People v. Palmer
Decision Date | 10 September 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 00SC326.,00SC326. |
Citation | 31 P.3d 863 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Dennis PALMER, Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied October 1, 2001.1
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Clemmie Parker Engle, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.
David Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Nancy L. Flax, Deputy State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave, III, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.
The prosecution in this case seeks review of the court of appeals' decision in People v. Palmer, 9 P.3d 1156 (Colo.App.2000). After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On appeal, the court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to the effect of Defendant's amnesia on his competency to stand trial. Id. at 1160. In doing so, the court of appeals adopted the test articulated in Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C.Cir.1968) as the appropriate analytical framework for assessing the competency of a defendant with no ability to recall the events underlying his conviction and whose amnesia was not self-induced. Palmer, 9 P.3d at 1159. The court of appeals also held that the trial court erred by denying Defendant's request for a second psychiatric examination by an expert of his own choosing at the state's expense. Id. at 1160.
We granted certiorari to address the appropriate treatment of a defendant's amnesia in determining his competency to stand trial. Specifically, we granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in adopting the Wilson approach, in holding that a remand was necessary in this case, and in holding that Defendant was entitled to a second competency examination by a psychiatric expert under section 16-8-108, 6 C.R.S. (2000). We now hold that amnesia, in and of itself, does not constitute incompetency and that a trial court should engage in a fact-specific inquiry which includes a review of the totality of the circumstances of a particular case. Under such a review, a defendant's amnesia is only determinative to his competency when the defendant has shown that his impairment renders him unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense. We also hold that a trial court need not, in all cases, make post-conviction findings of competency as required under Wilson. Finally, we hold that a trial court need not provide an indigent defendant with a second competency evaluation by an expert of his choosing at the state's expense. Furthermore, while a defendant may request such an evaluation at his own expense, a trial court may require a showing of good cause before granting the request.
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute after a confidential informant notified police that a substantial amount of marijuana could be found in the back of a white pickup truck driven by Defendant. The evidence presented at trial indicated that the truck was owned by Defendant's brother, but that Defendant had been borrowing it for about six months. Prior to trial, Defendant was injured when the transmission of a car he was working on fell on his head, causing him to forget the circumstances surrounding his arrest. Defendant alleged that because of his injury, he was unable to provide his attorney with information which would form a defense or to provide names of witnesses. Thus, Defendant moved for a continuance for a mental health evaluation to determine his competence to stand trial. The trial court granted Defendant's motion and ordered a mental health evaluation.
The psychiatrist's report indicates that although Defendant could not remember anything about his arrest or the events leading up to the arrest, Defendant could discuss his childhood, his high school years, and his service to the United States Army. According to the report, Defendant was also able to discuss a number of prior arrests dating back to 1979. Finally, the psychiatrist's report indicates that Defendant understood the workings of the court. Therefore, the psychiatrist concluded that Defendant was competent to stand trial. Accordingly, the trial court denied Defendant's request for a second psychiatric examination at the state's expense and ruled that Defendant was competent to proceed.
On appeal, Defendant argued that because he was unable to assist his attorney in his defense, the trial court had erred in concluding that he was competent to proceed. Defendant argued that the trial court had also erred by refusing his request for an independent psychiatric examiner. The court of appeals accepted Defendant's arguments and remanded the case to the trial court for another competency determination. Palmer, 9 P.3d at 1160. Specifically, the court determined that the multi-factor test articulated in Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 463-64 (D.C.Cir.1968), was the appropriate analytical framework for determining the competency of an amnesiac to stand trial. Palmer, 9 P.3d at 1159. Although the court of appeals acknowledged that in some cases the evidence of the defendant's guilt is sufficiently overwhelming to eliminate the need for a remand, the court of appeals determined that the evidence in this case was largely circumstantial. Id. at 1159-60. Thus, it concluded that a remand for a determination under the Wilson test was necessary. Id. at 1160. Finally, the court of appeals held that Defendant was entitled to a second psychiatric examination under section 16-8-108. Id.
We granted certiorari to determine whether amnesia is relevant to a defendant's competency and whether both a pre-trial and post-trial competency determination is required. We also granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred by remanding this case and by ordering the trial court to grant Defendant's request for a second competency evaluation by an independent psychiatrist at the state's expense.2
We have not previously addressed the appropriate treatment of a defendant's amnesia on a trial court's competency determination, nor whether an indigent defendant is entitled to a second competency evaluation at the state's expense. As these are issues of first impression, our analysis includes an examination of cases from other jurisdictions as well as academic sources.
A defendant's competence to stand trial is a question of fact. We will therefore uphold a trial court's competency determination absent an abuse of discretion. Jones v. Dist. Court, 617 P.2d 803, 807-08 (Colo.1980). Furthermore, the law presumes that a defendant is competent to stand trial; thus, the burden to prove incompetency rests with the accused. See People v. Schwartz, 135 Ill. App.3d 629, 90 Ill.Dec. 397, 482 N.E.2d 104, 110 (1985) ( ); State v. Martens, 521 N.W.2d 768, 770 (Iowa App.1994) ( ).
Under section 16-8-110(1)(b), 6 C.R.S. (2000), "No person shall be tried, sentenced, or executed if such person is incompetent to proceed at that stage of the proceedings against him or her." We have previously held that, "Putting an accused on trial while he is incompetent violates due process of law." Jones, 617 P.2d at 806; see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) ( ).3
Under section 16-8-102(3), 6 C.R.S. (2000), a defendant who suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him incapable of 1) understanding the nature and course of the proceedings against him, or of 2) participating or assisting in his defense or cooperating with his defense counsel, is "incompetent to proceed".4 In this case, the parties do not dispute Defendant's ability to understand the nature and course of the proceedings against him. Instead, the pertinent issue before us is whether Defendant's amnesia prevented him from being able to assist in his defense by rendering him unable to relate the events surrounding the offense to his attorney.
Several courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that amnesia alone does not hinder a defendant's ability to assist in his defense. Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1341 ( ); State v. McClendon, 103 Ariz. 105, 437 P.2d 421, 425 (1968) ( ); Morrow v. State, 293 Md. 247, 443 A.2d 108, 113 (1982) ( ). For example, in Morrow, 443 A.2d at 113, the court stated:
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