People v. Parks

• Decision Date: 05 November 2015
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 14CA0811
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Timothy Scott PARKS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

370 P.3d 346

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Timothy Scott PARKS, Defendant–Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 14CA0811

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Announced November 5, 2015

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Victoria M. Cisneros, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Martinez Law, LLC, Esteban A. Martinez, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.

Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO

¶ 1 Defendant, Timothy Scott Parks, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of multiple offenses and the trial court's finding that he is an habitual criminal. He contends that some of his convictions were based on evidence that should have been suppressed at trial because it was obtained in violation of his right, under article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution

, to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. In particular, Parks argues that the Colorado Supreme Court has held that the State Constitution provides greater protection against a vehicle inventory search than the Federal Constitution. We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural History

¶ 2 In June 2009, a Littleton police officer observed Parks driving a van on a city street and checked the license plate for possible traffic violations. The officer discovered that the license plate had expired in 2008 but displayed a 2009 registration sticker. He stopped the van on suspicion of fictitious license plates. Parks, who was the only occupant of the van, provided a revoked driver's license and admitted that he did not have insurance or registration for the van. The officer asked Parks to get out of the car and sit on the curb while a second officer conducted an exterior canine sniff of the van, which did not indicate the presence of drugs. The first officer called a towing company to impound the van.

¶ 3 The officer then inventoried the contents of the van pursuant to Littleton Police Department policy. Behind the driver's seat, he found and unzipped a soft-sided nylon cooler. Inside, he found nine plastic baggies of methamphetamine, two pipes, a digital scale, a scoop, a spoon, an empty pill bottle, two wiretap detection devices, and a receipt listing a credit card allegedly belonging to Parks. Parks was arrested and ultimately charged with drug and traffic offenses as well as seven habitual criminal counts.

¶ 4 Before trial, Parks moved to suppress the evidence collected from the inventory search. Evidence presented at a motions hearing showed that the Littleton Police Department's standard operating procedure for impounded vehicles required officers to inventory the contents of a closed container if access to the container "can be gained without physical damage to the container or the contents." The trial court ultimately denied Parks's motions, citing Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181 (Colo.2010)

, disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71, 334 P.3d 226, and finding that the police officer had followed a standardized departmental policy in conducting the inventory search and that there was no evidence of bad faith or pretext. The court also explained: "[S]o that there's no mistake about it, the court's rulings denying the motions to suppress are based on both a consideration of the U.S. constitution and the Colorado constitution."

¶ 5 The evidence gathered from the inventory search was admitted at trial. Parks was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, driving under suspension, failing to provide insurance, displaying fictitious license plates, driving an unregistered vehicle, and six habitual criminal counts. He was sentenced to thirty-two years in prison to be served concurrently with his sixty-four year prison sentence in another case.

II. Vehicle Inventory Search

¶ 6 Parks contends that the trial court erred by declining to suppress the evidence gathered from the inventory search of the cooler found in his van. Although he concedes that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, he maintains that the search violated his rights guaranteed by article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution

. In support, Parks claims that the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Counterman, 192 Colo. 152, 556 P.2d 481 (1976), held that the State Constitution provides greater protection from inspection of a "nondescript" closed container found during a vehicle inventory search. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 7 A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Vissarriagas, 2012 CO 48, ¶ 7, 278 P.3d 915

, disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71, 334 P.3d 226. We defer to the court's factual findings if supported by the record, but we review its conclusions of law de novo.

Id.

In the absence of a clear statement that the trial court relied on the State Constitution, we presume that the court addressed only the Federal Constitution. People v. Inman, 765 P.2d 577, 578–79 (Colo.1988). Here, however, the trial court clearly stated that it relied on both federal and state constitutional law.

B. Analysis

¶ 8 Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution

declares:

The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or things shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.

This provision is substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.¹ These state and federal constitutional commands "share[ ] a common purpose"—"the protection of legitimate expectations of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusion." People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 814 (Colo.1985)

(citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–52, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ).

¶ 9 As a result, both constitutional provisions require a two-step inquiry: (1) was the governmental intrusion a search? and (2) if so, was it a reasonable search? People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Colo.1992)

. The first inquiry is necessary "because the protections of article II, section 7, do not extend to investigative activity that does not amount to a search or seizure." Id."Whether the contested activities constitute a search depends on whether the officer's ‘actions intruded upon an activity or area in which the defendant held a legitimate expectation of privacy.’ " Id. (quoting People v. Wi e ser, 796 P.2d 982, 984 (Colo.1990) ).

¶ 10 If the governmental intrusion constitutes a search, constitutional protections come into play, including the warrant and reasonableness requirements. See Oates, 698 P.2d at 814

. "The Colorado and U.S. Constitutions are generally coextensive with regard to warrantless searches and seizures." Eddie's Leaf Spring Shop & Towing LLC v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 218 P.3d 326, 333 (Colo.2009) (citing People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1358–59 (Colo.1997) ). Under both constitutions, a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls under a specifically established and delineated exception to the warrant requirement. Pineda, 230 P.3d at 1184. One such exception, under both constitutions, "permits officers to conduct an administrative inventory search of a vehicle after that vehicle has lawfully been taken into custody." Id.

¶ 11 Parks contends, however, that the Colorado Constitution provides stronger protection than the United States Constitution as to the scope of an inventory search. Relying principally on Counterman,

he argues that, unlike the Federal Constitution, the State Constitution forbids the opening of a closed container found during an inventory search, absent indication that its contents are dangerous or particularly valuable and in need of special inventory. Parks emphasizes that we need not decide, as a matter of first impression, whether Colorado constitutional analysis should depart from federal constitutional analysis regarding inventory searches because "such a departure occurred long ago [in Counterman ]." Hence, we first consider that case and then examine later cases.

1. Counterman and Its Contemporary Cases

¶ 12 In Counterman,

the defendant's car was stopped for speeding, and the officer learned that he was wanted on a felony charge. 192 Colo. at 154, 556 P.2d at 482. The officer arrested the defendant, ordered the car towed, and conducted a warrantless inventory search of the car. Id.

Inside, the officer found a closed knapsack, untied it, and discovered cocaine. Id.

¶ 13 The Colorado Supreme Court first recognized that "[t]he owner clearly had an expectation of privacy with regard to his sealed knapsack which was sufficient to invoke constitutional protections against unreasonable police intrusion." Id. at 154, 556 P.2d at 483

. Regarding the reasonableness of the search, the court explained that legitimate purposes of an inventory search include protecting the owner's property while it is in police custody, insuring against claims of lost or damaged property, and protecting police from any danger posed by the contents of the vehicle. Id. at 157, 556 P.2d at 484. But the court held that the opening of the knapsack violated the United States and Colorado Constitutions because the knapsack was sealed and did not appear dangerous or valuable, and the inventory search could have been accomplished by merely describing the item as a sealed knapsack or giving the defendant the option of a full inventory of its contents. Id. at 157–58, 556 P.2d at 485.

¶ 14 The Counterman

court did not hold, however, that state constitutional analysis departs from federal constitutional analysis as to the scope of an inventory search. On the contrary, the court treated the two constitutions as coextensive in this...