People v. Ortiz

Citation15 Cal.Rptr. 398,195 Cal.App.2d 112
Decision Date22 August 1961
Docket NumberCr. 7639
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Salvador ORTIZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Salvador Ortiz, in pro. per.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., C. Michael Gianola, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

HERNDON, Justice.

In a trial before the court without a jury, appellant was convicted and sentenced to state prison for a sale of heroin in violation of section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code. At the conclusion of the trial, he admitted a prior conviction of a violation of section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code.

Appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment. His only contentions are that he was deprived of his constitutional rights to be represented by counsel and to have witnesses produced in his behalf and that he was thereby denied due process of law.

It appears from the record that prior to appellant's arraignment, the public defender was regularly appointed to represent him. On November 18, 1960, he appeared before the court with the public defender as his counsel and was duly arraigned. He appeared with his said counsel on November 23, 1960, and entered a plea of not guilty. The case was set for trial on January 16, 1961, in Department 112 of the court. On January 16, 1961, appellant appeared in the designated department with the deputy public defender as his counsel. In the record on appeal as originally filed, the proceedings on this date were reflected only by a minute order which, among other things, recited that the public defender was relieved as appellant's counsel and that he was substituted in propria persona.

In view of appellant's complaint that the record on appeal was incomplete and did not show the circumstances under which the public defender was relieved as his counsel, this court, on its own motion, ordered that a supplemental reporter's transcript containing the proceedings in the case on January 16, 1961, in Department 112 be prepared, certified and transmitted to this court.

The record as thus augmented clearly and conclusively shows that the trial court relieved the public defender and substituted appellant in propria persona at his insistence. When asked why he did not wish to have the public defender represent him, he said, 'Well, I feel he is quite busy and hasn't got enough time to take care of my case'. The gave no other reason.

When appellant then indicated that he would move to have private counsel appointed, the court advised him that he had given no sufficient reason for discharging the public defender and that the court would not appoint another attorney to represent him at taxpayers' expense. Appellant stated that if another attorney were not appointed, he wished to represent himself.

The trial court took great pains to inform appellant of the seriousness of the charge with which he was confronted and the dangers with which declination of counsel was fraught. The trial judge strenuously urged upon appellant the court's feeling that it would be advisable for him to avail himself of the services of his appointed counsel who was then and there ready, willing and able to represent him. The court concluded by saying, 'I would suggest that you keep the Public Defender, but that is all I can do, is to suggest it. I can't require you to do so. What do you want to do?' Appellant refused to withdraw his reiterated request that the public defender be relieved and stated that he preferred to represent himself. The court then made its order accordingly.

Thereafter, the court inquired of appellant whether or not he desired a continuance of the trial for the purpose of preparing his case. When he answered in the affirmative, he was asked how much time he would need. He answered, 'a couple of weeks'. The court thereupon ordered the trial continued to January 31, 1961.

On January 31, 1961, appellant appeared in propria persona and waived a jury trial, whereupon the case was transferred to another department of the court. When the case was called in the trial department, appellant addressed the court, stating in substance that because of a 'misunderstanding' with the deputy public defender who had been appointed to represent him, he previously had moved to have a different attorney appointed, but that his motion had been denied. He said, 'I don't think I am capable of handling this case by myself. I would like to get a P.D.' Upon being informed of the former proceedings in the matter, the trial court refused to make another appointment of counsel and ordered that the trial proceed.

In view of this record, appellant's contention that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel is entirely without merit.

Our Supreme Court in People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 788, 789, 336 P.2d 937, 946, after referring to the constitutional and statutory provisions which guarantee the right to counsel, observed: 'The foregoing sections accord the accused not only a right to counsel but also a right to represent himself if he so elects. Except in certain situations not here pertinent, the court cannot force a competent defendant to be represented by an attorney. (People v. Rose (1919), 42 Cal.App. 540, 553 ; see also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann (1942), 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.R. 435.)'

In the recent decision of In re Turrieta, 54 Cal.2d 816, 821, 8 Cal.Rptr. 707, 139, it was stated: 'It must also be conceded that generally where a defendant has intelligently 54 Cal.2d 816, 821, 8 Cal.Rptr. 737, 739, him to take some affirmative action to reinstate his right thereto. In such instances a motion for the assistance of counsel would be directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus in the case of In re Conner, 16 Cal.2d 701 , the defendant waived counsel at the beginning of trial proceedings and thereafter, during the prosecution's case, demanded the apointment of counsel. The court properly denied the motion in the circumstances there prevailing. See also People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 789, 336 P.2d 937.'

It is well settled that where the attorney for the accused is appointed by the court, the attorney selected by the court in the exercise of a sound legal discretion must be accepted by the accused in the absence of some compelling reason to the contrary. The accused is not entitled to a court appointed attorney of his own choosing. People v. Chessman, 52 Cal.2d 467, 491, 341 P.2d 679; People v. Manchetti, 29 Cal.2d 452, 458, 175 P.2d 533; People v. Williams, 174 Cal.App.2d 364, 377, 345...

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19 cases
  • People v. Norman
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • July 7, 1967
    ...... (People v. Mattson (1959) 51 Cal.2d 777, 793--794, 336 P.2d 937; People v. Turner (1967) 249 A.C.A. 1028, 1047, 57 Cal.Rptr. 854; People v. Bourland (1966) 247 A.C.A. 36, 43--44, 55 Cal.Rptr. 357; People v. Ortiz (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 112, 115--116, 15 Cal.Rptr. 398; People v. Green (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 280, 283--284, 12 Cal.Rptr. 591; People v. O'Ward (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 127, 132, 335 P.2d 762; People v. Morgan (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 796, 801--802, 296 P.2d 75; People v. O'Neill (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 888, ......
  • People v. Carter
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • May 5, 1967
    ...... * * * ' (Citation.) In the instant case it cannot be said that the waiver was not comprehended and understood by defendant. (Citation.)' .         And in People v. Ortiz, 195 Cal.App.2d 112, 116--117, 15 Cal.Rptr. 398, 401, it is stated: .         '* * * It has been declared to be a 'sound concept that it is the duty of the . Page 624 . [427 P.2d 224] court to safeguard and promote the orderly and expeditious conduct of its business and to guard against ......
  • Brooks v. State, G-64
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • March 16, 1965
    ...... In People v. Nunn, 8 it was held: . 'Clearly, one who rejects the services of the public defender, either in words or by overt refusal to cooperate with ... 'Court-appointed counsel must be accepted by the accused in the absence of some compelling reason to the contrary (People v. Ortiz, 195 Cal.App.2d 112, 116, 15 Cal.Rptr. 398), and he is not entitled to court-appointed counsel of his own choosing (People v. Chessman, 52 Cal.2d ......
  • Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin County
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • June 30, 1972
    .... Page 100. 103 Cal.Rptr. 100. 26 Cal.App.3d 647. Fleeta DRUMGE, Petitioner,. v. SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF MARIN, Respondent;. PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 31049. Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California. June 30, 1972. Rehearing ...Shields (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 716, 43 Cal.Rptr. 188; People v. Terry (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 415, 36 Cal.Rptr. 722; People v. Ortiz (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 112, 15 Cal.Rptr. 398; People v. Jackson (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 307, 8 Cal.Rptr. 849.         With the exception of ......
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