People v. Oates

• Decision Date: 07 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 34,34
• Citation: 119 N.W.2d 530,369 Mich. 214
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Billy Eugene OATES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 530

119 N.W.2d 530

369 Mich. 214

The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Billy Eugene OATES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 34.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 7, 1963.

George F. Taylor, Pros. Atty., Robert L. Templin, Senior Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, for the People.

Carlton S. Roeser, Pontiac, for defendant and appellant.

Before the Entire Bench.

BLACK, Justice (for reversal).

This case, one of prosecution of a 28 year old brother for having brutally beaten his younger sister, calls into play the self-disciplinary firmness which, 36 years ago, was voiced here by a distinguished predecessor. On that occasion another prosecutor said to the Court that the 'real' question was: 'Should the respondent in this case have been convicted?' Mr. Justice Fellows, speaking for himself and 3 other members of the Court, rejoined (People v. Rich, 237 Mich. 481, 497, 212 N.W. 105, 110):

'The 'real' question, and the only question for this court, sitting as a reviewing court, is whether there is reversible error on the record before us. If so, there must be a reversal; if not, there must be an affirmance. It is the boast of our people, and one of the tenets of our institutions, that the meanest of our citizens is secured a fair and impartial trial in accordance with the Constitution and laws; that he is entitled to be tried in 'accordance with the law of the land.''

Defendant was jury-convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from 7 1/2 to 10 years. He appeals on grant of leave.

First: The trial judge (Doty, J.), unable apparently to control his understandable feelings, told the jury:

'Now, the difference between aggravated assault and the assault charged in this case, of course, as has been stated here, is one of intent. That is the principle question for your consideration in this case. What was his intent when beating his sister? Ordinarily an accused or a criminal does not confess his intent, does not show it, and you cannot look into the breast of the accused and determine his intent, but in this case he did express his intent to the officers that 'I killed her and I would do it again.' 'I intended to kill her and I would do it again.' And he told his mother 'She got just what she deserved.' Now, those questions bear on his intent, and then he did tell one of the officers that he kicked her and then he changed it later. The kicking bears somewhat on the question of intent also, but, as bearing upon the question of intent, you may also consider the nature of the injuries received by the sister--a pitiful sight, going blind, going deaf, and, while there is no medical testimony to the effect, I am of the opinion from statements on the stand that she might lose her mind. He might better have killed her if that is the case. The force used bears very heavily upon the question of intent in this case. Furthermore, as bearing upon the question of intent: The fact he left the scene, thinking he had killed her--a little child, eighteen months of age--was he going for help? No. Then going out on the street--picked up two hours afterwards. Then he told the officer he had killed her, intended to kill her, would do it again. Did he show any remorse? And that was two hours after the commission of the crime. That bears upon the question of intent also.

'Now, you know what the doctor said, that it could have been caused by fists, but it must have been by a strong man. You saw the defendant on the witness stand in this case, with T. B. and weighing one hundred twenty-five or thirty pounds. Do you think he could cause all this injury with fists? Was he telling the truth in his first statement to the officers when he said he kicked her? That is a question of fact for your consideration in this case.'*

This exceeded all bounds of permissible 'comment' upon defendant's testified admission...