People v. Peals, Docket No. 128376.
| Decision Date | 31 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | COA No. 2.,Docket No. 128376. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darryl PEALS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training
and Appeals, and Jon P. Wojtala, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, for the people.
Robert Tomak, Canton, for the defendant.
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether the weapon at issue in this case constituted a "firearm" as defined in MCL 750.222(d), and thus whether defendant was properly convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f(1); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. We hold that the text of the statutory definition indicates that a weapon is a firearm if it is the type of weapon that was designed or intended to propel a dangerous projectile by an explosive, gas, or air. The definition describes the category of weapons that constitute a "firearm," but it does not prescribe a requirement that the weapon be "operable" or "reasonably or readily repairable." In other words, the design and construction of the weapon, rather than its state of operability, are relevant in determining whether it is a "firearm."
It is not disputed that the weapon in this case is the type of weapon that propels dangerous projectiles. It thus qualifies as a firearm under the statutory definition. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm defendant's convictions of felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm.
A jury found defendant guilty of felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm. Testimony at trial explored the condition of the gun found in defendant's possession. Defendant testified that he found the gun lying in two pieces in the grass and that he picked up the pieces and put them in his pocket. Upon examining them later, he saw that there was damage and thought that the gun was inoperable.
The police officer who examined the gun when it was received into evidence testified that "the weapon did not function as it was mechanically designed to function." It was missing the firing-pin assembly, part of the slide (and the part that remained was cracked), the magazine, and some springs. He further acknowledged that without the firing-pin assembly, "you cannot fire a bullet through that weapon."
When asked whether, despite the broken slide, a round could be fired from the gun if the missing springs as well as the firing pin were replaced, the officer responded:
To the best of my knowledge the way this slide sits right now with the broken piece I don't even know that it would properly chamber around [sic]. The fact of the tension of the springs if it had all of the springs would probably not allow this slide to close completely anyway to actually fire it. If it had the proper stop but this portion here of the slide was broken you'd get one round off. But with the function of the weapon and the slide going to the rear and nothing to stop it that slide is going to come off ....
On further examination, the officer testified,
Without objection, the trial court provided the following instruction to the jury regarding the operability of the gun:
A handgun need not be currently operable in order to qualify as a firearm for purposes of the offenses of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm at the time of the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
When the jury requested further clarification of what constitutes a firearm, the court stated:
A firearm includes any weapon from which a dangerous weapon [sic] can be shot or propelled by the use of explosive gas or air. A handgun need not be currently operable in order to be qualified as a firearm for the purposes of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a firearm at the time of a commission or attempted commission of a felony.
Defendant did not object to this instruction.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's convictions.1
This case requires us to interpret the definition of "firearm" contained in MCL 750.222(d). We review de novo questions of statutory construction. People v. Perkins, 473 Mich. 626, 630, 703 N.W.2d 448 (2005).
Initially, we note that both offenses of which defendant stands convicted, felon in possession of a firearm and felony-firearm, require proof that the defendant possessed a "firearm." The Legislature has defined that term in MCL 750.222(d):
"Firearm" means a weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled by an explosive, or by gas or air. Firearm does not include a smooth bore rifle or handgun designed and manufactured exclusively for propelling by a spring, or by gas or air, BB's not exceeding .177 caliber. [Emphasis added.]
On appeal, the sole challenge to defendant's convictions is that the weapon found in his possession was in such a state of disrepair that it could not constitute a "firearm" as defined in MCL 750.222(d).
It is readily apparent that the key question in construing MCL 750.222(d) is the meaning of the word "may" in the phrase, "a dangerous projectile may be propelled ...." Where, as here, a statute does not contain internal definitions of terms used in it, we give terms their ordinary meaning. Title Office, Inc. v. Van Buren Co. Treasurer, 469 Mich. 516, 522, 676 N.W.2d 207 (2004). In such instances, it is often helpful to consult dictionary definitions. Id. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) lists a number of definitions for "may" as an auxiliary verb:
1. (used to express possibility) ... 2. (used to express opportunity or permission) ... 3. (used to express contingency, esp. in clauses indicating condition, concession, purpose, result, etc.) ... 4. (used to express wish or prayer) ... 5. (used to express ability or power.) ....
