People v. Overstreet

Decision Date13 November 1986
Citation231 Cal.Rptr. 213,42 Cal.3d 891,726 P.2d 1288
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 726 P.2d 1288 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Freddie Lee OVERSTREET, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 24837.

David B. Florance, Florance and Wong, under appointment by the Supreme Court, San Diego, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., John W. Carney and Frederick R. Millar, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., San Diego, for plaintiff and respondent.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

The sole issue presented is whether a defendant who has pled guilty to a felony and thereafter commits another felony while released on his own recognizance pending sentencing is subject to the provisions of former section 12022.1 of the Penal Code imposing a two-year enhancement for felonies committed while released "pending trial." 1

On December 8, 1983, defendant pled guilty to receiving stolen property and was released on his own recognizance pending sentencing. Before sentencing, he was charged with murder, personal use of a firearm, and commission of a felony while released on his own recognizance pending trial. Pursuant to a plea bargain he pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter, admitted the firearm use allegation, and submitted the additional charge to the trial court. The trial court found the charge true, and sentenced defendant to the aggravated term of four years for involuntary manslaughter, two years consecutively for the firearm use, and two years consecutively for committing a felony while released pending trial. 2

Section 12022.1 as enacted in 1982 provided in part: "Any person convicted of a felony offense which was committed while that person was released from custody on bail or on his or her own recognizance pending trial on an earlier felony offense shall, upon conviction of the later felony offense, be subject to a penalty enhancement as follows: ... [p] (b) If the person is convicted of a felony for the earlier offense, is granted probation for the earlier offense, and is convicted of a felony for the later offense, any state prison sentence for the later offense shall be enhanced by an additional term of two years...." 3 (Italics added.) (In 1985 the section was rewritten to apply to persons released on bail or own recognizance "prior to the judgment becoming final, including the disposition of any appeal.")

Defendant contends that the word "trial" is unambiguous and excludes proceedings following the determination of guilt and that, even if it were ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved to exclude such proceeding. The Attorney General argues that the word "trial" is ambiguous and has been used to include the sentencing process, that the word should be interpreted to include the sentencing process to effectuate legislative intent and to avoid absurd consequences, and that the other language of section 12022.1 shows that the word "trial" was intended to encompass judgment. We conclude that, while the word is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be resolved in favor of defendant. His construction is not shown to be contrary to legislative intent, the claimed absurd consequences are not eliminated by construing trial to include sentencing, and the other provisions of section 12022.1, if anything, are contrary to the Attorney General's position.

The fundamental rule is that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the law's purpose, and in determining intent the court first turns to the words used. (People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104.)

When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it. (People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 843, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380; In re Atiles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 805, 811, 191 Cal.Rptr. 452, 662 P.2d 910.) The words "pending trial" are not reasonably subject to a construction to include appeals from a judgment, and to this extent there is nothing to construe.

However, while the word "trial" has long been interpreted to refer to the process culminating in the determination of guilt, particularly in bail cases (e.g., Ex Parte Voll (1871) 41 Cal. 29, 32; Ex Parte Brown (1885) 68 Cal. 176, 178 et seq. 8 P. 829), the word has also been interpreted to include the sentence or judgment in other cases (e.g., People v. McKamy (1914) 168 Cal. 531, 535-536, 143 P. 752; People v. Arbee (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 351, 356, 192 Cal.Rptr. 13). Accordingly, we recognize that the word is ambiguous as to whether it includes proceedings following the determination of guilt prior to sentencing.

When language which is susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law, the policy of this state is to construe the statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstance of its application reasonably permit. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of a statute. (People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 848, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186; In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210, 217, 168 Cal.Rptr. 455, 617 P.2d 1087.)

Strict construction of penal statutes protects the individual against arbitrary discretion by officials and judges and guards against judicial usurpation of the legislative function which would result from enforcement of penalties when the legislative branch did not clearly prescribe them. Strict construction also prevents judicial interpretation from changing the legal consequences of acts completed prior to the decision and thus aids in meeting the requirement that a defendant have fair warning of the consequences of his acts reflected in the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. (People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d 836, 848-851, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380; Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 632, 634, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617.)

As Justice Holmes reasoned in interpreting the language of a criminal statute: "Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used." (McBoyle v. United States (1931) 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 341, 75 L.Ed. 816.)

In addition, the Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time legislation is enacted and to have enacted and amended statutes " 'in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.' " (Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 839, 122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874; People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d 836, 844-846, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380; Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977-978, fn. 10, 140 Cal.Rptr. 669, 568 P.2d 394.)

Application of the above rules of construction requires us to conclude that the words "pending trial" refer to the period prior to determination of guilt and do not include the period between determination of guilt and judgment or execution of judgment. The court in McMillon v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 654, 657- 658, 204 Cal.Rptr. 52, reached the same conclusions rejecting a statement in People v. Superior Court (Price) (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 486, 489, 198 Cal.Rptr. 61, implying that the section applied to persons awaiting judgment. 4

The statutory history of the bill which became section 12022.1 shows that the bill as originally introduced by Assemblymember McAlister provided for the enhancement when a person "arrested or charged" and released from custody committed a felony. The quoted words were deleted in the Assembly, and the words "pending trial" were added along with a number of other changes. The basis of the change is not shown. Yet, it is apparent that the quoted words are words of limitation and could have been omitted if the Legislature did not intend to make a distinction based on the stage of the criminal proceeding.

Obviously, a determination that the words "pending trial" do not include the period following determination of guilt is in accord with the policy to construe statutes as favorably to the defendant as their language reasonably permits. Limiting the words "pending trial" to the proceedings culminating in the determination of guilt is in accord with common usage of the words.

Traditionally, the Constitution, the Legislature and the cases involving release on bail or own recognizance have drawn distinctions on the basis of the determination of guilt. Thus the constitutional right to release on bail or own recognizance (Cal. Const., art. I, § 12, formerly art. I, § 6) applies only to defendants who have not been convicted and is inapplicable after there has been a determination of guilt. (In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 929-930, 931, 127 Cal.Rptr. 97, 544 P.2d 1297; In re Scaggs (1956) 47 Cal.2d 416, 418, 303 P.2d 1009; Ex Parte Brown, supra, 68 Cal. 176, 178 et seq., 8 P. 829; Ex Parte Voll, supra, 41 Cal. 29, 32.) As stated in Voll, "the Constitution, in declaring bail to be a matter of right, contemplated only those cases in which the guilt of the party had not been already judicially ascertained; cases in which the prisoner as yet stood upon his plea of not guilty, supported with all of the presumptions of innocence with which the law delights to surround him. But when trial has been had,...

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