People v. Page

• Decision Date: 29 March 1990
• Docket Number: No. 3-89-0033,3-89-0033
• Citation: 553 N.E.2d 753,196 Ill.App.3d 285,143 Ill.Dec. 46
• Parties: , 143 Ill.Dec. 46 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick PAGE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 753

553 N.E.2d 753

196 Ill.App.3d 285, 143 Ill.Dec. 46

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick PAGE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 3-89-0033.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

March 29, 1990.

Rehearing Denied April 27, 1990.

Verlin R. Meinz (argued), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, William McMenamin, Joliet, for Patrick Page.

Terry A. Mertel (argued), States' Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, Edward Burmila, Will County State's Atty., Joliet, for the people.

Justice WOMBACHER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Patrick Page, was found guilty of murder, robbery, felony murder predicated on aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping. The court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment of sixty (60) years for murder and seven (7) years for robbery. The defendant appeals his convictions.

The record reveals the following information. In November, 1985, a hunter discovered a headless skeleton near Wilmington, Illinois. He contacted Will County law enforcement authorities who supervised the removal of the body from the scene. The body was badly decomposed and showed evidence of charring. During an autopsy the pathologist discovered a severe stab wound on the right side of the chest. This wound, possibly inflicted by a knife, resulted in death according to the pathologist. The remains were subsequently identified as those of Dale Andrew Devine.

On May 19, 1987, the defendant was in the custody of the Olympia Fields police department. The defendant made oral statements to the police and an assistant Cook County state's attorney regarding his involvement in the murder of Devine. Later that day the defendant agreed to give a court-reported statement.

The statement indicated that during the fall of 1985 Devine was residing with the defendant. Devine and Ken Cheney became involved in a drug deal in which Devine apparently "ripped off" Cheney. The defendant contacted Jerry Feinberg and told him that Devine was at his residence. Feinberg went to the defendant's house and the two proceeded to tie up Devine using an extension cord. The defendant then called Cheney and told him that Devine was at his residence. Cheney came over and, using a hypodermic needle, injected Devine with barbiturates. The defendant took approximately one hundred dollars currency from the pocket of Devine and gave it to Cheney.

The defendant, Feinberg and Cheney then put Devine into the defendant's automobile, and the four then drove to the Wilmington, Illinois, area. They took Devine out of the automobile and Cheney asked Devine how he wanted to die, either by being stabbed with a knife or injection by hypodermic needle. Devine indicated that he wanted to die by the injection.

Devine was taken to a wooded area by the three men and Cheney injected Devine five or six times with an empty needle. Cheney was attempting to inject an air bubble into Devine's bloodstream. Apparently this did not have the desired effect, so Cheney took the knife and slit Devine's throat. Cheney then directed Feinberg and the defendant to stab Devine in the chest one time apiece. Feinberg and the defendant complied, and the three left the area.

Cheney, Feinberg and the defendant travelled to Cheney's residence where they consumed alcoholic beverages and marijuana. Two days later Cheney and the defendant returned to the body. While the defendant waited in the car, Cheney doused the body with gasoline and set it afire.

The day after giving this statement to the police, the defendant was charged by complaint with murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated kidnapping, felony murder predicated on armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery. The grand jury returned indictments on all charges.

The defendant's first trial ended in a mistrial. The State filed an information in the cause, substantially repeating the charges in the indictment, but substituting a charge of robbery for that of armed robbery. The defense filed a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, but the motion was denied.

The State's case included testimony of one who knew Devine, the person who discovered Devine's body, and medical and law enforcement officials who investigated Devine's murder. The defendant's statement was read to the jury. The State rested and the defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing inter alia, that any robbery in the cause had occurred in Park Forest in Cook County, rather than Will County. This motion was denied.

The defense called three witnesses. The heart of the defense was the defendant's own testimony. The defendant testified that he did not kill, rob or kidnap Devine and insisted that Cheney had killed Devine. The defendant further testified that Cheney forced him and Feinberg to assist in the disposal of Devine's body and that Cheney had threatened them to remain silent. Several days later he and Cheney returned to the body and Cheney tried to burn it.

The defendant was found guilty of murder, robbery, felony murder predicated on aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping. The defendant was found not guilty of felony murder predicated on robbery. The court vacated the felony murder verdict and the aggravated kidnapping verdict. It then sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment of sixty (60) years for murder and seven (7) years for robbery. The defendant filed this timely appeal, raising three issues for our consideration.

The defendant first contends that the trial court committed reversible error during the voir dire of the jury. The defendant alleges two significant defects in the manner prospective jurors were questioned. First, the trial court refused to ask the prospective jurors all of the questions offered by the defendant and second, all prospective jurors were not thoroughly questioned during voir dire.

Prior to trial the defendant submitted a list of forty-seven (47) questions he wanted the trial judge to ask prospective jurors during voir dire. Many of these questions had sub-parts making the actual number of proffered questions substantially higher in number than forty-seven. During the pre-trial hearing the judge agreed to ask some of the questions as offered, ask some that were offered in another form and determined that others were repetitive and thus would not be asked.

A trial judge has the power to reasonably regulate the manner in which jurors are selected. (People v. DeSavieu (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 420, 426-27, 76 Ill.Dec. 104, 458 N.E.2d 504.) The decision of whether to permit supplemental questions in a voir dire examination is left to the discretion of the trial judge and the standard for determining whether the trial judge abused that discretion is whether the means employed to test impartiality have created a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present. People v. Bunch (1987), 159 Ill.App.3d 494, 510, 111 Ill.Dec. 359, 512 N.E.2d 748.

The exception to these general rules was discussed in People v. Zehr (1984), 103 Ill.2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062. In Zehr the court held that a trial judge abuses his discretion if he fails to ask defense tendered questions during voir dire to determine if prospective jurors would have any hesitancy in returning a not guilty verdict if the People failed to sustain their burden of proof, to determine whether the jurors would hold it against the defendant if he does not testify at trial and to determine whether the jurors understand that the defendant is presumed innocent and does not have to offer evidence at trial. The court in Zehr held that there is no precise form which must be used to question the jurors concerning these principles of law.

In People v. Emerson (1987), 122 Ill.2d 411, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109, cert. denied (1988), 488 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 246, 102 L.Ed.2d 235, the court held that the requirements of Zehr were satisfied if the trial judge covered those areas in general admonishments made to the jury and the trial judge asked if the jury would follow the law.

With these cases in mind, we turn now to the record. It is important to note that since this was potentially a death penalty case the trial judge conducted the voir dire by calling groups of jurors and questioning them generally and then allowing questioning of each potential juror individually by himself and counsel. A review of the record reveals that all of the jurors were generally admonished by the judge as to the law. Additionally, each juror, when questioned individually by the judge and the attorneys, was personally informed of the applicable legal doctrines outlined in Zehr and agreed to follow the law. It is also important to note that during voir dire the defense counsel never contended that the trial judge was violating the requirements of Zehr or was not asking sufficient questions to permit him to make proper use of his peremptory challenges. Instead he argued only that the judge wasn't asking all of his proffered questions.

We are of the opinion that the general admonishments made by the judge as to the law, combined with the individual admonishments and questioning by both the judge and counsel satisfied the guidelines set forth in Zehr and Emerson. We therefore find no error in the voir dire.

The second issue raised by the defendant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to permit the defendant to back-strike a prospective juror.

One of the prospective jurors, William Shepard, answered during voir dire questioning that he had a friend, Mr. Bazzani, who worked as a jailer at the Will County Jail. Sheperd indicated that he and Bazzani occasionally discussed Bazanni's work,...