People v. Patterson, 78-372

• Citation: 90 Ill.App.3d 775,46 Ill.Dec. 258,413 N.E.2d 1371
• Decision Date: 12 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 78-372,78-372
• Parties: , 46 Ill.Dec. 258 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chester PATTERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1371

413 N.E.2d 1371

90 Ill.App.3d 775, 46 Ill.Dec. 258

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Chester PATTERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-372.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Dec. 12, 1980.

Gary K. Morgan, 3rd year law student, Patrick J. Hughes, Jr., Springfield, Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.

Terry A. Mertel, John X. Breslin, State's Attys. Appellate Service Commission, Ottawa, Edward F. Petka, State's Atty., Joliet, for plaintiff-appellee.

BARRY, Justice:

The defendant Chester Patterson was charged by indictment in the Circuit Court of Will County with the offense of rape. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of rape and sentenced to a 15 year determinate prison term.

Defendant has presented 8 issues for review:

"1. Whether the defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

2. Whether in denying the defendant's requests for a directed verdict, the trial judge misapplied the law concerning the standard of proof in rape cases?

3. Whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by the trial judge improperly restricting the testimony of a defense witness who was present at the lineup where the complainant expressed doubt as to her ability to identify the defendant?

4. Whether the trial judge erred in denying the defendant's motion to strike the in-court identification because the identification was based upon suggestive police procedures and was unreliable?

5. Whether the trial judge erred in denying a mistrial motion after the prosecutor referred to the defendant as 'Chester the Molester' on a courthouse elevator in the presence of a juror in the case?

6. Whether the trial judge deprived the defendant of a fair trial by informing the jury that the case involved a 'black on white rape'?

7. Whether the court erred in failing to admonish the jury that the prior inconsistent statement of a hostile witness was to be used only in judging his credibility and not as substantive evidence?

8. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in sentencing the defendant, a youthful first offender with a good background, to a 15 year determinate sentence.

The defendant Patterson allegedly raped Susan Dome on January 3, 1978. The victim testified that she was abducted at gunpoint as she walked through the parking lot at Joliet East High School. She reported that she had arrived at the parking lot for her 11:15 a. m. class but did not recall seeing the security guard who was normally on duty. Walking through the parking lot she noticed a black male whom she did not know sitting in a car. As she walked by the car, which she later described as a red Ford Galaxy 500 XL, the black male spoke to her but she ignored his comment and continued to walk toward the school. Susan Dome then testified that this same person came up from behind her, grabbed her arm and turned her around. He had a pistol and ordered her to walk to his car. Her assailant was wearing a red and gold jacket with an Indian head emblem on one side and the letter "M" on the other.

The complainant testified that when they reached the car the assailant pushed her in on the driver's side. The complainant was made to sit on a console between the front bucket seats of the car.

The car left the parking lot and after a drive of about ten minutes arrived at a location on Rowell Avenue in Will County. The complainant was told to remove her clothes and lie down so that she was facing toward the front of the car with her head resting on the back seat. The assailant then drove around for thirty or forty minutes.

Ms. Dome's testimony indicated that the assailant kept the handgun between his legs during the entire time he was driving. She also stated that he drove with one hand most of the time.

The complainant said she was familiar with the area and could tell where she was even though she was lying down. The car eventually stopped at approximately the same location where she had earlier been told to disrobe. At this point the complainant was allegedly raped. She testified that she offered no resistance. She stated that she did not think that the assailant ejaculated during the act of intercourse which she estimated to last between five and fifteen minutes.

After the intercourse the complainant put her clothes back on. The assailant then drove her back to the high school and let her out of the car. On the way back he told her that he was not from the area, but that he had a friend who was and he would find out if she told on him. She arrived back at the school between 12:12 and 12:30 p. m.

Susan Dome testified that after leaving the car she went to the high school dean's office and asked to use the phone. She did not tell the dean what happened even though he asked her if anything was wrong. She called her mother who then came to the school. The principal was informed and the police notified. Susan Dome was then taken to a hospital for an examination.

