People v. Pacheco
Decision Date | 29 June 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 77-235,77-235 |
Citation | 581 P.2d 741,41 Colo.App. 188 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Norman Harold PACHECO, Defendant-Appellant. . II |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., Linda Palmieri Rigsby, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Deputy State Public Defender, Pueblo, for defendant-appellant.
After pleading guilty to charges of first degree murder and assault in the first degree, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on the first degree murder charge and 34 to 38 years on the charge of assault in the first degree. A plea agreement between the prosecution and the defendant provided, among other things, that the sentence imposed on the assault charge would run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the murder charge. Pursuant to § 18-1-409 C.R.S. 1973, the defendant seeks review of the sentence imposed on the assault charge, contending that the sentence was excessive.
Upon appellate review of a felony sentence, regard must be given to the interests of the public, the nature of the offense, and the possibility of rehabilitation as it relates to the character of the offender. People v. Strong, Colo., 544 P.2d 966 (1976). Assault in the first degree is a class 3 felony, § 18-3-202, C.R.S. 1973, punishable by five to 40 years in the state penitentiary. Section 18-1-105, C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Cum.Supp.). Accordingly, the 34- to 38-year term imposed against the defendant on the assault charge was, in effect, a maximum sentence. People v. Strong, supra.
The defendant argues that because the plea bargaining agreement contained a stipulation of his impaired mental capacity, see § 16-11-103, C.R.S. 1973 (1976 Cum.Supp.), which was supported by facts disclosed in the presentence investigation, the trial court was obliged, but failed, to consider the defendant's mental capacity in imposing sentence on the assault charge. While a defendant's impaired mental capacity at the time of the commission of an offense is an appropriate factor to be taken into consideration by a trial court at the time of sentencing, other factors must also be considered. Here, the defendant had an extensive juvenile and criminal history; the crimes to which he pled guilty were serious and vicious in nature; and a presentence psychiatric report characterized the defendant as a "very dangerous man" who was "actively homicidal." Given these circumstances, the trial court was justified in imposing what was tantamount to a maximum sentence on the assault charge. People v. Strong, supra.
The defendant also argues that the sentences for first degree murder and for first degree assault were inconsistent because of the disparate parole eligibility dates resulting from the two sentences. Thus, he argues that on his sentence of life imprisonment, he could be eligible for parole in ten years, see § 17-1-207(3), C.R.S. 1973; however, on the sentence imposed on the...
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Duffy v. State
...because the appellant had no "prior criminal propensities," the court reduced the minimum sentence to five years. In People v. Pacheco, 41 Colo.App. 188, 581 P.2d 741 (1978), the defendant appealed his sentence of 34-38 years for assault in the first degree as being excessive. A statute aut......
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