People v. Owens, 98SA225

• Decision Date: 11 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98SA225,98SA225
• Citation: 969 P.2d 704
• Parties: 1999 CJ C.A.R. 153 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott Michael OWENS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 704

969 P.2d 704

1999 CJ C.A.R. 153

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott Michael OWENS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98SA225.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Jan. 11, 1999.

James J. Peters, District Attorney, Eighteenth Judicial District, John Topolnicki, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Michael Spear, Deputy District Attorney, Englewood, Colorado Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Wayne L. Cole, Deputy State Public Defender, Castle Rock, Colorado Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this interlocutory appeal the People challenge an order suppressing the oral and written statements of the defendant, Scott Michael Owens. The basis for suppression was that although the police advised Owens of his Miranda rights and Owens executed a written waiver of those rights, the witness statement form that the police used contained erroneous information about Owens's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at trial. The trial court ruled that giving this misinformation to Owens was inconsistent with his Miranda advisement and invalidated his earlier waiver. Reviewing the undisputed facts in the record de novo, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the People established that Owens's initial Miranda waiver was valid. We hold that the erroneous information contained in the witness statement form did not invalidate this waiver because it did not pertain to Owens's rights during custodial interrogation. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order of suppression and return this case for further proceedings.

I.

In the course of conducting an investigation, officers of the Parker Police Department encountered the defendant at his mother's residence. While there, Owens pulled one of the officers aside to discuss an unrelated matter because he was worried about his girlfriend's alleged drug use. At this time, the officer noticed track marks on Owens's arms and saw evidence of drug paraphernalia. He arrested Owens for the possession of methamphetamine, a schedule II controlled substance. A subsequent search of the house revealed further evidence of drug use.

At the station house, Officer Saraff advised Owens of his Miranda rights and gave him a written Miranda waiver form to execute. Owens placed his initials next to each of the Miranda warnings printed on the form, signifying that they had been given to him. Also on this form, Owens signed an acknowledgement that he understood his rights and signed an express waiver of his right to a lawyer and agreed to answer police questions. Owens then made incriminating oral statements. Sergeant Gerlach then joined them and gave Owens a "Witness Statement Form" to sign. This police form contains the pre-printed statement that Owens may be required to testify in court about his statement:

This statement is given of my own free will without threat or coercion or without promises of any kind. I also understand that I may be called upon to testify in court as to this case and statement.

(Emphasis added.) Owens initialed and dated this form, indicating that he understood it. Thereafter, Officer Saraff prepared a written narrative from Owens's statements on the witness statement form. Owens did not sign this form.

It appears from the record that after Owens provided incriminating statements, Sergeant Gerlach inappropriately threatened to use a catheter if Owens did not provide a urine sample voluntarily. When Owens was still unable or unwilling to provide a sample, Sergeant Gerlach transported Owens to the hospital. However, the doctor refused to perform the procedure without Owens's consent.

Owens was charged with four related felony and petty offense drug charges. In pre-trial motions, he moved to suppress his oral and written statements on several grounds, including that these statements were obtained in the absence of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.

At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Gerlach testified that following the Miranda advisement, Owens was talkative; he initiated conversations with police and frequently repeated himself. Sergeant Gerlach related that police "had a hard time keeping [Owens] quiet."

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court suppressed Owens's oral and written statements, reasoning that the advice to Owens contained on the witness form directly conflicted with Owens's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966): ¹

The Court finds that that statement was directly contradictory to the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege as it was explained to him in the Miranda advisement, and based on that conflict and improper information conveyed to the defendant in this statement, the Court believes violates the defendant's Miranda rights, and therefore, the court suppresses the contents of the statement, as well as any oral statements made by the defendant to the officers at that time he provided the written statement.

The prosecution brings this interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling.

II.

An accused's statement made while being interrogated in a custodial setting is inadmissible unless it is provided pursuant to a valid Miranda waiver. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The prosecution has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused gave the Miranda waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 211 (Colo.1998); People v. Hopkins, 774 P.2d 849, 852 (Colo.1989). To determine whether the prosecution has met its burden, the trial court must evaluate the waiver based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation. See Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 852. "Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)). Factors to consider include, but are not limited to:

the time interval between advisement and interrogation[;] ... whether the defendant or the interrogating officer initiated the interview; whether and to what extent the interrogating officer reminded the defendant of his rights prior to the interrogation by asking him if he recalled his rights, understood them, or wanted an attorney; the clarity and form of the defendant's acknowledgment and waiver, if any; and the background and experience of the defendant in connection with the criminal justice system.

Hopkins, 774 P.2d at 852. If, after considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, the trial court finds that the prosecution has not met its burden of proving that the defendant waived his Miranda rights voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then the statements must be suppressed. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602.

When ruling on a motion to suppress a defendant's statement, the trial court must make findings of historical fact and then apply legal standards to these facts. See Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211. The trial court's findings of historical fact are entitled to deference by appellate courts and will only be overturned if they are...