People v. Pace

• Decision Date: 11 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1–11–0415.,1–11–0415.
• Citation: 44 N.E.3d 378
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael PACE, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

44 N.E.3d 378

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Michael PACE, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–11–0415.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

Filed Sept. 11, 2015.

Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing Oct. 16, 2015.

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Yasaman Hannah Navai, State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, William Toffenetti, and Mary P. Needham, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice DELORT

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Michael Pace appeals the trial court's denial of his motions to vacate his guilty plea and reconsider sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court committed reversible error by (1) considering its personal beliefs and private investigations during the sentencing hearing; (2) exhibiting bias against him; (3) improperly considering his declination to speak in allocution; (4) considering improper evidence; (5) failing to consider mitigating evidence; (6) improperly questioning a defense witness during a hearing on his motion to vacate his plea; and (7) failing to properly admonish him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)

(eff. July 1, 1997). In addition, he contends that the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/5–130 (West 2006) ) and the application of the 25 years-to-life mandatory firearm enhancement and consecutive sentencing statute violate the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.VIII) and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11 ). We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate defendant's sentence and remand with instructions.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On June 15, 2007, defendant was charged in a 29–count indictment with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1)

, (a)(2) (West 2006)), attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8–4 (West 2006) ), and aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12–4.2 (West 2006) ). Defendant was 16 years old at the time he committed the offense. Due to the nature of the offenses, his case was transferred to adult criminal court pursuant to the automatic transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act. 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) (West 2006). On June 19, 2009, defendant entered into a blind guilty plea whereby he plead guilty to one count of first degree murder, one count of first degree murder in which he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death, and two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm.

¶ 4 After defendant announced his intent to enter a guilty plea, the trial court furnished him with several admonishments. The court began by admonishing defendant about the sentencing ranges applicable to him. The court specifically informed defendant that the sentencing range for first degree murder was 20 to 60 years' imprisonment, that the sentencing range “[o]n the charge of Personally Discharging a Firearm Which Proximately Caused the Death of Blair Holt” was 25 years to life in prison, and that the sentencing range for aggravated battery with a firearm was 6 to 30 years' imprisonment. After informing the defendant of the range applicable to each offense, the court asked defendant if he understood. Defendant answered “yes” each time.

¶ 5 Next, the court admonished defendant about the nature of a blind guilty plea. The court explained that there was no agreement between defendant and the State or the court regarding what sentence would be imposed. The court asked defendant if he understood and still wanted to plead guilty and defendant answered affirmatively.

¶ 6 The court then admonished defendant about the nature of the rights he would be relinquishing by pleading guilty. The court explained that defendant had a right to plead not guilty and force the State to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then informed defendant that he had right to a jury trial. The court explained what a jury was, how it functioned, and that a jury's verdict must be unanimous. After each of these admonishments, defendant indicated that he understood. Defendant then signed a jury waiver form, at which point the court stated “[b]y signing that you are indicating to me in writing that you understand that you're waiving your absolute right to trial by jury, do you understand that?” Defendant replied “yeah.”

¶ 7 Next, the court informed defendant that he had a right to a bench trial, and it explained to defendant what a bench trial was. The court also told defendant that by pleading guilty he was giving up his right to confront witnesses against him and subpoena witnesses to testify on his behalf. After each of these admonishments, defendant indicated that he understood.

¶ 8 The court then inquired into the voluntariness of defendant's plea by asking whether defendant's decision to plead guilty was made of his own free will and whether the plea had been induced by any threats, force or promises. Defendant answered “yes” and “no,” respectively.

¶ 9 The State then presented the following factual basis for defendant's plea: Around 3 p.m. on May 10, 2007, a Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) bus stopped at Julian High School (Julian). Several students who had been released from Julian for the day boarded the bus, including Blair Holt, Christine Coley, and Megan James. The bus began travelling west on 103rd Street towards Halsted Street.

¶ 10 While the bus traveled towards Halsted Street, defendant and some other friends were at Mt. Vernon Park near 105th Street and Aberdeen Street. At that time, they formed a plan to “go get” rival gang members whom they believed were travelling on the bus. One of defendant's friends, Kevin Jones, gave defendant a gun and a hoodie. The group then walked to a bus stop at 103rd Street and Halsted Street and waited outside a currency exchange for the bus to arrive.

¶ 11 When the bus approached, defendant peered inside and then ran onto the bus at the front entrance. Standing by the driver's area, defendant took out the handgun and fired several shots into the crowd of people on bus. Several people were struck by defendant's gunfire, including Coley, who suffered gunshot wounds

to her chest and arm, James, who suffered a gunshot wound to her knee, and Holt, who suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen. Coley and James survived, but Holt died from his wounds later that day.

¶ 12 After firing the shots, defendant fled to the area around 105th Street and Aberdeen Street. There, he told a person named Jimmie Malone that he had “just laid down the murder game.” Defendant then left the area.

¶ 13 Surveillance video from outside the 103rd Street currency exchange showed defendant waiting for the bus and pulling the gun out. Surveillance video from onboard the bus showed defendant entering the bus, firing the gun, and then exiting. Police captured still images from the bus's surveillance video. A police officer took one of the images to Julian, where an attendance officer identified defendant. Defendant turned himself in on May 12, 2007.

¶ 14 After finding that defendant's plea was supported by a factual basis, the court found defendant guilty and entered judgment against him. The court then admonished defendant for a second time regarding the sentencing ranges he was facing and the fact that there was no agreement about what sentence he would receive. Defendant again indicated that he understood the admonishments.

¶ 15 The court conducted a sentencing hearing on July 20, 2009. In aggravation, the State presented testimony from Detective Neil Maas, Coley, James, and victim impact statements from Holt's parents, Ronald Holt and Annette Nance Holt.

¶ 16 In mitigation, the defense presented testimony from Dr. Robert Hanlon, whom the parties stipulated was an expert in neuropsychology. Dr. Hanlon testified that he met with defendant in May 2008 in order to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation. The evaluation revealed that defendant had an IQ of 77, which according to Dr. Hanlon was in “the borderline range of intelligence.” He explained that meant defendant was “above the mental retardation

range, but below the low average range.” The evaluation also showed that defendant had a “nonverbal learning disorder.” Dr. Hanlon explained that a nonverbal learning disorder “involves impaired perceptual abilities and deficient spatial processing[ ]” and can lead to “difficulty in perceiving and interpreting gestures, nonverbal communication, [and] facial expressions.” He noted that such disorders have “a significant academic impact on school performance” which leads to difficulty “forming and understanding * * * the abstract meaning of things and drawing inferences.” He also noted that individuals with such disorders experience emotional problems, stating “many of these kids generally are frustrated, and they are often angry and often depressed. They tend to act out. They're compulsive, and they have poor social judgment.” Dr. Hanlon believed that defendant's learning disability “very likely” affects his judgment and socialization.

¶ 17 On cross-examination, Dr. Hanlon testified that he believed defendant knows right from wrong “in many cases.” He also conceded that he stated in his report that defendant's “thought processes were logical, linear, and goal directed” and that he did not find evidence that defendant had a “thought disorder or psychotic thought content or severe mood disorder or marked anxiety.”

¶ 18 After the State finished its cross-examination, the following colloquy took place between the court and Dr. Hanlon:

“THE COURT: Doctor, you talked a little bit about socialization in your evaluation of Mr. Pace; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Are people who suffer from nonverbal learning disorders such as his often isolated within communities?

THE WITNESS: Often * * *. Particularly, if there

...