People v. Pace

• Decision Date: 23 April 1979
• Docket Number: Cr. 17911
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clayton B. PACE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 811

154 Cal.Rptr. 811

92 Cal.App.3d 199

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clayton B. PACE, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 17911.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

April 23, 1979.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1979.

Hearing Denied July 12, 1979.

Jules F. Bonjour, Jr., Bonjour, Gough, Stone & Remer, Hayward, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Sr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

HALVONIK, Associate Justice.

We hold that the warrantless search of a container, removed from a person incident to arrest and reduced to the exclusive control of the police, is unlawful because unjustified by any exigent circumstances.

The arrest occurred on March 20, 1977. Officers Jack Dahl and Ronald Packard were on patrol in separate cars. Both were directed by radio to Union City's Casa Verde Park to investigate complaints about an intoxicated man there. Packard arrived first and saw a man who "seemed to stagger quite heavily, almost in a somewhat dazed fashion . . . ." Packard said hello and asked him how things were going and "he just kind of stared at me." Packard asked him how he felt and he said "I'm okay. I'm making it home. I'm fine." He said that he lived "over there." Packard asked for identification and the man felt in his pockets but produced nothing.

Less than a minute passed before Dahl arrived and told Packard "that he thought he knew the individual was Mr. Pace." Pace was carrying a lunchbox and Dahl told him "to set the box down for my own safety." Pace complied, setting the lunchbox in front of Dahl. Dahl moved it to insure that it was beyond Pace's reach. Dahl, like Packard, noticed Pace's clumsy movements, thick tongue and incapacity to answer simple questions promptly. Dahl detected no smell of alcohol, noticed that Pace's eyes were dilated, decided that he was not in need of medical assistance and concluded that he was under the influence of PCP or some other drug. Dahl handcuffed Pace and, without searching him, put him in the back of the patrol car. Dahl then returned to the lunchbox and "opened it up looking for some sort of identification, if the subject had any, and the possible intoxicant that he was under the influence of." Dahl found exactly what he was looking for. The lunchbox contained, among other items, Pace's driver's license, PCP, marijuana and cocaine.

Pace pleaded guilty to a violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, possession of cocaine. On this appeal, pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5(m), the sole question presented is whether the warrantless search of appellant's lunchbox violated the constitutional guarantees prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. (Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution; Article I, section 13, California Constitution.)

The Attorney General submits that there was nothing dubious about the search and cites People v. Belvin (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 955, 80 Cal.Rptr. 382 for the proposition that a search incident to arrest is not unlawful even when it extends to the inside of a container carried by a person when arrested.

Pace does not quarrel with the Attorney General's interpretation of that authority but contends that it is contradicted by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Chadwick (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538.

In Chadwick, federal agents seized a 200-pound footlocker incident to the arrest of three men, two of whom had just placed it in the trunk of an automobile. The arrest occurred before the trunk was closed. The locked footlocker, containing marijuana, was opened by unknown means after it had been removed by the agents to the Federal Building in Boston. The agents had probable cause to believe marijuana was in the footlocker and the question, as the government posed it, was "(w)hether a search warrant is required before federal agents may open a locked footlocker that is properly in their possession and that they have probable cause to believe contains contraband." (433 U.S. at p. 7, fn. 3, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2481 n.3.) The question was answered affirmatively because "(t)here being no exigency, it was unreasonable for the Government to conduct this search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provides." (433 U.S. at p. 11, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2483.) "(T)he Warrant Clause places the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive dominion of police authority." (Id. at p. 15, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2486.)

Conceding that Pace's lunchbox was reduced to the exclusive control of the police before it was searched, the Attorney General insists that there is a good deal of difference between a 200-pound footlocker and appellant's lunchbox and points to the following language as evidence that the decision in Chadwick permits a warrantless search incident to arrest of anything within the immediate control of the person arrested: "When a custodial arrest is made, there is always some danger that the person arrested may seek to use a weapon, or that evidence may be concealed or destroyed. To safeguard himself and others, and to prevent the loss of evidence, it has been held reasonable for the arresting officer to conduct a prompt, warrantless 'search of the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control" construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)." (Id. at p. 14, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2485.)

But the question here is whether a warrantless search may be justified after a container has been removed from the immediate control of the person arrested and there is, therefore, no longer any danger that he will seize a weapon or destroy evidence of a crime. ¹

That Chadwick cannot be confined to cases of bulky footlockers is inferable not only from its reasoning but by the Supreme Court's decision to return to the Court of Appeals, "for further consideration in light of United States v. Chadwick," the case of Schleis v. United States (1977) 433 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2968, 53 L.Ed.2d 1089. Schleis, like Pace, was arrested when he appeared to be under the influence of drugs. He was carrying a locked briefcase at the time. At the police station, an officer forced open the briefcase and discovered cocaine. Prior to Chadwick, the Eighth Circuit had found the search a lawful one (United States v. Schleis (8th Cir. 1976) 543 F.2d 59) but on remand it reached the opposite result. (United States v. Schleis (8th Cir. 1978) 582 F.2d 1166, en banc.)

In Schleis II the court rejected the government's attempt to distinguish Chadwick as a special rule applicable only to bulky objects: "The contents of a briefcase are entitled to the same protection of the Fourth Amendment as the contents of a footlocker." (582 F.2d 1170.) Whether the briefcase was searched at the place of arrest or at the police station was also found immaterial: "(T)he critical factor is the extent to which the property is within the control of the law enforcement officers, rather than the amount of time or space between the arrest and the search." (Id. at 1172.) The court held that the justification for a warrantless search "evaporates once the officers seize the luggage or other personal property and reduce it to their exclusive control." (Id.) We think the Schleis II analysis of Chadwick is correct. ²

Before it was searched, Pace set down his lunchbox and Officer Dahl had, wisely and cautiously, moved it well out of reach; additionally, Pace had been handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the patrol car. Pace, at the time the lunchbox was searched, had no access to it and could neither extract a weapon from it nor destroy any of its contents. (See Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 460, 461, fn. 18, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.) Warrantless searches incident to arrest are justified on the ground that it would be senseless to require "the arresting officer to calculate the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved." (United States v. Chadwick, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 15, 97 S.Ct. at p. 2485.) But where the police have the item in their exclusive control, no calculation is necessary and the justification for a warrantless search no longer obtains. When the justification no longer obtains, a warrant is necessary because "the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate with the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant requirement." (Cupp v. Murphy (1973) 412 U.S. 291, 295, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 2003, 36 L.Ed.2d 772.) (Footnote omitted.) (And see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 466-467, 91 S.Ct. 2022; People v. Escudero (1979) 23 Cal.3d 800, 811, 153 Cal.Rptr. 825, 592 P.2d 312; People v. Smith (1972) 7 Cal.3d 282, 286, 101 Cal.Rptr. 893, 496 P.2d 1261.)

[2,3] The warrant requirement must be satisfied in every case where exigent circumstances do not justify ignoring it. A warrantless search is not a reasonable search unless the police establish "that it was impracticable for them to obtain a search warrant . . . ." (Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399 U.S. 30, 35, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L.Ed.2d 409.) In California, that constitutional principle is reflected in the rule placing upon the prosecution the burden of establishing the legality of any search not conducted pursuant to warrant. (People v. Norman (1975) 14 Cal.3d 929, 933, 123 Cal.Rptr. 109, 538 P.2d 237; People v. Superior Court (Kiefer) (1970) 3 Cal.3d 807-812, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 478 P.2d 449; People v. Haven (1963) 59 Cal.2d 713, 717, 31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927; Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23.) ³

The Attorney General...