People v. Parker
| Decision Date | 13 October 1887 |
| Citation | 34 N.W. 720,67 Mich. 222 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. PARKER, impleaded, etc. |
Appeal from circuit court, Hillsdale county.
Defendant Parker was convicted in the circuit court for the county of Hillsdale, upon an information charging him jointly with Charles Van Alstine and Edward C. Cleveland with the forging and uttering of a deed of 40 acres of land lying in the township of Somerset, Hillsdale county. The charge was in effect, that a conspiracy existed between said several parties to forge the name of Eleanor Van Alstine to a deed transferring her title to 40 acres of land to Charles Van Alstine, who has been heretofore convicted of the offense and is now serving out his term of imprisonment under such conviction. The alleged forged deed purports to be executed by Eleanor Van Alstine, in the presence of Edward C Cleveland and defendant, and acknowledged by the grantor before the defendant as a notary public of Lenawee county. The deed bears date the ninth day of May, 1876, at which time the legal title to the land in question was in Eleanor Van Alstine, under the name of Eleanor Pelton. It was claimed by the prosecution, and the evidence upon this point is not conflicting, that Eleanor Van Alstine and Eleanor Pelton were one and the same person. For several years Eleanor Pelton had resided with Charles Van Alstine as his wife, although no legal marriage had ever taken place between them. The evidence shows that he treated her as his wife, and claimed her to be such. At one time she joined in a deed with him as his wife, under the name of Eleanor Van Alstine. She died in the month of August, 1876, leaving, if this deed was a forgery, this 40 acres in question, and certain personal property, and, as her heirs at law, two sisters, a Mrs Giddings and a Mrs. Westcott. A will of Eleanor Pelton was discovered and offered and admitted to probate in Hillsdale county, an executor was appointed, the estate appraised, and the ordinary steps of administration taken. At the time the executor made his inventory, the record title of the land, being the S.E. 1/4 of N.W. 1/4 of section 26, township 5 S. of range 1 W. appeared to be in Eleanor Pelton, and was included in the inventory as property belonging to her estate. Afterwards, and on the sixteenth day of April, 1877, Charles Van Alstine placed upon record in the office of the register of deeds for Hillsdale county the deed in question, being a quitclaim deed of said land, bearing date May 9, 1876, and purporting to have been executed by Eleanor Van Alstine to him in the manner above stated.
The information contains 10 counts; the first nine of which were objected to in the Van Alstine Case, 23 N.W. 594, for the reason that they contained no allegations that Eleanor Van Alstine had any interest in the land. The seventh and eighth counts were found to be objectionable, on the ground of duplicity. Each charges the respondents jointly with the offense of forgery. The seventh charges them also with the offense of uttering the forged deed; while the eighth charges Van Alstine alone with uttering it. The only testimony necessary to set out in order to sufficiently illustrate the points decided in the opinion is that of Mr. Mercer, who testifies that Van Alstine came to him and said: that Van Alstine then took the deed out of his pocket, and showed it to him, and that it had not been recorded.
Moses Taggart, Atty. Gen., for the People.
C.E. Weaver, for defendant.
The respondent Parker was convicted in the circuit court for the county of Hillsdale upon an information charging him, jointly with Van Alstine and Cleveland, with the crime of forging and uttering a deed to 40 acres of land in said county. Van Alstine had been previously found guilty, and the affirmance of the verdict in his case by this court will be found in the case of People v. Van Alstine, reported in 57 Mich. 69, 23 N.W. 594. The particulars of the forgery are set forth in the opinion in Van Alstine's Case.
A large number of errors are assigned, but we shall only notice such as appear to be of importance.
The information contains 10 counts. In Van Alstine's Case this court passed upon the validity of these counts, and held all of them good save the seventh and eighth. There is no good reason in the present case for any different ruling.
Evidence was introduced by the people of the record of a deed executed in 1869 by one Watters to Eleanor Pelton, and the register of deeds was permitted to testify that a careful examination of the records failed to show any transfer of the land by Eleanor Pelton, or Eleanor Van Alstine, since that time, save the alleged forged instrument. This was done with the avowed purpose of showing title to the land in Eleanor at the time of the alleged forgery. The evidence was proper.
The probate court files in the estate of Eleanor Pelton, deceased, were offered in evidence by the people, and admitted, against the objection of respondent's counsel. The papers thus admitted included the will, and all the proceedings leading to its probate and allowance, executors' bonds, and letters testamentary, appraisers' warrant and inventory, notices of commissioners' meeting to audit claims, final account of executor, order allowing same, order of distribution, and discharge of executor. None of these papers or proceedings were at all material or relevant to the question at issue, and could possibly throw no light upon the case. Yet witnesses were permitted to examine the signature of Eleanor to the will, and compare the same with the signature to the alleged forged deed, and give testimony from such examination and comparison tending to prove the latter signature a forgery. This was error. Comparisons of this kind can only be made with such writings as are legally in evidence for some other purpose than that of being compared. I can see from the record no reason why the will should have been admitted except for the very purpose for which it was used on the trial, namely, to show that the signature to the deed was a forgery. No other reason was assigned upon the trial, nor upon the argument in this court. It is evident that the probate files were introduced for the express purpose of putting the will in evidence, that it might be used as it was used. This cannot be permitted. Merritt v. Campbell, 79 N.Y. 625; Miles v. Loomis, 75 N.Y. 291; Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N.Y. 51, 52; U.S. v. Jones, 10 Fed.Rep. 469; Randolph v. Loughlin, 48 N.Y. 456. See, also, Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287, 293, 294; Van Sickle v. People, 29 Mich. 61-64.
A very important question arising in this case relates to the admission of the statements of Van Alstine, made at various times in reference to this deed and the ownership of the land, not in the presence or hearing of the respondent Parker, and without his knowledge or consent. The theory of the prosecution was that Van Alstine, Cleveland, and Parker conspired together to commit the crime, and that the acts and declarations of each in the pursuance of the common purpose was evidence against all, whether in their presence or not. This is true where the acts and declarations sought to be given in evidence are confined to the time intervening between the beginning and ending of the conspiracy. What was said or done by one of the conspirators before the conspiracy was formed, or after its object had been obtained, or its work fully completed, not in the presence or hearing of the others,...
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