People v. Orange
| Decision Date | 11 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 62144,62144 |
| Citation | People v. Orange, 521 N.E.2d 69, 121 Ill.2d 364, 118 Ill.Dec. 1 (Ill. 1988) |
| Parties | , 118 Ill.Dec. 1 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Leroy ORANGE, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for appellee; Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Kevin Sweeney, Asst. State's Attys., Renee G. Goldfarb, Sp. Asst. State's Atty., of counsel.
Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Supreme Court Unit, Robert E. Davison, First Asst. Appellate Defender, Beth Katz, Asst. Defender, Springfield, for appellant; Karen McNaught, Second Year Law Student, on brief.
The defendant, Leroy Orange, was convicted in a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County on charges of murder, concealment of a homicidal death, and aggravated arson.The defendant waived his right to a jury for purposes of a death penalty hearing, and the trial judge sentenced the defendant to death.The defendant's execution was stayed pending direct review by this court.Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b);107 Ill.2d Rules 603, 609(a).
The offenses in question occurred at an apartment building located at 1553 West 91st Street in Chicago on January 12, 1984.Responding to a report of a fire, authorities arrived at the scene around 6:30 that morning and discovered the bodies of four persons in a third-floor apartment in the building.The victims were three adults--Rene Coleman, Michelle Jointer, and Ricardo Pedro--and a child, Coleman's 10-year-old son, Anthony.All four persons had been stabbed repeatedly and had died from those wounds.The defendant, who was an acquaintance of the victims, and his brother, Leonard Kidd, were arrested later that day in connection with the offenses.The defendant made a series of incriminating statements to the police, culminating in a signed confession to the crimes.
The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt, and that evidence may be summarized briefly.According to the defendant's statement, during the evening of January 11, 1984, he and Rene Coleman went to meet Leonard Kidd to ask about using Kidd's combination radio and tape player to exchange for some cocaine.Kidd agreed to the plan, and the defendant and Coleman then returned to her apartment with the appliance.Michelle Jointer, Ricardo Pedro, and Coleman's son were present at that time.After smoking some cocaine, the defendant called his brother at 12:30 or 1 o'clock that morning and asked him to come to the apartment; when Kidd arrived, the defendant explained that he was having some problems with Ricardo Pedro.In the statement, the defendant said that around 3:30 he got into a fight with Pedro and stabbed him and then tied him up, leaving him in the back bedroom of the apartment.Following that, the defendant went to another part of the apartment and consumed more cocaine.The defendant said that he returned to the back bedroom around 5:30 and stabbed Pedro again.The other victims were also in the bedroom at that time, and the defendant tied up Jointer, and attempted to tie up Coleman's son; Coleman, however, insisted on doing that herself, and when she was done, the defendant tied her up also.The defendant said that he gagged Jointer and the Colemans and then stabbed them.The defendant set the bed on fire and started another fire in the front of the apartment.The defendant and Kidd then left the apartment together; Kidd took with him the combination radio and tape player.The defendant said that he disposed of some knives and his cocaine pipe in garbage cans in the vicinity and that he burned some of his clothing.
The defendant testified at trial, and he denied any involvement in the crimes.The defendant's account at trial of the activity preceding his brother's arrival at the apartment corresponded in large part to what the defendant had told the police concerning that period.In his testimony, however, the defendant said that he left the apartment around 2:30 a.m., when he went to the home of friend, Shirley Evans, where he stayed until 8 o'clock that morning.The defendant also testified that the police mistreated him while he was in custody, and he attributed his confession to the alleged abuse.Shirley Evans testified in the defendant's behalf as an alibi witness, and she corroborated the defendant's account of his visit to her home.She explained that the defendant had come over to pick up an employment application from the place where she worked.They talked for several hours, and then he left.
Also testifying in the defendant's behalf at trial was Leonard Kidd.Kidd said that the defendant left the Coleman apartment at 2:30 that morning.Kidd testified that it was he who had committed the murders and set the fires in the apartment.He explained that he got into a fight with Ricardo Pedro over the combination radio and tape player and stabbed Pedro and that, several hours later, after consuming more drugs, he stabbed the other victims.Kidd denied that the defendant took any part in the offenses.
