People v. Oatis
| Decision Date | 01 August 1966 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 51148 |
| Citation | 220 N.E.2d 71,74 Ill.App.2d 103 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Claude OATIS, Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Amiel G. Hall, Howard T. Savage, Chicago, for appellant.
Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, Elmer C. Kissane, James S. Veldman, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel, for appellee.
After a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of forcible rape and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 8 to 20 years. On appeal, defendant asserts the evidence fails to establish penetration or the use of force.
The complaining witness, 20 years old, testified that on the morning of June 11, 1963, she left her home at 5:15 to take a bus to a department store where she worked. She lived on South Eberhart and was walking west on 74th Street when a car pulled into an alley in front of her. A man got out of the car with a tire iron in his hand. He pushed and dragged her into the back seat of his 2-door car. During this time she was begging him to let her go. He told her to be quiet or he would hit her. He drove her
On cross-examination, she testified,
Another witness for the State, a police officer assigned to the Homicide-Sex Unit, testified that on the evening of June 11, 1963, he was informed that defendant Oatis was in custody on a rape charge which had been preferred earlier that day. In the presence of the defendant, a written and signed statement was taken from the complaining witness. The officer further testified,
The defendant testified that he had seen the complaining witness He had been driving along 74th Street when he saw the complaining witness. He stopped and they talked, and it was agreed that he would drive her to work after he made a few stops. He drove to the home of a friend he was supposed to pick up; he honked the horn, but received no answer. Defendant then testified that he and the complaining witness started to 'neck,' and she made no objection except to say, 'Not here.' They then drove until they found a secluded alley and there began to 'neck' again. He told her to get ready, and he got out of the car to urinate and then put on a 'rubber.' 'She was in the back seat when I got back. She was just sitting with one leg up on the seat and then I had intercourse with her. I was ready to have intercourse with her, and she pushed me up and she called a cuss word out and said, 'Now look what you've done.' I looked down and there was blood all over the seat. My clothes and her clothes too, so I just got out. There was a heavy rain that morning and I got out and took some rags and wet the rags and we wiped the back seat off. * * * When we were through we got back into the front. She sat with me. I drove to 74th Street and got out and walked with her. She said that I didn't have to walk her home. I got back in the car and I said I will see you later. She didn't say anything about whether she was going to work that day. I used no force against the young lady, she submitted of her own will. I did not chase her with a tire iron. She got in the car of her own will. * * * I talked to the police officer who just sat down a few minutes ago. I told him that she had submitted and I told him that I had used no force.
On cross-examination, he testified,
After both sides rested, the trial judge commented on the evidence and found the defendant 'guilty as charged in the indictment.'
Initially, we agree with defendant that proof of penetration is a necessary element of the crime of forcible rape (People v. Perez, 412 Ill. 425, 427, 107 N.E.2d 749 (1952)), but we do not agree that 'a reasonable doubt of penetration exists in this record.' The direct testimony of the complaining witness, defendant's admissions to the police officers, and defendant's own testimony leave no reasonable doubt of penetration.
As to force, defendant argues that taking the testimony of the complaining witness 'as true in every detail, it fails to establish that the intercourse with defendant was forcible and against her will within the meaning of the statute defining the offense of rape.' Defendant contends there was no evidence that her faculties or physical powers were in any way impaired, and that there is no evidence that she resisted defendant in any way or made any outcry or attempted to escape, though the opportunity was afforded her, and her voluntary submission while having power to resist amounts to consent and removes from the act an essential element of the crime of rape.
On this point defendant's authorities include People v. Rossililli, 24 Ill.2d 341, p. 346, 181 N.E.2d 114, p. 117 (1962), where the court stated:
'The sum and substance of her testimony is that Rossililli demanded that she submit to sexual intercourse and told her he would hurt her if she did not consent; that she refused; and that...
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