People v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 30 April 1895
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. PARSONS.

63 N.W. 69

105 Mich. 177

PEOPLE v. PARSONS.

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 30, 1895

Error to circuit court, Saginaw county; Eugene Wilber, Judge.

Newell B. Parsons was convicted of larceny, and appeals. Affirmed.

Dan P. Foote and Trask & Smith, for appellant.

Fred A Maynard, Atty. Gen., and E. A. Snow, Pros. Atty., for the People.

McGRATH C.J.

Respondent was convicted of the theft on the 4th of April, 1894, from a vault in the office of Wells, Stone & Co., at Saginaw, of 463 bonds, of the value of $1,000 each, issued by the Cincinnati Saginaw & Mackinac Railroad Company. A. W. Wright, F. C Stone, and C. W. Wells had composed the copartnership of Wells, Stone & Co. Stone and Wells had died. A. W. Wright, of Alma, and B. E. Wells, of Duluth, were Wells' executors and A. W. Wright and E. P. Stone and Harriott F. Stone were Stone's executors. The business was being continued by Wright on behalf of all, Edwin P. Stone having charge thereof. Wright, the estate of Wells, and the estate of Stone owned the bonds. Respondent was at the time, and had been for a number of years, the trusted bookkeeper of the firm. He had assisted in clipping the January coupons from the bonds, and knew that the bonds were kept in a tin box in the fault. He had the combination, a key to the inner door of the vault, and a key to the tin box. On the morning of the 6th of April the attention of the proprietors was called by Parsons to the condition of the vault; to the fact that the combination lock had been removed from the outer door of the vault, and that certain books and vouchers which were in the vault on the day before had been taken. It was at this time that the loss of the bonds was discovered. The people's evidence tended to show that the bonds had been sent by Parsons, by express, to one Knight, at Grand Rapids, with instructions, by mail, to "deposit them in two safety-deposit vaults, where they could not be found, and wire me"; that Knight received the bonds, placed them in one safety-deposit vault, and, after the arrest of Parsons, exposed the whole matter, when the bonds were recovered. The defense was that Knight and Parsons had been very intimate; that Knight had frequently visited Parsons, at Saginaw, and, upon such visits, Knight stopped with Parsons, at the latter's home; that, in the latter part of February, Knight spent two or more days a Saginaw, and, on the night before his departure, brought a package to Parsons' house, and on the next morning, representing that he had too much to carry, left the package with Parsons, to be forwarded to him when requested; that, on the 3d of April, Parsons received a letter from Knight requesting him to forward the package to him by express; and that, on the 4th of April, Parsons forwarded the package, innocent of its contents. Knight claimed that he had destroyed the letter he received with the package, agreeably to the instructions contained therein, and Parsons claimed that he had lost the letter sent him by Knight, requesting him to forward the package.

A juror was challenged by the prosecuting attorney, and excused by the court. The record discloses the examination of the juror, the challenge, and the fact that he was excused, but contains nothing tending to show that respondent was prejudiced thereby.

Knight testified that he was at the time in the employ of Houseman, Donnely & Jones; that the package was received in his absence; that when he came in the parcel boy held up the package, and notified him of its receipt; that he then told the boy to open it; that his attention was then called by the cashier to a letter which had been received for him; that he recognized the handwriting upon the letter, opened it, and read it hurriedly, and then told the boy not to open the package, but took it, and left the office. The cashier and the bundle boy were called, and testified to what had occurred upon the receipt of the package, agreeing substantially with Knight. Error is assigned upon the admission of this testimony, but the testimony related to what occurred on the receipt of the package, rather than to the conversation. It bore upon the character of the letter which Knight had received.

Error is assigned upon the receipt of the testimony of the police officer as to admissions made by respondent. In response to questions the officer stated: That no promises or inducements were held out by him. That no threats were made, and that the statements made by respondent were voluntary. That "I told him I did not come there to get any information from him. He started to give me some, and I told him he had better go to Mr. Stark [attorney for Wells, Stone & Co.], and talk with him. I told him he was under no obligations to tell me anything, and I did not want any information. I asked him for the key to his desk. He wanted to know what I wanted of it. I told him I was going to look through his desk. He said I would not make anything by that. I told him I was ordered to get the key, and go look through his desk, and he said to me to see his mother; she would give the key. I told him, 'Why do you not talk with some of the company, and avoid all this trouble and notoriety?' and he said they had not given him any chance. 'Why,' I said, 'I supposed they had.' He says, 'No; they haven't said anything to me at all.' I said, 'Why do you not send for Mr. Stark, and talk to him?' 'Why,' he says, 'he ought to come and talk with me."' No testimony was offered by defendant bearing upon the question of the admissibility of the statements made to the officer. The testimony of the officer upon that point must be considered as a whole, and we think it sufficiently appears that respondent volunteered the talk, to warrant the admission of the testimony; that it was suggested to him that he should do his talking with the attorney for his employers, and that he was under no obligations to talk with the witness. And the only suggestion that savors of possible advantage was one that he might, by talking with the attorney, not with the witness, avoid trouble and notoriety.

Although the theft was alleged to have been committed on the 4th of April, it was entirely proper to show the condition of the vault on the morning of the 6th, when the proprietors were telephoned for by the defendant; that upon their arrival they found the bonds gone, together with the books and vouchers; and that the combination lock had been taken from the vault door.

The court was requested to instruct the jury as follows "(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of larceny. Larceny consists of distinct elements: First, the unlawful and felonious taking; second, the carrying away; third, the goods of another; fourth, with the intent to convert the same to his own use; fifth, and the taking and carrying away must be without the consent of the owner. To convict upon this charge, each element of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (2) Where a reasonable doubt is entertained by any one juror upon any one of the elements constituting the crime, the defendant must be acquitted. (3) Where the property is charged and shown to belong to several owners, the people must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, the nonconsent of all the alleged owners. (4) In a criminal prosecution, nothing can be presumed against the defendant. The people must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of every element and condition constituting the crime charged. (5) The nonconsent of each of the several owners of the property alleged to have been taken is a necessary element of the crime, and must be proved, like every other element of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt. (6) It is not for the defendant to prove the consent of the several owners, but for the people to prove the nonconsent of the owners, and all of the owners, where there are several owners, beyond a reasonable doubt. (7) It is necessary for the people to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, at least the de facto existence of the railroad company issuing the bonds alleged to have been stolen. (8) And the people must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the bonds in the case were the genuine bonds of the company; that is, that the signatures of the president and secretary, by which the bonds are signed and authenticated, are the genuine signatures of the persons whose names are signed thereto as president and secretary. (9) The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the offense charged, and that presumption is a complete shield until the people have introduced evidence to the jury, beyond all reasonable doubt, that he is guilty; that is, the jury must be satisfied, beyond all reasonable doubt, after property considering all the evidence, that the defendant has committed the offense charged, before the jury can lawfully find the defendant guilty. (10) A reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense, and grows out of the testimony in the case. It is such a doubt as will leave one's mind, after a careful...