In rebuttal, the State introduced the testimony of the police officers who had taken part in the investigation of the offenses and the interrogation of the defendant; they denied that any mistreatment had occurred.The State also published to the jury the statement that Kidd had given to the police; it was generally consistent with what the defendant had said in his confession.Also testifying as a rebuttal witness for the State was Dr. Shirish Parikh, who had examined the defendant at the county jail medical facility on January 14, 1984, two days after the defendant's arrest.According to Dr. Parikh, the defendant's complaints were that police officers had stuck needles in his back or buttocks and had squeezed his testicles; however, Dr. Parikh testified that he found no evidence of mistreatment.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty on four counts each of murder and concealment of a homicidal death, in connection with the deaths of the Colemans, Jointer, and Pedro, and guilty on one count of aggravated arson.The defendant was also charged with the armed robbery of Ricardo Pedro, but the jury acquitted him of that offense.
As a preliminary matter, we note the State's argument that several of the contentions made by the defendant in this appeal may be considered waived because defense counsel failed to raise them in the post-trial motion filed in this case.(SeePeople v. Szabo(1986), 113 Ill.2d 83, 93-94, 100 Ill.Dec. 726, 497 N.E.2d 995;People v. Caballero(1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 31-33, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223.)"The waiver rule is one of administrative convenience rather than jurisdiction"(People v. Smith(1985), 106 Ill.2d 327, 333, 88 Ill.Dec. 42, 478 N.E.2d 357), and we do not believe that it should be applied here.In this case, defense counsel filed a post-trial motion following the sentencing hearing, raising some 16 allegations of error.At the hearing on the post-trial motion, the defendant said that he was dissatisfied with the motion and that he believed that additional matters should have been asserted.In response, the trial judge suggested that a contemporaneous objection by counsel was all that was necessary to preserve an issue for review and that, once objected to, a matter did not have to be realleged in the post-trial motion.The trial judge also said, however, that he would allow the defendant an additional week in which to file a supplemental motion and indicated that he was going to appoint counsel for that purpose.No additional post-trial motion was filed.Because the defendant may have failed to file a supplemental motion in light of the court's remarks suggesting that a contemporaneous objection was, by itself, sufficient to preserve an issue for review, we do not believe that it would be appropriate in this case to consider as waived objected-to matters that were not realleged in the post-trial motion.
The defendant first argues that he was denied a fair trial because the State suggested, in cross-examination and closing argument, that Leonard Kidd had fabricated his trial testimony in collusion with defense counsel.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited from Kidd the information that he had originally been represented in this matter by defense counsel, Earl Washington.The prosecutor later asked Kidd whether he had ever discussed his testimony with Washington; when Kidd replied that he had not, the prosecutor asked, Defense counsel's objection was overruled, and Kidd responded, "That's correct."
We do not believe that the State's cross-examination may be interpreted as an attack on defense counsel.Kidd maintained that he had not previously related his trial testimony to anyone, and in cross-examination, the prosecution was warranted in asking Kidd whether defense counsel had originally represented him and whether he had ever discussed the testimony with counsel.
The defendant also complains of certain remarks made by the prosecution in closing argument.In closing argument, the prosecutor described the defense strategy in this case as Defense counsel's objection was overruled.Later, after noting that the pretrial statements made by Kidd and the defendant were consistent, the prosecutor said, ...
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Table of Cases
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Privileges
...If a spouse fails to raise the privilege during the testimony of the other spouse, the privilege is deemed waived. [ People v. Orange, 121 Ill 2d 364, 521 NE2d 69, 118 Ill Dec 1 (1988).] PRIVILEGES 21-15 Privileges §21:70 §21:62 Unauthorized Disclosure by Agent Although there may be several......
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Privileges
...If a spouse fails to raise the privilege during the testimony of the other spouse, the privilege is deemed waived. [ People v. Orange, 121 Ill 2d 364, 521 NE2d 69, 118 Ill Dec 1 (1988).] §21:62 Unauthorized Disclosure by Agent Although there may be several people with the authority to asser......
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Privileges
...If a spouse fails to raise the privilege during the testimony of the other spouse, the privilege is deemed waived. [ People v. Orange, 121 Ill 2d 364, 521 NE2d 69, 118 Ill Dec 1 (1988).] §21:62 Unauthorized Disclosure by Agent Although there may be several people with the authority to asser......