People v. Patrick
| Decision Date | 23 September 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 13324,13324 |
| Citation | 355 N.E.2d 224,41 Ill.App.3d 1037 |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Allan R. PATRICK, Defendant-Appellant. |
Yoder, Yoder, Luedtke & Hartweg, Bloomington, for defendant-appellant; Alan L. Sternberg, Jerry N. Raymer, Bloomington, of counsel.
Paul R. Welch, State's Atty., McLean County, Bloomington, G. Michael Prall, Principal Atty., Illinois State's Attys. Assn., Statewide Appellate Assistance Service, Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant was tried before a jury in McLean County and found guilty of committing arson in violation of section 20--1 of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 20--1). Defendant's co-defendant was his wife who was acquitted on the same charge. Defendant was sentenced to 5 years probation and was required to make restitution in the amount of $7,886.40 plus costs to be paid at the rate of $30 per week. Defendant appeals his conviction.
Defendant urges two issues on appeal: (1) that evidence seized without a warrant by fire officials and used at trial should have been suppressed; and (2) that he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because his co-defendant was acquitted on the same evidence on which the jury found him guilty.
The facts giving rise to this appeal concern a fire which occurred in the early morning hours of January 13, 1974, at defendant's residence in Arrowsmith, Illinois. The fire did not totally destroy defendant's dwelling, but extensively damaged certain portions. According to the defendant, the fire might have been caused by a malfunction in the furance or the electrical system. Earlier that morning, defendant experienced difficulty with the furnace and took his children to a neighbor's home for the remainder of the night, however, defendant and his wife returned to their home to restart the furnace.
Immediately after the fire was extinquished, the fire chief, James Wick, conducted an inspection of the premises as required by statute. The fire chief was attempting to determine the origin of the fire and to ascertain whether it had been completely extinguished. He checked the furnace at the request of the defendant and found it to be in working order. During his inspection, Wick noticed certain burn patterns on the stairwell leading to the second story, although he found no evidence of a surrounding fire. He completed his investigation around noon on January 13. Suspecting arson, he immediately contacted the State Arson Bureau.
The next morning, around 9 a.m., Lawrence R. Metzelaars, an arson investigator, arrived at the scene of the fire. He was accompanied by Chief Wick and two other individuals. Metzelaars first examined the locations in the home where fire might have occurred, including the areas around the furnace, wiring, and water heater. He concluded that the fire could not have started in any of these areas, however, he discovered four other locations where the fires had occurred, to wit: The utility room doorway; the kitchen; the stariwell leading to the attic; and the hallway. Defendant and his wife were present during Metzelaars' investigation and they observed him removing samples of woodwork in the suspected areas.
The samples taken by Metzelaars were forwarded to the State Crime Lab, where they were analyzed. Results from the tests performed on the samples revealed that certain accelerants were present in the samples. The tests, however, did not conclusively establish the specific identity of the accelerants.
Later the same afternoon after Metzelaars had concluded his investigation, defendant and his wife were questioned by Metzelaars at the Arrowsmith Fire Station. On June 7, 1974, defendant and his wife were indicted for arson.
The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on October 2, 1974, alleging that on January 13 and 14, 1974, the authorities conducted a warrantless search of his residence and seized certain items of physical evidence. The defendant contended that the evidence should be suppressed since no search warrant was issued. The search was not incident to a lawful arrest, nor was it made with the consent of the defendant. A hearing was held on the motion at which the defendant testified. He stated that the kitchen and back bedroom of the house were totally destroyed, but that the front of the house was intact, and that there were many items of furniture and personal property still in the house at the time the authorities made their alleged illegal search and seizure. Defendant stated that he never gave anyone permission to search his home, nor did anyone from the fire department request his permission. Defendant was never presented with a search warrant.
Defendant's wife, Jacquelyn E. Patrick, also testified for the defense. She stated that she gave no one permission to search her home, although she admitted on cross-examination that she did not request any of the investigators to leave. On January 20, 1975, the court entered an order overruling defendant's motion to suppress.
The matter then went to a jury trial. The evidence which was the subject of defendant's motion to suppress was offered and received into evidence over defendant's objection. Defendant was found guility while his wife was acquitted. Defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and that his guilt had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's motion was denied and he appeals.
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the circuit court failed to suppress certain physical evidence obtained without a search warrant. It is defendant's main contention that an arson investigator must secure a search warrant to enter premises after a fire has occurred when the investigation is not contemporaneous with the fighting of a fire and all the fire personnel and equipment have left the scene. Defendant reasons that the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution is mandatory unless the situation falls within the exceptions to the warrant rule which, defendant alleges, are inapplicable to the instant case. This issue is one of first impression in this jurisdiction and defendant has called our attention to numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support of his position. E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court (1967), 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930. See v. City of seattle (1967), 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 and People v. Dajnowicz (1972), 43 Mich.App. 465, 204 N.W.2d 281.
The People urge that an arson investigation pursuant to section 6 of the Fire Investigation and Prevention Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 127 1/2, par. 6), is not a search but rather an inquiry into the cause and source of a conflagration, and that the public safety and interest is the underlying rationale for the aforesaid administrative action thus talking precedence over an individual's right of privacy. The People attempt to distinguish the cases cited by the defendant from the case at bar and we find the People's argument to be persuasive.
We agree with the People's contention that the Camara and See cases are distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Camara, defendant was arrested for refusing to permit building inspectors to inspect his apartment without a warrant. The building inspectors were attempting to determine if defendant was violating the City's Housing Code. Their decision to inspect defendant's apartment was based on information given them by defendant's building manager. Defendant refused to permit the inspectors to enter his apartment and was ultimately cited for violating a provision of the City's Housing Code which permits building inspectors to search for Code violations without a warrant. The State courts ruled that the warrantless intrusion was permissible. Defendant ultimately appealed to the United States Supreme Court and that Court reversed, holding that an administrative search is a serious intrusion upon fourth amendment rights and that 'such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual * * *.' (387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733.) The Court, however, specifically limited its holding when it stated:
387 U.S. 523, 539, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1736.
In See, the Supreme Court applied the Camara principle to commercial structures as well as private dwellings.
The Camara and See cases were reviewed in U.S. v. Green (5th Cir. 1973), 474 F.2d 1385, a case very similar to the case at bar. In Green, the defendant's apartment caught fire after which an arson investigator entered to determine the fire's cause. At that time, defendant's identity was unknown and the authorities entered the premises without his permission. After searching the entire apartment to determine if the fire might reoccur, the investigator returned to the kitchen to examine a box in which he though the fire might have started. In the course of his examination, he found several metal plates which were later determined to be counterfeit $20 Federal Reserve Note plates. The arson investigator then called a representative of the Secret Service who subsequently seized the plates for use in the defendant's prosecution for possession of counterfeit plates with the intent to counterfeit Federal Reserve obligations. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the evidence was seized without a warrant. The defendant in Green, as does the defendant herein, relied upon the cases of Camara and See. The Green Court, however, rejected...
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