Reviewing these definitions in the context of the statute, it seems that the third and fourth definitions are more compatible with the understanding that a weapon is a firearm if it was designed or intended to propel a dangerous projectile. The words "purpose," "wish," and "prayer" connote intention, aim, or planning. In other words, these definitions are consonant with the idea that a weapon is a firearm if that was the intent or design of its creator.
The first, second, and fifth definitions, meanwhile, seem more compatible with the understanding that a weapon is a firearm if it possesses the ability to propel a dangerous projectile. The words "opportunity," "possibility," "ability," and "power" connote capability or capacity. In other words, these definitions are consonant with the idea that a weapon is a firearm if it has the ability or power to fire a projectile.
Because both of these meanings are plausible given the use of "may" in the statute, we are required to make a determination as to which meaning is most representative of the Legislature's intent. As will be discussed below, we conclude that the offenses of which defendant was convicted do not require proof that the firearm was "operable" or "reasonably or readily operable." Rather, the statute requires only that the weapon be of a type that is designed or intended to propel a dangerous projectile.2
We reach this conclusion on the basis of several considerations. Initially, to the extent that the "may" clause serves as a restrictive clause, narrowing the class of "weapons" that are included within MCL 750.222(d), as we understand it to do,3 we believe it is more reasonable to view this clause as differentiating between weapons generally and a specific subclass of weapons, rather than as differentiating between weapons generally and a specific subclass of weapons and also between weapons that are operable and weapons that are not.
Moreover, a definition of "may" that is focused on operability would produce results that we believe are unlikely to have been within the contemplation of the Legislature in defining "firearm." Consider by way of illustration, a length of narrow metal pipe that could be considered a weapon, given its potential for bludgeoning. Were "may" not to encompass some design component, it is conceivable that even a simple pipe could constitute a "firearm," something that is difficult to reconcile with the fact that it is a "firearm" that is the object of the "may" clause.
Next, the "operability" definition of "may" would enable a felon to possibly avoid prosecution by the simple expedients of separating his firearm into separate parts, hiding a critical part of the firearm, or discarding the firearm immediately after being seen possessing it so that its level of operability could not be determined. Given the manifest purpose of the instant statute as reflected in its text, this would impede firearms prosecutions for reasons that seem altogether arbitrary and irrational.
It is also noteworthy that in several instances, the Legislature has defined "dangerous weapon" to include a "loaded or unloaded firearm, whether operable or inoperable." See, e.g., MCL 750.110a(1)(b)(i); MCL 600.606(2)(b)(i); MCL 766.14(4)(b)(i) (emphasis added). While these statutes do not fall within the "firearms" chapter of the Michigan Penal Code, they are instructive on the Legislature's understanding of what constitutes a "firearm." If, as the dissent posits, "firearm" included an operability requirement, defining "dangerous weapon" to include a firearm ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Hill
...only feigned the use of a weapon. See People v. Taylor, 245 Mich.App. 293, 297-303, 628 N.W.2d 55 (2001); compare People v. Peals, 476 Mich. 636, 640-656, 720 N.W.2d 196 (2006). III. DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that a new trial is required becaus......
-
Davis v. City of Detroit Fin. Review Team
...56.Id., quoting MCL 15.262(a). 57.MCL 15.262(a); see also Herald Co., 463 Mich. at 129, 614 N.W.2d 873. 58. See MCL 141.1512(3). 59.MCL 8.3a. 60.People v. Peals, 476 Mich. 636, 641, 720 N.W.2d 196 (2006); Title Office, Inc. v. Van Buren Co. Treasurer, 469 Mich. 516, 522, 676 N.W.2d 207 (200......
-
People v. Osantowski
...or fuses, the prosecution need not prove that a firearm is operable to convict a defendant of felony-firearm. People v. Peals, 476 Mich. 636, 650, 720 N.W.2d 196 (2006). In accordance with Peals, because the incomplete pipe bombs were designed and constructed as weapons from which a dangero......
-
Petersen v. Magna Corp.
...(2007); Bukowski v. Detroit, 478 Mich. 268, 732 N.W.2d 75 (2007); Karaczewski, supra; Fluor, supra; Rowland, supra; People v. Peals, 476 Mich. 636, 720 N.W.2d 196 (2006); Paige, supra; Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 476 Mich. 55, 718 N.W.2d 784 (2006); Ford Motor Co. v. Woodhaven, 475 Mic......