During the entire incident Ms. Dome testified that she did not scream or resist her attacker.

Defendant was arrested wearing a jacket and a jumpsuit matching the description provided by the complainant. An automobile similar to the one she described was also impounded from the owner who lived across the street from the defendant. The defendant allegedly admitted to police that he had been in the area of the school parking lot on the day of the rape.

The victim identified the defendant's jacket as similar to the one worn by her attacker. At the trial, Patterson in addition to denying committing the crime, denied admitting his presence in the school parking lot on the day in question. Defendant stated that he did not attend school that day and among the other things he did he helped his neighbor work on the impounded car. Patterson testified that on the day of the alleged rape the car in question had no power steering and bad brakes. He did admit, however, to driving the car around the block that day.

The victim had been shown a photographic lineup with defendant's picture included three days after the rape and at that time she expressed some concern as to her ability to identify the defendant as her assailant but reported that defendant was the individual who most closely resembled her attacker. A week after the rape the victim viewed a live lineup and although again expressing some doubt identified the defendant as the one most closely resembling the rapist. At this time she indicated on a written form that the defendant "looked the closest." Despite some degree of pre-trial doubt, the victim positively identified the defendant at the trial as the rapist.

In addition to the defendant and the victim several other witnesses testified to significant facts regarding the various issues on appeal. Dr. Ladislaw Lukacisak, the emergency room physician who examined the victim, in summary testified that no medical evidence was present to support a claim of either rape or sexual intercourse, although he admitted on cross-examination that sexual intercourse could occur without trauma. Michael Podlecki, a forensic serologist and chemist, testified with regard to three negroid hairs found on the victim's sweater. He stated that the pubic hairs were dissimilar in color and characteristics from the comparison standards taken from defendant Patterson. Found in the impounded vehicle was a gasoline can similar to the one described by the victim. Police Officer Louis Silich, an evidence technician, testified that he examined the impounded car for latent fingerprints and found no prints at all. The record also reflects that the impounded vehicle was driven into the police garage and was consequently drivable despite the contrary testimony of defendant indicating otherwise.

Defendant's initial argument is that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As a reviewing court we are charged with the duty to carefully examine the evidence in rape cases, and if the evidence does not remove all reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt and create an abiding conviction that he is guilty of the crime charged, we must reverse. (People v. Faulisi (1962), 25 Ill.2d 457, 185 N.E.2d 211).

Defendant's theory of insufficient evidence of his guilt is many-facetted. He first claims that the complainant's identification of him was not clear and convincing. The uncorroborated testimony of the victim in a rape case must be clear and convincing to support a conviction. (See People v. Sweeney (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 858, 5 Ill.Dec. 205, 361 N.E.2d 344, and People v. Jones (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 850, 353 N.E.2d 375). The testimony of the victim in the case at bar was clear and convincing. She had an excellent opportunity to view the defendant close at hand for sufficient time to identify him. The details of the rape brought forth during the trial,-the defendant's clothing, the car, the gas can in the back seat, the course of their journey into the countryside, and the time at which they left and returned certainly corroborate her version of the incident. Similar testimony which was also not doubtful or uncertain was held to be sufficient to sustain a rape conviction in People v. Turner (1968), 91 Ill.App.3d 436, 235 N.E.2d 317. The defendant contends that the evidence otherwise does not corroborate the victim's testimony resulting in it becoming unclear and unconvincing. (People v. White (1962), 26 Ill.2d 199, 186 N.E.2d 351). We disagree. The evidence in the record sufficiently lends credence to the complainant's testimony which was detailed, certain, and free from doubt.

As to the defendant being the man who raped her, the adequacy of the victim's identification of the defendant is properly a question for the jury and we will not upset the jury's determination of that factual issue unless the evidence as a whole is so unsatisfactory as to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. (People v. Jones (1976), 40 Ill.App.3d 850...