People v. Padilla

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MANELLA, J.
• Citation: People v. Padilla, 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 (Cal. App. 2016)
• Decision Date: 25 October 2016
• Docket Number: B265614
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mario Salvador PADILLA, Defendant and Appellant.

4 Cal.App.5th 656

209 Cal.Rptr.3d 209

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Mario Salvador PADILLA, Defendant and Appellant.

B265614

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Filed October 25, 2016

Jonathan E. Demson, Santa Monica, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb and Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MANELLA, J.

In 1999, appellant Mario Salvador Padilla was convicted of a murder he committed when sixteen years old, and was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In the underlying proceeding for writ of habeas corpus, appellant sought resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (Miller ). After conducting a resentencing hearing, the trial court reimposed the LWOP term. Following that ruling, the United States Supreme Court decided Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (Montgomery ), which held that Miller announced a substantive rule of law that had retroactive application in state collateral review proceedings. In so holding, the United States Supreme Court clarified and elaborated on its earlier holding in Miller. Because the trial court exercised its discretion in resentencing appellant without the guidance provided by Montgomery, we reverse its ruling and remand for a new resentencing hearing.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In July 1999, a jury convicted appellant of the murder of his mother Gina Castillo (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a) ) and conspiracy to murder his stepfather Pedro Castillo (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1) ).¹ The jury found true special-circumstance allegations that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery and while lying in wait (§ 190.2, subds. (15), (17)(A)). The trial court imposed an LWOP term on the murder conviction (§ 190.5, subd. (b)), and imposed and stayed a term of 25 years to life on the conviction for conspiracy to commit murder (§ 654). In an unpublished opinion (People v. Padilla (June 1, 2001, B135651)), this court determined there was insufficient evidence to support the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding, but otherwise affirmed appellant's judgment of conviction.

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller, which held that the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders,” and set forth factors controlling the determination whether that penalty may be imposed on such a juvenile. (Miller , supra , 132 S.Ct. at pp. 2469–2470.)

In August 2014, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court, seeking resentencing under Miller. On July 15, 2015, after respondent admitted that appellant was entitled to a resentencing hearing, the court conducted that hearing and resentenced appellant to an LWOP term. Appellant noticed this appeal from that ruling. In January 2016, while the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Montgomery, which concluded that Miller announced a substantive rule of law that applies retroactively on state collateral review to juvenile offenders whose convictions and sentences were final when Miller was decided. (Montgomery , supra , 136 S.Ct. at pp. 727, 729, 736 ).²

DISCUSSION

Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in resentencing him to an LWOP term, contending (1) that Miller and Montgomery preclude the imposition of such a sentence on juvenile offenders convicted of a homicide, and alternatively, (2) that the court exercised its sentencing discretion without the benefit of Montgomery. As explained below, we conclude that although neither Miller nor Montgomery expressly forbids LWOP terms for juvenile offenders convicted of a homicide, the court's resentencing decision does not reflect the guidance provided by Montgomery.

A. Governing Principles

We are governed by the supremacy clause (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 ), pursuant to which we follow decisions of the United States Supreme Court on matters of constitutional interpretation (Calderon v. City of Los Angeles (1971) 4 Cal.3d 251, 258, 93 Cal.Rptr. 361, 481 P.2d 489 (Calderon )), including the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 756 ).

1. Key United States Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Miller

Miller and Montgomery rely on two prior high court decisions addressing the application of the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment to juvenile offenders, namely, Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (Roper ) and Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (Graham ). In Roper, the court held that the Eighth Amendment bars the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders, relying on the existence of a consensus against that practice, as well as certain differences between juveniles and adults. (Roper , supra , 543 U.S. at pp. 564–570, 578–579, 125 S.Ct. 1183.) The court observed that juveniles generally exhibit less maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, are more vulnerable to outside influences, and lack a well-formed character. (Id . at pp. 569–570, 125 S.Ct. 1183.) In view of those differences, the court explained, the penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—apply with lesser force to juveniles; their diminished culpability and lack of foresight call into question whether the death penalty is merited or acts as a deterrent. (Id . at pp. 571–572, 125 S.Ct. 1183.) While acknowledging the possibility that in “a rare case” the death penalty might be warranted, the court adopted a categorical rule barring capital punishment in order to foreclose the risk of its imposition “despite insufficient culpability.” (Id . at pp. 572–573, 125 S.Ct. 1183.) As the court observed: “It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (Id . at p. 573, 125 S.Ct. 1183.)

In Graham, the court adopted a categorical rule barring the imposition of LWOP terms on juvenile nonhomicide offenders. (Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 81, 130 S.Ct. 2011.) As in Roper, the court relied on the existence of a consensus against that practice, as well as the features of juveniles relating to the penological justifications for imposing an LWOP term. (Graham, supra, at pp. 61–79, 130 S.Ct. 2011.) The court rejected a case-by-case approach to such sentencing, pointing to the difficulties in distinguishing “with sufficient accuracy ... the few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.” (Id . at p. 77, 130 S.Ct. 2011.)

2. United States Supreme Court's Decision in Miller

In Miller, the high court expressly declined to decide whether the Eighth Amendment requires a “categorical bar” to LWOP terms for juvenile offenders convicted of a homicide, but held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing schemes mandating such punishment. (Miller , supra , 132 S.Ct. at p. 2469.) The court relied primarily on Roper and Graham, and a strand of decisions traceable to Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (plur. opn.), which required individualized sentencing in death penalty cases. (Miller , supra , 132 S.Ct. at p. 2463–2464.) In Roper and Graham, the court explained, “emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” (Id . at p. 2465.) The court further stated that Roper and Graham, like the cases in the second strand of decisions, “teach that in imposing a State's harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.” (Id . at p. 2468.)

The court thus concluded that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing schemes mandating LWOP terms for juvenile offenders: “Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and home environment that surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. [Citations.] And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances most suggest it.” (Miller , supra , 132 S.Ct. at p. 2468.)

In declining to examine whether the Eighth Amendment required a “categorical bar” to LWOP terms for juveniles, the court remarked: “[W]e think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at this early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ [Citations.] Although we do not foreclose a...