * * * wouldn't feel anything."

[215 Ill.Dec. 194] bruise on the victim's groin and more bruises on his chest and underneath both arms. The bruises ranged in color from light red to very dark purple and bluish. Weis also noticed a small laceration or abrasion above the left eye, in the hairline. Upon arrival at Hammond-Henry Hospital in Geneseo, Illinois, at around 2:10 p.m., the victim's condition remained unchanged. Weis testified that when he saw the victim several hours later, more bruises were showing up and the lighter bruises were becoming darker.

Sheryl Ranos, a special agent with the Illinois State Police, Division of Criminal Investigation, testified that she received a call from her superior officer at approximately 9:45 p.m. on July 29, advising her that there was a three-year-old child at Iowa City Hospital presumed brain dead and that she was to meet with Dee Shannahan of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and Henry County Detective Jerry Hamilton and assist in the investigation. After being advised that defendant was in Bettendorf, Iowa, and may have been responsible for the victim's injuries, Ranos, Hamilton and Shannahan decided to go to Bettendorf and speak to defendant. Hamilton and Shannahan went to the residence of Darlene and Fritz Schlitter, defendant's grandparents, and requested to speak with defendant. Defendant voluntarily accompanied them to the Bettendorf police department, arriving at approximately 11:30 p.m. Ranos testified that she, Hamilton and Shannahan interviewed defendant after he was advised of his Miranda rights. Thirty to 40 minutes into the interview, which began at approximately 11:45 p.m., Ranos left the interview room and discovered that the interview was being videotaped, which is routinely done by the Iowa authorities. The interview was completed at approximately 1:30 a.m. and Detective Hamilton then began to take a written statement from defendant. Shortly after 2 a.m. on July 30, Ranos, Shannahan and Hamilton left the Bettendorf police department and went to the hospital in Iowa City to view the victim and to speak to Tonya Nelson and the doctors. Ranos stated that the victim was unconscious and on a life support system and that she observed bruises on his stomach, chest, groin, arms, wrists, ankles and head.

The videotape of defendant's interview with Ranos, Hamilton and Shannahan was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. The transcript of that videotape reflects that defendant was told that he was not under arrest, but was read his Miranda rights and stated that he understood them. Defendant stated that he arrived at Tonya Nelson's apartment at about 11:30 p.m. on Monday, July 27, 1992, and did not leave until shortly after the victim was injured about 1:17 p.m. on Wednesday, July 29. Defendant initially denied that he had injured the victim, stating he thought the injuries After Detective Hamilton told defendant that his story was inconsistent with the nature and extent of the victim's injuries, defendant stated that the right side of the victim's head may have grazed the television stand when he fell while reaching for the popcorn bowl, and that defendant then picked him up, and seeing that he was all right, playfully tossed him in the air two or three times. The last time, the victim caught the edge of the couch coming down and landed on a mattress in front of the couch, hitting his head and shoulder hard. When defendant was again told that his story was...

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