People v. Paynter

• Decision Date: 16 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97SA409,97SA409
• Citation: People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68 (Colo. 1998)
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 1188 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shawn Adrian PAYNTER, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 68

955 P.2d 68

98 CJ C.A.R. 1188

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shawn Adrian PAYNTER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97SA409.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

March 16, 1998.

David J. Thomas, District Attorney, First Judicial District, Donna Skinner Reed, Chief Appellate District Attorney, Golden, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Kristi L. Sanders, Deputy State Public Defender, Golden, for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice SCOTT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The People bring this interlocutory appeal to challenge a suppression order entered by the Jefferson County District Court (trial court). The order suppressed marijuana found during a search conducted as part of the county jail booking procedure. The trial court ruled that the marijuana was discovered as a direct result of an invalid investigatory stop that occurred the instant the police officer asked the defendant for his identification. However, that per se rule fashioned and applied by the trial court is erroneous. "[A] request for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). Similarly, it does not convert a consensual encounter into an investigatory stop. Because it relied upon a per se rule and, hence failed to apply the correct standard, we reverse the trial court's ruling and vacate its order.

I.

On April 2, 1997, at approximately 11:55 p.m., while on evening patrol of his district, Officer Greg Guzman of the Arvada Police Department observed a car parked on the northwest corner of 58th Avenue and Vance Street in Arvada. He observed that the lights of the vehicle were off and that there were two occupants inside. The vehicle was parked on a public street near a private residence, approximately two blocks from the nearest commercial establishment that was still open for business. The vehicle was not illegally parked.

Officer Guzman parked his marked patrol car behind the vehicle. He turned on his side spotlight to provide some illumination, but did not activate his siren or any other lights. He walked up to the driver's side of the parked car and contacted Ms. Alm, who was seated in the driver's seat. Defendant, Shawn Adrian Paynter, was seated in the front passenger seat. Officer Guzman inquired as to what they were doing, and Alm responded that they were just talking. Neither Alm nor Paynter appeared to be in need of any type of assistance.

Officer Guzman then "asked" for identification, and both Alm and Paynter complied. Noticing from their identification that neither Alm nor Paynter lived in the area, the officer told Alm and Paynter that he would "be back in a minute." He returned to his patrol car with the identification cards for the purpose of conducting a computer check on the names of the driver and the defendant. Within a minute, the Arvada Police dispatcher informed Officer Guzman that a threats complaint was on record naming Paynter as the suspect. Shortly thereafter, Officer Guzman was advised that Paynter had an outstanding felony warrant for his arrest. Following the usual procedure to effect an arrest, Officer Guzman called for backup and when the cover car arrived, Paynter was arrested. Approximately five minutes elapsed between the officer's initial contact with Paynter and Paynter's arrest. ¹ Following Paynter's arrest, Officer Guzman conducted a pat-down search of Paynter. During the search, he discovered Zigzag cigarette rolling papers, commonly used for marijuana. The officer then asked Paynter if he had any marijuana on him and Paynter stated he did not.

Thereafter, Officer Guzman transported Paynter to the Jefferson County Jail. At the jail, Deputy William Underhill had Paynter face a wall and directed him to read the contraband warning sign. Deputy Underhill asked Paynter if he had on his person any of the contraband items referred to in the warning sign and Paynter answered "no." Paynter was also asked if he had anything the arresting officer may have missed, and Paynter answered "no." This questioning was part of the booking procedure. While still dressed, Paynter was searched. Deputy Underhill then escorted Paynter to the shower area for a strip search. During the strip search, Paynter was found to be hiding a cigarette packet containing marijuana.

Paynter was charged with introducing contraband in the first degree in violation of section 18-8-203(1)(a), 6 C.R.S. (1997). Paynter pleaded not guilty before the Jefferson County District Court (trial court) and filed a motion to suppress the marijuana found in the cigarette packet. At the suppression hearing, Paynter argued that because Officer Guzman had no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer's request for identification violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, Paynter contended that the marijuana seized from him during the strip search should be suppressed because the seizure was a direct result of the illegal stop. The trial court agreed, concluding that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to support Officer Guzman's request for defendant's identification, and that had it not been for this request, Paynter would not have been arrested. Therefore, concluding the request constituted a seizure, the trial court granted Paynter's motion to suppress the marijuana.

The People subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal, ² disputing the trial court's finding that the request for identification amounted to a seizure. We agree with the People and hold that a request for identification, without more, does not convert a consensual encounter into a seizure which requires Fourth Amendment protection. We therefore vacate the trial court's suppression order and return this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II.

A.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the people shall "be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. "The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between police and citizens, but is designed 'to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference with the privacy and personal security of individuals.' " Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215, 104 S.Ct. at 1762 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)). Thus, only when a police officer's encounter with a citizen impermissibly intrudes upon the citizen's personal security or privacy are the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution implicated. See generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3 (3d ed.1996). Some encounters between the police and citizens do not trigger Fourth Amendment protections: "[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has held that law enforcement officers do not implicate the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The fact that an officer identifies himself as a police officer, without more, does not convert an encounter into a constitutionally protected seizure. See id. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave if he does not comply, one cannot say that questioning results in a seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 104 S.Ct. at 1762.

Our precedent has followed and is consistent with Supreme Court decisions. We have recognized three general categories of police-citizen encounters: (1) arrests, (2) investigatory stops, and (3) consensual interviews. See People v. Morales, 935 P.2d 936, 939 (Colo.1997). The first two encounters, an arrest and an investigatory stop, are seizures and implicate constitutional protections. Therefore, such encounters must be justified by probable cause and reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, respectively. See People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 676 (Colo.1996). The third encounter, a consensual interview, is not a seizure and, accordingly, does not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. During a consensual interview, a police officer seeks the voluntary cooperation of an individual by asking non-coercive questions. See People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Colo.1992). A citizen is free to leave at any time during such an encounter or to ignore the police officer's questions. See id.; see also People v. Cascio, 932 P.2d 1381, 1384-85 (Colo.1997) (consensual encounter with occupants of parked vehicle); People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 843 (Colo.1994) (consensual encounter at an airport); Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1177 (investigatory stop of moving vehicle followed by consensual encounter).

B.

In order to distinguish between a consensual encounter and a seizure, a trial court must take into account all of the circumstances surrounding the incident and determine whether a citizen reasonably believes he or she is free to leave. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) ("The test provides that the police can be said to have seized an individual 'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' ") (citations omitted). See generally LaFave, supra, § 9.3(a). As we stated in Thomas, "[t]he test...